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Abstract 
This thesis focused on investigating how the current commercialization landscape and, 
specifically, the regulatory landscape, affects the market entry of biosimilars. A biosimilar is a post-
patent biologic medicinal product that delivers similar clinical outcomes to a reference originator 
biologic product that is currently marketed. Previous work has indicated that market entry of 
biosimilars has been slower than initially expected.  
 
Thus, it remains an open question whether advantages accrue to the 1st mover biosimilar 
during the commercialization process, relative to the 2nd or 3rd or subsequent movers. These 
advantages could potentially accrue as a result from time gains made at any stage of the 
commercialization pathway. If the time efficiency is not sustained along the commercialization 
process, then a biosimilar that is first to apply for regulatory approval process might not necessarily 
be the first to enter a market and hence will not be able to capitalize its market position as the first 
mover. First mover disadvantages may deter companies from risking the development of biosimilars. 
The thesis investigates the duration of the pre-market regulatory phase for biosimilar drugs and the 
trends between first and subsequent generations of biosimilars in the current commercialization 
environment. 
 
To investigate the trends in duration of regulatory approval of first and subsequent 
generations of biosimilars and identify whether there is an advantage or disadvantage to the first 
biosimilar applicant in terms of duration of the regulatory approval process, this study first identified 
the key regulatory milestones to define a measure for the duration of the regulatory approval process. 
Secondly, a quantitative method was utilized to assess first mover advantage or first mover 
disadvantage for the early generations of biosimilar applicants during the regulatory approval phase.  
  
The  data analysis demonstrated that there are no first mover advantages within the 
regulatory approval phase for biosimilars in Europe and the United States of America. Furthermore, 
a first mover disadvantage was evident for first generation of biosimilar applicants in Europe. It was 
also discovered that the duration of regulatory approval phase decreased with each subsequent 
3 
 
generation of biosimilars in Europe. In comparison, the duration of the regulatory approval phase 
remained fairly consistent for the different generations of biosimilars in the U.S.   
 
In the latter stage, this thesis explored the reasons behind the findings of the study, with a 
particular focus on the presence of first mover disadvantage during the regulatory approval phase of 
biosimilar commercialization in the EU. The thesis also explored three potential policy interventions 
to improve market entry of biosimilars; providing incentives to early generations of biosimilar 
applicants, reimbursement, and promoting uptake. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Introduction of a new product to a market is associated with risks and uncertainties. From the 
viewpoint of the industrial firm, the actions leading to new product development and market entry 
include a long-term investment decision. This incorporates several stages of capital investment, 
research, development and commercialization. Companies often offset the risks of bringing new 
products to market, by factoring in the advantages of entering the market early. By entering the 
market early, these companies aim to capitalize on their investment and earn above average profits. 
This is evident in the case of the pharmaceutical industry. 
 
The benefits associated with entering the market first are widely known as first mover 
advantages. Often, first mover advantage is analyzed in the literature in terms of post-market 
performance indicators such as market share and price. First mover advantages include the 
enjoyment of market monopoly through gaining intellectual property (IP) rights or market exclusivity 
periods, increased brand awareness or becoming the consumers’ preference or standard in a 
product category. Furthermore, first movers can increase market entry barriers to later market 
entrants in a multitude of ways such as limiting the access to suppliers and raw materials, preempting 
assets, monopolizing distribution channels and by engendering brand loyalty. 
 
1.1. An investigation of the duration of the pre-market regulatory phase for biosimilar 
drugs: trends between first and subsequent generations of biosimilars 
Commercialization is the process by which a new service or product is introduced to the 
market.  Commercialization, as a strategy often requires companies to anticipate market entry 
barriers and to develop plans to mitigate these challenges and to ensure successful market entry.  
Companies undertaking commercialization of products also focus on the identification of micro-
economic and macroeconomic factors that might affect the commercialization process.  
 
The pharmaceutical industry is highly regulated; pharmaceuticals undergo a unique 
commercialization process before market entry (refer to Figure 1-1). This process requires significant 
resources to prove to regulatory authorities that a product is effective and safe, via multi-step clinical 
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development and regulatory approval. This requires significant resources in multiple domains such 
as capital investment, technical know-how and regulatory expertise.  The rate of passage of  a 
pharmaceutical product through this multi-step process will determine the time taken to reach market 
entry.  
 
Figure 1-1: Summary of the commercialization pathway for pharmaceuticals  
 
The United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA), the regulatory body for drug 
approvals in the United States of America (U.S.), estimates that, on average, only 250 drug 
compounds out of 5000 to 10,000 potential drug compounds in opportunity verification phase reach 
the stage of pre-clinical development1. Of the 250 drug compounds that reach pre-clinical 
development, only one compound will receive FDA approval; that is a success rate of 0.01% to 
0.02%1. For these reasons a commercialization landscape that allows a new pharmaceutical product 
to retain and capitalize its market entry position is a sensitive and vital determinant in encouraging 
firms to take on the challenge of bringing new products to market. Absence or loss of the ability to 
retain and capitalize market entry position in the pathway to commercialization may deter companies 
from taking the risk of pharmaceuticals development. 
 
The thesis reports the results of an investigation into whether there is first mover advantage 
or disadvantage for first mover biosimilars relative to subsequent generations of biosimilars, during 
the regulatory approval phase. It will also report any trends discovered in the regulatory time periods 
for these generations of biosimilars. 
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1.2. What are Biopharmaceuticals?  
Biopharmaceuticals, also known as biologics, are medicinal drugs synthesized using living 
organisms including microorganisms and plants. Biopharmaceuticals were first introduced to the 
market in 1982, following the discovery and development of recombinant DNA technology. This 
technology made it viable for commercial large-scale production of biologic drugs2. The first 
biopharmaceutical approved for therapeutic usage was Humulin, a human insulin product developed 
by Genentech Inc. and manufactured by Eli Lily and Company3. Since then, biologics have had a 
profound impact on a variety of disciplines of medicine, especially in areas such as oncology, 
rheumatology and neurology. The continuous increase in demand for biologic drugs and the 
widespread acceptance of biologics as a therapeutic option are attributable to the number of unmet 
clinical needs for which biologic drugs provides a potential treatment option for and expanded 
innovative treatment choices for specialty diseases. Prior to the discovery of biologic drugs, such 
patients did not have any treatment options, or the treatment options available were inadequate4. 
The clinical benefits, including factors such as safety, effectiveness and immunogenicity, of 
biopharmaceuticals have also made them a care option in many indications5. Due to these 
advantages, and the rise in prevalence of diseases such as cancer and diabetes5 the demand for 
biologic drugs continues to increase. 
 
However, these advanced, targeted biologic therapies are expensive; on average biologics 
cost 20 times more per dose than simpler chemical drugs. Moreover, biopharmaceutical prices 
continue to rise at 10 to 15 percent per annum6,7. . At present, biologics account for 20% of global 
pharmaceutical spending. Spending on biologic drugs was expected to reach US$ 21 billion by the 
end of 20178. Biologic drugs also account for a large component of federal or government healthcare 
spending on prescription drugs across the developed world. In 2014, the United States (U.S.) 
government spent US$ 21.5 billion on Medicare Part B payments for “drugs administered in doctor’s 
setting and other outpatient settings”9, of which 53% (US$ 11.5 billion) was spent on the top 15 of 
the total 40 products10. Of these top 15 products, 11 were biologics, with each of the biologics in the 
top 6 contributing to over US$ 1 billion in Medicare Part B spending10. 
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Biologic drugs are expected to constitute an expanding share of the entire pharmaceuticals 
market11. This is largely attributable to the increasing percentage of the aged population especially 
in the developed world, and a concomitant increase in the demand for targeted therapies11. Although 
the potential market size is increasing, the biopharmaceutical industry is at a critical juncture. The 
industry has experienced a “patent cliff”, with many of the first in class, originator biologics 
(originators) that were brought to market in the last decade of the 20th century, are coming off patent 
protection. In 2015 alone, 32 biopharmaceuticals with combined sales of US$ 51 billion lost patent 
protection12. This has opened the biopharmaceutical market for potential competition from follow-on 
or “imitator” products. With a growing demand and rising prices, the current biopharmaceutical 
market appears to exhibit ideal characteristics for the emergence of a post-patent products industry. 
The open question is whether that potential for competition will be realized. 
 
Biosimilars and  biobetters are the key products of the post-patent biopharmaceutical industry 
and both variants of originator biopharmaceuticals (Refer to Figure 1-2). Biobetters are new 
molecular entities that are related to existing biologics by target or action, but they are deliberately 
altered to improve disposition, safety, efficacy, or manufacturing attributes via changes in the 
molecular structure  such as recombinant fusions, antibody drug-conjugates, PEGylation, antibody 
engineering and affinity maturation13. Whilst biosimilars are required to  have the same clinical 
outcome as the reference originator biopharmaceuticals, due to structural modifications biobetters 
provide a  clinical outcome different to that of reference originator such as increased half-life, reduced 
immunogenicity, reduced toxicity or improved pharmacodynamic effects13,14. Unlike  biosimilars, 
biobetters are not approved via abbreviated regulatory approval pathways, however, at present 
biobetters are eligible for patent protection and market exclusivity periods equivalent to that of 
originator biopharmaceuticals. 
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Figure 1-2: Overview of different post-patent pharmaceutical industries 
 
1.3. Biosimilars 
Biosimilars are a second (or subsequent) generation of follow-on products that imitate 
originator biologic drugs. As such they are often likened with generic drugs, which are second (or 
subsequent) generation products imitating the originator small molecule chemical drugs. Although, 
biosimilars and generics are comparable in many aspects (they are both follow-on products to a 
successful reference product) a key distinction lies in the definition. Generics drugs are required to 
have the same Active Pharmaceutical Ingredient (API) as their reference originator product and as 
a result the API in the generics has to possess the same chemical structure as the reference15. In 
contrast, biosimilars are similar but not necessarily chemically identical products16. Many regulatory 
authorities, including European Medicines Agency (EMA) and the FDA base biosimilar definitions on 
equivalence in clinical outcome rather than having the same molecular structure (refer to Table 1-1). 
The reasoning why biosimilars are not defined based on their structure lies in the inherent inability 
to have uniform APIs in products manufactured using living systems2. 
 
As biosimilars are produced using living cells, formulation, testing, trials and manufacturing 
are much more complex than traditional small molecule drugs. As a result, the commercialization 
process is significantly longer and more costly for biosimilars in compared to the process for 
generics17. 
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Biosimilar Definition 
FDA “A biosimilar is a biological product that is highly similar to a US-licensed reference 
biological product notwithstanding minor differences in clinically inactive components, and 
for which there are no clinically meaningful differences between the biological product and 
the reference product in terms of the safety, purity, and potency of the product”18 
EMA “A similar biological or 'biosimilar' medicine is a biological medicine that is similar to 
another biological medicine that has already been authorized for use. Biological medicines 
are medicines that are made by or derived from a biological source, such as a bacterium 
or yeast. They can consist of relatively small molecules such as human insulin or 
erythropoietin, or complex molecules such as monoclonal antibodies”19 
Table 1-1: Comparison of biosimilar definitions by the EMA and FDA 
 
1.3.1. Potential for Biosimilars 
The biosimilar market is largely driven by the urgency to capture growing healthcare markets 
and the potential to provide much needed cost savings to patients4. In the years after global financial 
crisis in 2008 there has been a systemic effort by national governments in developed countries to 
reduce healthcare expenditure, however the emergence of expensive biologics has created 
significant economic pressures on national healthcare budgets4.  
 
The number of biosimilars entering the market will be dependent on potential market size, 
development cost and the barriers faced during the drug development pathway20,21. The numbers of 
biosimilar market entrants will affect competition and the price of biosimilars22,23. It is expected that 
greater competition among biosimilars will lead to decrease in price and increase in cost savings to 
payers 22,23. In the case of the generics industry, price of generics has been observed to decrease 
with the increase in number of market entrants 20,21,24. A report by the FDA that considered retail 
prices of generics and their corresponding brand name originators showed that emergence of a 
second generic reduces the average retail price of generics to nearly 50% of the originator brand 
name price 25.  The same report found that the average retail prices of generics continue to decrease 
as competition increases, leading to greater cost savings to the payers 25.  
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Initial market predictions of the biosimilar market size were in the range of US$ 24 billion in 
sales in 2014 and $30 billion in sales by 202026. However, most of these figures have subsequently 
been revised by the industry and it is clear that there is a reduced momentum of product release into 
highly regulated markets in Europe and the U.S.26. Roche, one of the leading biopharmaceutical 
companies, in an announcement stressed the importance of constant evaluation and revision of 
market entry timing of competitor biosimilars targeting Roche’s originator biologics. Roche initially 
anticipated that by year 2016, there would be competition from biosimilars to their originator 
biologics. Roche has  since revised this position and now expects competition from biosimilars by 
year 202027. Hence, despite the anticipated market potential for biosimilars, regulatory approval and 
subsequent market entry of biosimilars in the European Union (EU) and the U.S. has been slower 
than what was initially anticipated28. 
 
The countries in the EU leads the biosimilars market in terms of revenue, making up 80% of 
global purchases of biosimilars by 2012 21. Within the EU, Germany accounted for the largest 
percentage of biosimilar sales, with 34% of the overall European sales21. France accounted for the 
second largest percentage of sales, with 17% share of the European market21. The U.S. is expected 
to become the largest market for biosimilars in terms of revenue 29. To date, sales of most 
biopharmaceuticals are markedly higher in the U.S. in comparison to the rest of the world, this is 
likely due to combination of higher volumes and price. Furthermore, the biologics market in the U.S. 
continues to show high growth rates. For example from years 2012 to 2013 the biopharmaceutical 
market in the U.S. grew by 18.2% from US$ 53.8 billion to US$ 63.6 billion 30.  
 
  When there is large market potential and anticipated demand, lack of market entry of a 
product has been attributed to the complex challenges associated with the commercialization 
process 24,31-33. However, this is not the first time the post-patent pharmaceutical industry in 
developed pharmaceutical markets has shown slow market growth, despite the market needs. 
Before the enactment of Hatch-Waxman Act in 1984, the small molecular generics industry in the 
U.S. was facing long development timelines and high barriers to market entry 34. The Hatch-Waxman 
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Act (1984) created an abbreviated, streamlined and less costly approval process by for generic drugs 
in the U.S,  drastically reducing the development costs, so that in recent years the generic drug 
industry has shown some of the fastest growth rates seen in the pharmaceutical sector35. Previous 
studies have shown that first mover generics have benefitted from first mover advantage35-37. First 
mover generics have been sold at a higher price35-37 and gained higher market share than later 
entrants35-37. Furthermore, first to market generics also benefit from brand loyalty, both from end 
product consumers as well as from channel managers such as hospitals and pharmacy chains36-38 
 
1.4. Chapter Conclusion 
From patient and public policy standpoints, biosimilars could offer significant cost savings.  
Biosimilars have shown slower than anticipated market entry and traction in developed 
pharmaceutical markets, specifically in the EU and the U.S. There are also differences in these two 
markets with much greater ground being gained in the EU32. This study investigates the duration of 
the regulatory approval phase for biosimilars and the trends in the duration of the regulatory process 
of first and subsequent generations of biosimilars. This investigation is conducted with the aim of 
identifying whether there is an advantage or disadvantage to first movers during the regulatory 
phase.  
 
The thesis is divided into five chapters (refer to Figure 1-4). The first chapter  introduces the 
topic (Introduction). The second chapter reviews the literature and introduces schools of thought on 
first mover advantage. This chapter also examines literature on the biosimilar industry and orientates 
the research question (Chapter 2: Literature Review). The third chapter details research 
methodology with the relevant contextual issues (Chapter 3: Research Methods) and data collection 
(Chapter 3: Research Methods). The last section of the thesis discusses the findings (Chapter 4: 
Findings) and the contributions (Chapter 5: Discussion) of this research. Chapter 5 also provides 
suggestions on directions for further research possibilities based on the findings of this thesis. 
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Chapter 1 
 
Chapter 2 
 
Chapter 3 
 
Chapters 4 & 5 
Figure 1-4: Overview of the thesis 
 
Chapter 2, the literature review, considers the current body of literature on first mover 
advantage and disadvantage, and some of the unique challenges faced by the biosimilar industry. 
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1. Introduction 
The findings from this thesis will contribute to the theory of first mover advantage by analyzing 
the first mover biosimilar during a crucial stage of the commercialization process. Secondly, the 
thesis will add to the current body of first mover literature, by investigating the presence or absence 
of first mover advantage or disadvantage during the regulatory approval phase of a biosimilar 
product, prior to market entry. The advantage or disadvantage will be measured relative to 
subsequent generations of biosimilar, or relative to the originator product. The findings could 
potentially be extended to other complex pharmaceutical products. This study aims to bring clarity 
to the understanding of the segmentation of first mover advantage in the biopharmaceutical industry.  
Lastly, it will identify whether there is a first mover advantage or disadvantage for biosimilars at the 
regulatory stage of commercialization in the two key markets, the EU and the U.S. and discuss 
potential policy or regulatory interventions based on the findings. 
 
The current chapter builds on Chapter 1, specifically exploring the concepts of: 
• first mover,  
• first mover advantages and disadvantages, 
• defining the first mover in pharmaceutical markets,  
• first mover advantages in post-patent pharmaceutical markets, and 
• biosimilar commercialization challenges. 
Figure 2-1 summarizes Chapter 2. 
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Figure 2-1: Chapter 2 summary 
2.2. First Mover  
The timing of market entry of a new product is one of the most important decisions a firm has 
to cope with39. Optimal timing for market entry is dependent on market dynamics, managerial 
decision-making, and organizational resources and capabilities40. Resources can be used to describe 
a firm’s stock of intangible and tangible assets. Resources can be quantified or valued and traded 
when necessary41. Capabilities of an organization consist of a firm’s ability to deploy resources 
utilizing organizational procedures and processes to reach a desired target, and the abilities of a 
company to manage its resources 41,42. Pioneering is found to be a preferred strategy for firms who 
possess relatively higher skills in new product development. In contrast, firms with relative strengths 
Introduction (Chapter 1)
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2.3. First Mover Advantage
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2.8. Research Question
2.9. Chapter Conclusion
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in manufacturing and marketing prefer to enter after the pioneers, once the initial technological and 
market uncertainties are settled42.  
 
One of the fundamental debates in first mover literature is related to the broad and varied 
definitions associated with the term “first mover”. Typically, the first mover is widely understood as 
the first market entrant43, 44,45. Many of the widely used definitions for first mover are broadly based 
on the order of product development or market entry (Refer to Appendix 2-1). Importance of being 
the first mover is linked to whether there are any advantages associated with being first. First mover 
related literature first developed in the late 1950s with the studies carried out by Bain in 1956 related 
to market entry barriers46. The concept of first mover advantage was further developed by multiple 
studies carried out in the late 1980s42-44.  
 
2.2.1. Defining the First Mover in the Pharmaceutical Industry 
In the literature, definition of the first mover often entails the following questions. Firstly, if a 
firm accesses an established market, but capitalizes on some technological discontinuity or appeals 
to a novel demand segment, should this firm be considered as first movers?  What extent of 
discontinuity or segment novelty is sufficient for a firm to be considered a pioneer?42 These questions 
are especially important when defining a first mover in the pharmaceutical industry.  
 
From an industry vantage point, originator pharmaceutical products would be considered as 
the first mover and post-patent pharmaceutical products would be considered as the late entrants. 
However, due to the lengthy exclusivity periods enjoyed by originators, market entry conditions and 
market dynamics for the originators are significantly different from the post-patent pharmaceutical 
products. These differences are further enhanced due to the presence of unique regulatory approval 
pathways for post-patent pharmaceutical markets. For example in the United States, the originator 
biologics are approved via the 351(a) pathway, whereas the biosimilar drugs are approved via 351(k) 
pathway (refer to Table 2-1)47.. 
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Type of Drug Act Type of Application Approval 
Pathway 
Requirement for clinical data 
Originator 
Biologic 
Public Health 
Service Act  
Biologic License 
Application (BLA) 
351 (a) Yes 
Biosimilar 351 (k) abbreviated 
Biologics License 
Application (aBLA) – 
created by the Patient 
Protection and 
Affordable Care Act 
(Year 2010) 
351 (k) Yes, requiring assessment of 
immunogenicity & pharmacokinetics 
(PK) or pharmacodynamics (PD) 
sufficient to demonstrate safety, 
purity & potency to an approved 
reference product 
Originator 
small 
molecule 
chemical drug 
Food, Drug 
and Cosmetic 
Act (FD&C Act)  
New Drug Application 
(NDA) 
505(b)1 Yes 
Generic Abbreviated New Drug 
Application (ANDA) – 
created by Hatch 
Waxman changes (Year 
1984) to FD&C Act (Year 
1938) 
505(b)2 Yes, require safety and effectiveness 
data. Certain studies do not need to 
be carried out by the sponsor 
Generic  505(j) No, approval based on 
bioequivalence 
Table 2-1: Summary of FDA approval pathways for branded, generic, originator biologic and 
biosimilar drugs 
 
In addition, post-patent pharmaceutical markets are unique as the first movers in a new post-
patent pharmaceutical market enter into a proven and established market where the reference 
product has enjoyed a significant time period of monopolistic market conditions particularly in 
developed countries. For example, a reference originator product in the U.S. enjoys an exclusivity 
period of 12.9 years on average because of intellectual property protection and marketing exclusivity 
provisions48. Furthermore, in post-patent pharmaceutical markets, the competing products are 
essentially undifferentiated to one another or to their reference originator product in terms of the 
target clinical outcome. Whilst the market need and acceptance for the product has already been 
proven by the reference originator, post-patent pharmaceutical product companies do not have much 
control of positioning their products as there can be no differences in safety, efficacy and quality in 
comparison to their predicate or competitors35. 
 
As such, in the literature post-patent pharmaceutical product and originator pharmaceutical 
product markets are differentiated, and the first mover in a post-patent pharmaceutical market is 
considered to be the first imitator product to enter the market after the market exclusivity expiration 
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of the originator32,35,36,49. As such the post-patent pharmaceutical industry is an interesting and 
unique context within which to study first mover advantages. 
 
2.3. First Mover Advantages  
Most researchers have approached first mover advantage (FMA) from either an economic-
analytical viewpoint or consumer behavior based analysis35. The key question with respect to first 
mover theory is whether there are any advantages or disadvantages of being the first mover. FMA 
can be defined as an organization’s ability to earn more economic profits than its competitors as a 
result of being the first to market in a novel product category50. FMA is considered to occur 
endogenously through a multi-stage process, in the early stages  asymmetry is created, allowing 
one firm to gain an edge over other competing firms42. This head start may be related to the foresight 
of the firm’s decision makers, unique resources or luck. This asymmetry created allows one of the 
competing firms to exploit its position. FMA can arise from a variety of reasons; the following sections 
will investigate sources of FMA. 
 
2.3.1. Consumer Based Advantages  
Consumer based advantage is associated with benefits that can be obtained by being the 
consumers’ first choice when repurchasing a particular product51. The first mover influences how 
customers evaluate the characteristics in the product category and often the first mover may become 
the standard for that particular product category52. Studies have shown that when customers 
successfully use the pioneering brand in a new product category, they will choose it over later 
entrants. Consumers have been shown to develop stable preferences for pioneering products over 
time if they know for certain that the pioneering products meet their requirements51,53. Therefore, a 
first mover can develop a strong customer base early and as a result increase the product switching 
costs for late movers53. 
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2.3.2. Pre-emption of Scarce Assets  
Another avenue in which first mover firms may be able to gain advantage is by pre-empting 
rivals from acquiring scarce assets such as raw materials, space and investment 42. Gilbert and 
Newbury were the first to come up with a pre-emptive model in 1982, which analyzed how firms with 
an early start in research and development can exploit this lead and exclude rivals54. Pre-emption of 
natural resources and raw materials by first movers is a common occurrence since the beginning of 
trade; an early empirical study into Canadian nickel industry looks into pioneer advantages in 
controlling high-grade nickel deposits in a single locality, which made it possible for the first movers 
in that locality to secure rights to almost the entire supply, enabling them to dominate global 
production for several decades55. 
 
First movers can prevent competition via strategic pre-emption of space, including 
geographic and product characteristic space42. In most markets there is only space for one or limited 
number of firms to be profitable. Pioneers can pick and choose the most attractive segments or 
niches (such as preferred geographies or product characteristics), and at the same time take 
strategic decisions to reduce or limit the amount of space available for later entrants. The targeting 
by Wal-Mart of small southern townships in United States provides an example of the deterrence 
competition through pre-emption of spatial assets. Competitors of Wal-Mart initially found these 
contiguous geographic locations unprofitable to service. However, Wal-Mart was able to maintain 
high profits and sustain its position for many years by combining spatial pre-emption at the retail 
level together with a highly effective distribution network 56.  
 
Another method by which  first mover advantage is established is by deterrence of 
competitors from entry via pre-emption of investment in plant and equipment57. Through continuous 
investment, first mover can expand and maintain higher outputs after entry and as a result, the first 
mover is in a position to threaten price discounts and in turn make late entrants unprofitable58. Pre-
emption by investment in plant and equipment also bring focus onto the role and effect of economies 
of scale on first mover advantage. First mover advantages are often enhanced in circumstances 
when economies of scale are large42. 
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2.3.3. Technological Leadership 
Two ways, identified in literature, in which technological leadership can result in FMA are, 
firstly, advantages gained from experience or learning curve, where expenditure falls with aggregate 
product output and, secondly, success in intellectual property races 50.  
 
2.3.4. Experience/Learning Curve based Advantages  
Advantages obtained from the ‘experience’ or ‘learning’ curve, where expenditure decreases 
with cumulative output, is a mechanism through which pioneers can gain advantage through 
sustainable technological leadership50. In a groundbreaking study in 1981, it was shown that the 
learning curve could create extensive barriers to entry if the learning can be kept proprietary59. 
Further, if a pioneering firm is able to keep the learning and experience proprietary, it results in a 
continuous cost advantage for the firm, which will help, in turn, to maintain its leadership in market 
share42. Some examples of early empirical proof for learning based first mover advantage include a 
study into European synthetic fiber industry, where late entrants to the market were unsuccessful in 
achieving low cost or any significant market share, leading many of them to exit the market60. Another 
early example of learning based advantages was evident from a case study of the Lincoln Electric 
Company, which indicated that Lincoln was able to maintain high profit for decades due to early 
market entry with strong and superior patented products, along with a managerial system that 
promoted continual cost decrement during a transformative technological phase61.   
 
2.3.4.1. Innovations and Intellectual Property  
Pioneers often gain a head start via sustained technological leadership. One of the ways to 
achieve sustained leadership and prevent potential competition, is through having a successful and 
strong intellectual property portfolio62. First movers can gain significantly, in circumstances where 
technological advantage is chiefly a function of research and development expenditure and if this 
technology can be kept proprietary by patenting and/or maintaining as trade secrets42. Often, first 
movers with an IP portfolio benefit from a temporary market monopoly, which helps them to 
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strengthen any FMA. This temporary market monopoly can be further lengthened with successful 
long-term intellectual property management. Further, strong IP can prevent and deter competition 
from imitators and make it difficult for late movers to be gain market share 40,63. It is also important 
to note that second movers and other later market entrants can own intellectual property and use IP 
to protect their innovations and market position. However, in a study that utilized the Profit Impact of 
Market Strategies (PIMS) database, it was found that the first mover firms benefitted significantly 
more (29 percent) from patents than late entrants (13 percent)64. 
 
Patents are a type of IP that perform an important function in protecting innovations65. If a 
new product or service is largely dependent on a patent protected component or asset of the firm, 
this firm would likely to dominate the market62. The Xerox Corporation and Polaroid Corporations are  
examples where companies managed to be the only players in the respective photocopier and 
instant camera markets as a result of owning strong patents63. However, in some industries patents 
do not provide a great degree of protection and often it is relatively easy to “invent around” the 
patents, or patents only provide a transitory value as the technology changes at a rapid pace42. 
Patent races play an especially important part in few industries; however, pharmaceutical and 
biopharmaceuticals are two such industries42,66. In a sample study of products from pharmaceutical, 
electrical and chemical industries, it was found that, on average, follow on companies can imitate 
the patented innovations for about 65 percent of the innovators cost of development67. However, it 
was found that cost of imitation in pharmaceutical industry tends to be relatively higher  in comparison 
to other industries investigated and this was attributed to the fact that most imitators have to go 
through an extensive regulatory approval process similar to the innovator67. This is even with national 
regulators often allowing for expedited or shortened regulatory approval process for imitator 
pharmaceutical products. 
 
Nevertheless, patenting is only one method of IP protection and accounts for only a fraction 
of the advantages enjoyed by first movers and innovations. Research and development need not be 
confined only to the product, process or hardware. Firms can also innovate and improve in 
managerial systems and organizational processes, which can be proprietary as well68.  Innovations 
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in organizational processes and managerial systems have been shown to be a more durable form 
of first mover advantage69. Many firms such as Campbell Soup, American Tobacco, Procter and 
Gamble still maintain dominant positions in their respective industries as their managerial 
innovations allowed them to exploit economies of scale in distribution and manufacturing, starting 
from the late nineteenth century40,70.  
 
2.4. Disadvantages to the First Mover and Late Mover Advantage 
Not all first movers are successful and sometimes being a late mover in an industry can be 
advantageous. Microsoft, for example has a history of being successful by being a late mover71. So, 
why is it that sometimes companies are better off to enter the market late?  
 
2.4.1. Free Rider Effects  
In the case of Microsoft, one of the company’s biggest breaks came when Bill Gates managed 
to sell an operating system for IBM’s personal computers. However, Microsoft was not the first to 
create a desktop operating system neither did they develop the operating system that was sold to 
IBM71. This example illustrates one of the main disadvantages associated with being a pioneer, 
known in literature as the “free rider effect”.  
 
The free rider effect can be defined as a circumstance where an organization or an individual 
is able to profit from the work of another without contributing to the expenses associated with such 
actions53. Late entrants have the potential to “free ride” on pioneering firms’ investment and progress 
in number of areas such as research & development, infrastructure development and buyer 
education42. For most products and in most industries cost of imitation is often lower than cost of 
innovation and often, a late entrant can acquire the same technology as the first mover, but at a 
lower cost42,72. Late movers can further free ride on training and development of human capital 
carried out by pioneers and gain access to more productive labor force in comparison to the first 
mover73. The ability and extent to which late entrants can free ride decrease the durability and 
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magnitude of the pioneers’ ability to maximize profits. As such, the greater the ease of obtaining free 
rider effects, the lower the incentive for firms to invest to become a market pioneer40. 
 
2.4.2. Inter-firm Diffusion of Technology from the First Mover 
Inter-firm diffusion of technology results in a decrease in first mover advantage 74. Diffusion 
of technology can occur via variety of ways, some of the common mechanisms include research 
publication, work force mobility, reverse engineering, informal communication and plant tours42. 
Study of a sample of companies in ten industries found that the competitors usually gain detailed 
information of both processes and product technology within a year of development75. In addition, 
further findings show that product technology leaks faster than process technology75. Organizational 
innovations such as innovations in management systems, often have slow inter-firm diffusion rates 
compared to process or product innovations69.  
 
2.4.3. Resolution of Market Uncertainties by the First Mover 
First movers have to take on the risk of dealing with market uncertainties such as whether 
the customers will like the product, or the pricing is accurate. Late entrants may gain by positioning 
at the “ideal point” in that specific market space, if the first mover had not done so in the first place. 
Such situations often arise when knowledge of such an “ideal point” comes into light only after the 
product is widely introduced to the market and when the costs of repositioning is too high for the 
pioneers52. In most new markets, uncertainties are resolved by the appearance of a dominant product 
and after appearance of such a product, competition will often move to price42. As the market 
matures, inability of the first mover to successfully adapt to changes in competition, demand and 
environment may hinder it from maintaining their dominant market position76. In addition, if the 
market pioneers are not able to adapt successfully as the market evolves, it may lead to pioneer 
burnout and they may not have long term success77. 
 
Being the first mover in a new market is risky and expensive but at the same time potentially 
very profitable and rewarding. On the other hand, because of the risks and challenges associated 
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with the pioneering, it can sometimes be advantageous to be a late entrant to a market. If first movers 
have advantages in costs, information, intellectual property, product line breadth, product quality and 
long-term market, they are likely to profit from first entry. However, if late entrants have the 
opportunity to overtake first movers with positioning, branding, and superior technology, firms could 
gain more by entering after the pioneers.  
 
Section 2.3. and 2.4. of this Chapter looked into first mover advantages and disadvantages 
recognized in literature and examples from other products and areas of the market. The next section 
of this chapter looks at how these can be applied to pharmaceutical industry, specifically to post-
patent pharmaceutical products such as biosimilars. 
 
2.5. First Mover Advantage in Post-Patent Pharmaceutical Industries 
Previously, first mover advantage in post-patent generics market is quantified by looking at 
market share, pricing and uptake of products based on their time of entry. Evidence of first mover 
advantage in generic drug market has been observed by the studies carried out by Caves et al 
(1991), Grabowski and Vernon (1992), Hollis (2002), Yu and Gupta (2014) and Ali et al (2015) and 
the following sections looks into key findings from these studies 35-37,78. 
 
2.5.1. Pricing and Market Share 
Pricing and market share are two widely used indices to analyze first mover advantage, and 
this applies to the generic market as well. Pricing and market share is not only important in the 
analysis of first mover advantage but is also a significant determinant in ensuring market competition, 
since if the generic companies can gain market share without significant price reductions, then there 
is little incentive for these companies to discount the drug prices36. 
 
A distinct feature observed in pharmaceutical markets is that even after loss of patent 
protection and market exclusivity, originators continue to maintain their prices and further, some of 
the originator drugs even increased their prices by a small percentage, with the entry of first to market 
generics35. Originators rely on their brand positioning to allow for this surge in prices. This increase 
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in prices is a strategy by originator companies to compensate for the loss in market share that they 
experience with the entrance of generics into the market49.  However, previous studies have also 
identified that originators have eventually drop their prices as the number of generics and competition 
increases37,79. This provides a window of an opportunity for the first generic to enter the market at 
higher price than the late entrants and maintain a higher selling price before the later generics enters 
the markets. Given that   on average the marginal cost of a small molecule generic drug is only 
around 5% of the retail price of an originator, higher selling price will certainly increase the profitability 
for the first mover generics80. Hence, this allows the first to market generic firms to ride on the 
success of the originator and enjoy a first mover advantage in terms of pricing and profitability. A 
FDA study shows that on average, the first to market generic enters the market at a 6% discount to 
the originator price and price reduction of 20% is achieved when there are 8 or more generics in the 
market 81.  
 
Another aspect to consider when looking at price variations is the market share obtained by 
the first to market generics in comparison to subsequent generic market entrants. A sample study of 
the generics market in the U.S. in 2014 indicated that the first to market generics and the originators 
each have equal percentage of  the available market share by around the 36th month after generic 
entry into the market35. Furthermore, this study also found that on average the originator and first to 
market generics each have  30% of market share by the 36th month after generic entry, subsequent 
second and third generic entrants lagged behind in market share with 12% and 8% respectively35. 
  
2.5.2. Retail Setting vs. Hospital Setting 
Prior first mover literature looking at generics has found that the pioneer advantage differs 
greatly between the retail and hospital markets35-37. First to market generics experience significantly 
higher share of the market in the retail setting in comparison to the hospital setting. An empirical 
study data shows that first to market generics enjoyed on average an 80 percent higher market share 
than the second to market generics and 225 percent higher market share in comparison to the third 
to market generics35.  
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Within the retail space the choice of generics is largely dependent on which of the generic 
drugs the pharmacies carry and the willingness of the patients to accept the generic version 
proposed by the pharmacist. Several studies have found that pharmacists choose to continue selling 
the first to market generic drug36,37. This preference is attributed to pharmacists finding it difficult to 
explain the bio-equivalence of generics to the patients, as some patients find it uncomfortable to 
switch from one brand to another35. Furthermore, although generic drugs are essentially equal 
products in terms of safety, clinical efficacy and outcome, the differences in shape, size, color and 
other such branding and packaging between different generic products of the same molecule may 
also influence patients’ preferences and overtime patients would develop preferences due to 
familiarity35. Retail pharmacies have shown preference to products that provide regular delivery on 
schedule and positive refund policies for redundant inventory82. If the first to market generic meets 
these expectations of the retailer, there is no incentive or necessity for them to switch to a late entrant 
generic. 
 
In contrast, in a hospital in-patient environment, patients often receive multiple examinations 
and treatments and prescription drugs are usually not the most expensive component and as a 
result, patients are less likely to aware of which generic drugs are being given as part of their 
treatment. Furthermore, most hospital based systems bill the insurance companies a fixed fee based 
on the patients' illness36. Hence, it is expected that hospitals to be much more interested in reducing 
costs and thus more sensitive to price discounts offered by generics35. Furthermore, hospital 
pharmacies usually obtain their stocks via drug wholesalers, who in turn liaise with the manufacturers 
for special pricing structures. As such hospitals have less influence in determining the choice of 
generic product as well as negotiating the prices. These factors have shown to weaken any FMA of 
first mover generics in the hospital space in comparison to the retail space 35..  
 
In a study carried out in Netherlands, Norway, Portugal and Slovakia comparing list prices 
versus actual hospital prices of 12 medicines in 25 hospitals, it was found that the discounts and 
rebates granted for medicines decreases when there are no therapeutic alternatives (generics) 
available83. This study also demonstrated that hospitals have limited ability to negotiate prices in the 
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absence of therapeutic alternatives such as generics83. Whilst, this study did not explore the 
extent of discounts or rebates when there are more than 1 generic in the market, it was 
found that high rebates and discounts tend to present for pharmaceutical products which 
are likely to continue in primary care once a patient is discharged83. This strategy by 
pharmaceutical companies to provide high rebates for hospitals for products that are 
continued during primary care, likely sourced directly by patients in retail settings, can be to 
ensure patients’ preference for a particular brand of product early on. As studies have shown 
that patients develop preferences due to familiarity35. 
 
As such the difference between retail and hospital market segments can be related to FMA 
that occurs in retail space may be related to consumer behavior, as well as the degree to which 
consumer preferences are taken into consideration by retail pharmacy chains. As explained by 
customer-based pioneer advantages (refer to section 2.3.1), consumers may continue to purchase 
the product that they are familiar with, thus providing the first to market generic a substantial 
advantage in the retail space.  
 
It should be noted that in the U.S., the approach to pharmaceutical pricing differs to most 
industrialized countries, in that it leaves pricing to the market to a much greater extent. In 
comparison, in other industrialized countries such as Germany, Australia and Canada public health 
insurance system will determine a maximum allowable price for both originator and post-patent 
pharmaceutical products84-86. Additionally, these countries also use a range of price control 
mechanisms such as reference-based pricing, in which all therapeutically equivalent products with 
a drug class would be reimbursed only at the same base price.  
 
2.5.3. Summary – FMA in Post-Patent Pharmaceutical Markets 
In summary, FMA for generics post-commercialization in terms of pricing and market share 
is well established. Furthermore, literature indicates that FMA for generics sold in a retail setting is 
much greater than in a hospital setting.  With limited biosimilar products in the market current, there 
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is a dearth of literature on first mover advantages focusing on the post-patent biopharmaceutical 
industry. However, prior experience in other post-patent pharmaceutical markets especially that of 
the generics provides insight into what might be expected for the biosimilar industry. By simply 
extrapolating the experience from generics market, it would be predicted that the first to market 
biosimilar would be likely to gain a degree of FMA in terms of pricing and market share.  Yet, it is 
important to consider that the commercialization processes for biosimilars bear distinct 
characteristics to that of the generics 24,31-33.  
 
2.6. Biosimilar Commercialization 
Initial predictions expected biosimilar industry to have a worth of US$10–25 billion by year 
20202. However, biosimilar market entry and acceptance has been slower than what was initially 
anticipated28. Development of biosimilars continues to require extensive resources 24,31-33. This has 
led to higher development costs and longer development times for biosimilars in comparison to the 
other post-patent pharmaceutical product – small molecular generics87. The average cost of 
development of biosimilars is in the range of US$ 100 million with a development time of three to 
five years20.  This length of time and cost of development is mainly due to the processes required to 
align with the regulatory requirements and more extensive clinical data required for biosimilars to 
gain regulatory approval20,21. Unlike the originator biologics industry, emerging pharmaceutical 
markets in Asia, Eastern Europe and South America are at the forefront of research, development 
and the bringing of biosimilars to the market88. Although, a significant number of companies is 
working on biosimilars, the number of available reference candidates are limited. This has led to 
multiple companies developing biosimilars for the same reference product.   
 
2.6.1. Biosimilar Commercialization Challenges  
Biosimilars are large, complex molecules and their pharmaceutical functions and resulting 
clinical outcomes are dependent on the 3-dimensional shape2. Due to their structural complexity and 
molecular weight, biosimilars encounter developmental and commercialization challenges, in 
particular with analytical characterization and process development (refer to Figure 2-2).  As a result, 
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for biosimilars, unlike generics, the non-clinical analytical results cannot be used as strong evidence 
to obtain the status of similarity to their comparator originators. Hence, unlike generics, biosimilars 
must be subjected to more extensive clinical studies to prove their similarity and obtain regulatory 
approval17. The need for extensive clinical trials results in a longer duration and a higher cost of 
development17. The process development of biosimilars is considered to be more technically 
challenging than generating an originator biologic as biosimilars have to meet constrict comparability 
requirements89,90. While progress in DNA recombinant technology and manufacturing know-how has 
refined the selection methods for cell lines, reduced bottlenecks in downstream processes, increased 
production output and reduced the costs of biopharmaceutical production, access to these 
technologies and the requisite technical knowledge is still limited to a few companies4,91-93.  
 
 
Figure 2-2: How the complexity of different pharmaceutical molecules affects process complexity 
and conclusiveness of analytical data28 
 
In addition to the technical complications associated with complex molecules, evolving 
regulatory processes, intellectual property issues, legal challenges initiated by originator 
biopharmaceutical to delay or prevent market entry, resistance from physicians and potential product 
pricing, and reimbursement issues have further hampered biosimilar development and 
commercialization process and increased the risk of investment in biosimilars11,26,28,33,94. This is 
clearly reflected by the differences in the cost and time involved in developing a biosimilar in 
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comparison to a generic drug. On average, development of a biosimilar costs is in the range of US$ 
100 million whereas development of a generic costs US$ 3-5 million17. The development period of 
biosimilars is in the range of 3 to 5 years, in comparison a small molecule generic usually takes 2 to 
3 years to develop17. In the following sections, some of the key challenges faced by biosimilar 
developers in bringing these products to the market, are discussed in detail. 
 
2.6.1.1. Challenges Faced by Biosimilars due to Molecular Complexities 
As biologics, biosimilars are significantly larger and have much more complex molecular 
structures than small molecular chemical drugs. These complex molecular structures are highly 
sensitive to changes in manufacturing processes. A small change in production process techniques 
can result in a structural change that may affect the safety and efficacy of the biosimilar 22. Biosimilar 
manufacturers do not have access to complete formulation and manufacturing process information 
of originator product. As a result, often biosimilar developers have to design and reverse engineer 
their own processes during the manufacturing95.  
 
2.6.1.2. Evolving Regulatory Process and Complexities Associated with Managing 
Different Regulatory Pathways 
Another challenge faced by the biosimilar developers is to navigate the uncertainties arising 
from the evolving regulatory frameworks. Both the FDA and the EMA has established number of 
biosimilar guidelines in the past few years including molecule specific approvals, manufacturing 
processes and controls, pre-clinical and clinical testing, and naming28. Yet, there are still number of 
biosimilar guidelines yet to be finalized and inconsistencies between the EMA and the FDA 
regulatory frameworks continue. Definitions and language used in guidance documents and 
regulations are examples of such differences between EMA and the FDA regulatory framework for 
biosimilars28. Industry experts have expressed concerns that such variations in terminology used by 
the EMA and FDA can lead to complications when determining discrepancies related to potential 
safety problems 22. 
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2.6.1.3. Challenges with Reference Product Selection  
Biosimilar guidelines that determine the selection of originator product that would be the 
reference biologic is a vital aspect within the current biosimilar regulatory approval process. A 
reference product is an approved originator biologic drug that is currently authorized to be marketed. 
Both the FDA and EMA require that the same reference biologic to be used throughout the entire 
developmental cycle for a particular biosimilar22. Both the EMA and the FDA may also permit the use 
of a reference biologic with foreign regulatory approval for providing in-vivo pre-clinical and clinical 
data to demonstrate biosimiliarity96,97. However, in such scenarios biosimilar developers are required 
to submit clinical and non-clinical data to scientifically substantiate and validate the biosimilarity of 
the foreign reference product to a U.S. or EU licensed product. In addition, the EMA requests that 
such foreign reference biologics are approved by a country that is a member of the International 
Conference on Harmonization (ICH)98. EMA states that this is to ensure the regulatory approval 
process for the foreign reference biologic is similar to the scientific standards of the EMA98. 
Furthermore, the FDA has suggested that, at present, it is improbable that biosimilars relying on 
clinical data compared to a foreign reference originator would be sufficient for the FDA to decide on 
interchangeability status of a biosimilar to a biologic approved by the FDA96. These provisions result 
in a complicated reference product selection process for biosimilars, which adds to development 
time and cost. 
 
2.6.1.4. Non-Clinical and Pre-Clinical Testing and Data Requirements 
The most obvious distinction between the EMA and the FDA with regards to non-clinical and 
pre-clinical testing requirements is in how the guidance documents have been established. The EMA 
has published guidance documents for the various product classes such as growth hormones, 
somatropins, and insulin22. The FDA does not have such individual guidance documents based on 
various product classes. Instead, the FDA applies general guidelines as applicable to each individual 
biosimilar application22. The FDA holds number of in-depth development meetings with the biosimilar 
developers to facilitate this process99. 
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Both the EMA and the FDA require substantial in-vitro data comparing biosimilar to the 
reference originator100. The EMA has expressed that in comparison to in-vivo animal studies, in-vitro 
assays are often more sensitive and specific to establish comparability between biosimilar and the 
reference originator. As such, EMA does not necessitate in-vivo pre-clinical data and animal studies, 
and maintains a risk-based approach to determining the need for such testing101. In contrast, the 
FDA requires data from in-vivo and animal studies as part of the biosimilar application, unless 
otherwise the FDA decides these studies are not necessary89. Both the EMA and the FDA do not 
require developmental, carcinogenicity and non-clinical safety pharmacology toxicity studies if there 
is sufficient evidence from structural and functional characterization indicating similarity to the 
reference originator22.Hence, biosimilar developers are tasked with identifying the appropriate 
amount of pre-clinical and non-clinical data that is required the different regulatory approval 
pathways. 
 
2.6.1.5. Clinical Studies Requirements 
Similar to pre-clinical data requirements, the key difference between the EMA and the FDA 
in regard to clinical data guidelines for biosimilars is how the guidance documents are structured and 
utilized22. The EMA uses guidance documents developed for different product classes of biosimilars 
whereas the FDA uses a general guidance document22. The EMA and the FDA emphasis the 
requirements for clinical data for biosimilars in both pre-regulatory approval and post-market 
surveillance conditions. Both the EMA and the FDA have the same opinion that unlike with generics, 
non-clinical data of biosimilars is insufficient to predict the immunogenicity, hence requiring clinical 
data to predict the immunogenicity of biosimilars102. Both regulatory frameworks require comparative 
human pharmacodynamics (PD), pharmacokinetics (PK), immunogenicity evaluation via clinical 
studies, and in some cases comparative data. Therefore, whilst the EMA and the FDA have both 
indicated possibility for smaller clinical development programs for biosimilars with clinical trials with 
reduced study size, biosimilars still require extensive clinical data 28,89. 
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2.6.1.6. Issues with Interchangeability  
Interchangeability designations enables substitution to an interchangeable (often post-
patent) product by the pharmacy without the intervention of the prescriber/physician87. In the U.S., 
small molecular generics receive interchangeability status with FDA approval.  In contrast, 
biosimilars need further clinical data to gain interchangeability status. Biosimilars are yet to receive 
the interchangeability status in the U.S. The EU does not have harmonized guidelines on biosimilar 
interchangeability, instead the interchangeability status is determined by the regulatory frame-work 
in each member country103.Due to the need for additional clinical data, biosimilars even with 
regulatory approval and cost benefits to the payer, cannot be interchanged without the 
interchangeability status. This adds number of commercialization challenges to biosimilars such as 
selection of reference product, need for clinical studies, navigating state specific regulatory 
frameworks, and prescriber and patient education.  
 
2.6.1.7. Manufacturing Challenges 
Manufacturing of biosimilars and biologics in general, requires specialized processes such 
as cell culture and purification, which are often proprietary to the originator companies4. Even minor 
differences can alter the 3-dimensional structure, which  can, in turn,  lead to adverse consequences 
for patient health104. Often, biosimilar developers have to comprehensively characterize multiple 
batches of the reference biologic, then plan and actualize a production process that manufactures a 
similar biologic, usually without the detailed know-how of the production process used for 
manufacturing the originator biologic105.  
 
The complex production process and nature of biologics makes identical replication of the 
originator drug virtually unachievable as a result can lead to many manufacturing challenges for 
biosimilars that are not present during generic drug manufacturing. Primary amino acid sequence of 
a biosimilar protein drug is identical to that of the reference product. However, post-translational 
modifications such as phosphorylation, deamidation or glycosylation often affect the product that can 
lead to changes in impurity, safety and efficacy profiles in comparison to reference product16. In 
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addition, the utilization of novel expression techniques may introduce new risks like atypical 
glycosylation patterns, changed impurity profiles and host cell proteins106. 
 
A proposed formulation for a biosimilar drug has to be tested to ensure that it meets the 
necessary regulatory guidelines with respect to stability, potency and compatibility with diluents, 
excipients and packaging materials107.  Further, potential impact on efficacy and safety must  
be clearly justified if a chosen formulation, closure system, container or material in contact with 
biosimilar during the production process varies from that of the reference product. Thus, quality and 
purity of all biosimilars must be monitored continuously and carefully during the entire manufacturing 
process to ensure biological activity, immunogenicity and safety profiles are what is expected. Minor 
differences to existing production lines can result in extensive delays. Because of these challenges 
only a limited number of companies have the necessary capital funding required to attain such 
manufacturing expertise, knowledge and current Good Manufacturing Practice (cGMP) facilities 
necessary to manufacture108. 
 
2.6.1.8. Intellectual Property Challenges 
As detailed in Section 2.6.1.2., the regulatory structure for the biosimilars continues to evolve. 
Similarly, the legal framework for biosimilar industry is being established. As such there is still room 
for varying interpretations of regulatory and legal requirements by the different stakeholders resulting 
in uncertainty 87.  The “patent dance” procedure in the U.S. for new biosimilars, provides an excellent 
example to demonstrate the complications arising for such varying interpretations. 
 
With regards to potential IP infringements related to biosimilar developments, the BPCIA 
provisions that once aBLA has been submitted to the FDA by a biosimilar sponsor, the sponsors for 
the reference originator and the biosimilar must exchange information with respect to patents that 
are regarded to be potentially infringed. The sponsors must recognize which of these patents the 
originator would be prepared to license to the biosimilar sponsor. This process of information 
disclosure and negotiation around the originator patents is commonly known as the “patent dance”, 
has already led to debate and litigation with in the biopharmaceutical industry28. Sandoz, the first 
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biosimilar sponsor to obtain FDA approval for its biosimilar Zarxio, was sued by the originator 
sponsor Amgen in relation to provisions around the patent dance 109. Amgen alleged that by refusing 
to disclose the aBLA and manufacturing information related to Zarxio to Amgen, Sandoz did not 
follow the rules set by the BPCIA in regard to information disclosure by the biosimilar sponsor 109. 
The District Court’s decision was in favour of Sandoz, that the BPCIA does not require Sandoz to 
disclose information related to Zarxio’s aBLA as well as manufacturing information to the originator 
company. Amgen appealed this decision, the U.S. Federal Court decided to partly uphold the 
decision by the District Court, stating that a biosimilar developer is not absolutely required to engage 
in the “patent dance” 28,109,110.  Furthermore, biosimilar applications to the FDA require assurance by 
the biosimilar company that there are no intellectual property infringements of relevant patents of the 
reference originator biologic. As such it is important for biosimilar applicants to consider that if it was 
decided not to share their applications, they are potentially risking an immediate declaratory 
judgement action by the originator to claim patent infringements. 
 
Similar patent disputes can be seen in Europe as well. Celltrion’s Remicade biosimilar for 
infliximab was the first biosimilar monoclonal antibody approved in Europe in September 2013 for 
reference originator Remsima (refer to Figure 2-3). However, the reference originator company 
Janssen Biotech received a paediatric extension for Remsima until 24th February 2015 in twelve of 
the leading European markets111. As a result of this extension, the effective patent life for Remicade 
was extended for all approved indications, both paediatric and adult. This delayed the market entry 
of Celltrion’s Remicade until 2015111. 
 
In addition, originator biopharmaceuticals usually have number of subsidiary patents or 
double patenting to ensure extensive intellectual property protection. An example of such subsidiary 
patents is patents protecting manufacturing process28. An example of allegations of “double 
patenting” by a biosimilar company was seen in the US court case Celltrion Healthcare Co. Ltd. et 
al. vs Janssen Biotech, Inc., case number 1:14-cv-11613-MLW, requesting a declaratory judgement 
that Janssen’s prevailing patents were unenforceable and invalid28,112. According to Celltrion, 
Janssen’s previous owner, Centacor Biotech, had applied for patents, all of which protected the 
49 
 
same invention of cA2 and its applications, “or obvious variations of that purported invention” 113. 
Thus, in this case, Celltrion  alleged that  Janssen “double patented” and purposely delayed the entry 
of Remsima 113. There is a very strong tradition in the pharmaceutical market of 'evergreening' 
strategies to extend patent protection and these subsidiary and double patents often are a part of 
such strategies. Biosimilar companies have to spend resources to understand the scope and the 
strength of the intellectual property related to the reference originator as well as estimate the best 
time for to file regulatory applications and market entry20. Patent disputes have become increasingly 
common for biosimilar products, further increasing the cost and time taken for product 
commercialization 20,87,114. 
 
2.6.2. Summary - Biosimilar Commercialization Challenges in the U.S. and the EU  
The review of literature on the biosimilar industry in the U.S. and EU has shown that biosimilar 
commercialization is fraught with challenges. Whilst, some of these challenges are common to both 
originator biologics and biosimilars, other challenges are unique to biosimilars. For the originator 
biopharmaceutical and generic first mover applicants, market exclusivity provisions in regulatory 
frameworks have allowed them to create a market monopoly to ensure that they can recoup their 
initial investment and incentivizes the risks associates being first. Examples of such regulatory 
provisions include a 12-year period of market exclusivity for originator biopharmaceuticals in the 
U.S.115, an 8-year period of data-exclusivity in Europe for originator biopharmaceuticals followed by 
a 2-year market-exclusivity period116, provided they meet certain requirements according to the EU 
guidelines117. In comparison for biosimilars, these developmental challenges will potentially reduce 
the extent of price savings provided by biosimilars. Since biosimilars do not provide any additional 
therapeutic benefits over the reference biologic, price of biosimilars is expected to be a key incentive 
to switch from the known reference originator biologic to the biosimilar product17. Hence 
developmental challenges that reduce the ability of biosimilar products to provide sufficient price 
discounts can affect the degree of market uptake and commercial success of these products17. 
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The next section discusses the primary research question of the thesis, formulated based on 
the literature review. 
 
2.7. Research Setting: Biosimilar Industry in the EU and the U.S. 
The thesis aims to answer the research question in relation to biosimilar products 
commercialized in the EU and the U.S. Biosimilars are biopharmaceutical drugs designed to have 
the same clinical outcome as previously licensed reference originator biologics (refer to Table 1-1 
for U.S. FDA and EMA definitions of biosimilars). This focus stems from the realization that literature 
applicable to understanding FMA within the biosimilar industry is still in its nascent stages and 
biosimilars are facing a complex commercialization environment filled with special 
challenges31,32,118,119. Some of these challenges include complications arising due to the complex 
nature of the molecules (detailed in section 2.6.1.1.), the evolving nature of the regulatory framework 
(detailed in section 2.6.1.2.), the need to manage different regulatory pathways in different 
jurisdictions (detailed in section 2.6.1.2.), difficulties associated with reference product selection 
(detailed in section 2.6.1.3.), the need to resolve complex challenges in manufacturing such as 
maintenance of batch-to-batch consistency (detailed in section 2.6.1.4.), the navigation of complex 
pre-clinical and clinical development (detailed in section 2.6.1.5. and section 2.6.1.6.) and intellectual 
property challenges (detailed in section 2.6.1.8.). Furthermore,  post-commercialization challenges  
exist with respect to naming, labeling and interchangeability of biosimilars28. It is thus imperative that 
not only the biosimilar commercialization process become better understood, but also that potential 
policy interventions be identified to stimulate the growth of this industry. The literature review also 
revealed that although originator and post-patent pharmaceutical products share the same product 
characteristics, the originator and post-patent pharmaceutical regulatory approval pathways differ 
considerably.  Moreover, the steps preceding market entry, and the changes in the market size and 
product pricing could be reasonably expected to be different for originators and post-patent 
pharmaceuticals.  
 
To provide background to this research, the following subsections present a brief overview 
of the regulatory approval process for biosimilars in the U.S. and the EU as well as the roles of the 
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two different regulatory bodies, the FDA and the EMA. Both the EMA and the FDA will only approve 
a biosimilar once the market exclusivity periods allocated to the reference originator via regulatory 
provisions have been expired. New product approval process for the biosimilar industry is a highly 
regulated process. Any new biosimilar product must go through a stringent and government 
mandated clinical development program prior to gaining regulatory approval for market launch. In 
the EU, the EMA is the appointed government body responsible for granting approval for new 
biosimilar products for market entry. In the U.S., the FDA is the government body responsible for 
assessing whether a biosimilar product meets the necessary requirements to obtain regulatory 
approval.  
 
Any firm that is intending to sell biosimilars in the EU or the U.S. must comply with the EMA 
or FDA regulations, which includes clinical development and comprehensive regulatory approval 
process. Furthermore, as leading regulatory agencies for pharmaceutical products, regulatory 
frameworks developed by these two agencies are often mirrored by other regulatory bodies across 
the world. 
 
 The EU was the first of the locations to develop a regulatory framework specific for 
biosimilars. The EU directive 2003/63/EC published on the 25th of June 2003, created a regulatory 
approval pathway for biosimilars and the first biosimilar was approved in the EU in 2006. According 
to this legislation, biosimilar products applying for regulatory approval in the EU can refer and use 
the originators’ clinical data. Whilst the regulatory approval process is harmonized across all the EU 
countries, the interchangeability status of approved biosimilars is dependent on the legislation and 
regulatory framework of individual member states32. 
 
In the United States, biosimilar legislation for biosimilars is governed by the Biologics Price 
Competition and Innovation Act of 2009 (BPCIA). Formally established under Title VII of the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act in March 201016, the BPCIA creates an abbreviated and 
dedicated approval pathway known as the 351(k) pathway120 in the U.S. for biopharmaceuticals that 
are highly similar to, or potentially interchangeable with, a FDA approved reference, originator 
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biologic. Figure 2-3 depicts the history of biosimilar guidelines in the U.S. by the FDA and the EU by 
the EMA. 
 
Figure 2-3: Comparison between the U.S. and EU biosimilar regulatory milestones28 
 
The two timelines represent the history of establishing biosimilar guidelines by the FDA (orange 
arrows and boxes) and the EMA (blue arrows and boxes) and key biosimilar regulatory milestones 
in the U.S. and the EU. 
 
 
The 351(k) pathway (in the U.S.A.) permits companies developing biosimilars to use and 
extrapolate clinical data from originator biologics to show clinical safety and efficacy. Furthermore, 
the BPCIA provides that the first biosimilar to obtain interchangeability status with its reference 
product is eligible for a 12-month market exclusivity period115. This exclusivity period is designed to 
recover the substantial research and development expenditure that the first mover biosimilar 
developers incur during biopharmaceutical development and to encourage further innovation and 
investment into drug development.  The provisions provided by the BPCIA are summarized in table 
2-2. 
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Key Elements BPCIA 
Abbreviated approval 
pathway for follow-on 
imitators 
Yes, via 351(k) pathway for biosimilars 
Ability to use 
originators' clinical data 
Yes – extrapolation of reference drug’s clinical data 
Interchangeability Yes – requires demonstration that the biosimilar can be expected 
to produce same clinical result as the reference product 
Exclusivity period for 
biosimilar products 
Yes – 1-year period of market exclusivity for the first biosimilar to 
obtain interchangeability status with its reference product.  
Market exclusivity for 
originators 
Yes, 4-year period of data exclusivity upon FDA approval. During 
this time a 351(k) application for a biosimilar cannot be submitted 
to the FDA 
 
12-year market exclusivity to originator biologic upon FDA 
approval. FDA can accept a biosimilar 351(k) application during this 
time, however FDA approval can only be granted after this market 
exclusivity period has elapsed.  
 
Market exclusivity and data exclusivity periods run concurrently. 
 
Exclusivity is independent of any available patent protection. 
Table 2-2: Summary of incentives provided the BPCIA Act (2009) 
 
A new biosimilar product will gain regulatory approval based on clinical data showing 
sufficient similarity to the reference originator biologic. Clinical development is carried out in phases 
of I, II and III. Phase I, II and III clinical trials are a series of experiments aimed at testing the safety, 
toxicity and efficacy of a new medicinal product in a sample population of humans prior to regulatory 
approval and subsequent wider usage by public. Phase I clinical trials are conducted in small number 
of human subjects, often 20-30 healthy volunteers to aimed at testing the pharmacologic and 
metabolic effects of the product being tested. Phase II clinical trials develop on phase I trials, 
increasing number of participants up to about 200. Often phase II clinical trials are conducted on 
patients with the treated condition, aimed at evaluating the effectiveness of the product being tested 
against its target as well as understanding any side effects and risks. Phase III clinical trials expand 
on phase I and II trials, to further evaluate the safety, risks and side effects of the product being 
evaluated. Phase III trials can enroll large number of patients up to several thousands. Clinical 
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development is often long and costly. Clinical trial data and performance has a definite impact on 
the regulatory approval.  
 
The biosimilar commercialization process can be broadly categorized into a few sequential 
processes namely (1) research and development, (2) pre-clinical development (3) clinical 
development (4) regulatory approval and, culminating in (5) market launch. Information about the 
first two stages is often not disclosed by most organizations to the public domain. As such it is difficult 
to analyze and measure the performance of products in these two stages. Phases 3 to 5 account for 
the bulk of time and expenditure spent on commercializing biosimilars33,114,121. Furthermore, clinical 
development and regulatory approval are considered the riskiest phases in the commercialization 
process of new pharmaceutical products, with only about 10 percent success rate122,123. This thesis 
will focus on phase 4 – regulatory approval phase of the commercialization process. Furthermore, 
given that one of the research objectives is to identify potential policy and regulatory interventions 
that can accelerate the growth of the biosimilar industry, this thesis concentrates on phase 4 of the 
commercialization process. 
 
2.8.      Research Question 
Often, the first biosimilar entrant of a product category would go through a challenging 
development process whilst accounting for the uncertainties in the regulatory approval process. If, 
during the commercialization process of biosimilars the first biosimilar to apply for regulatory 
approval process is likely to lose its FMA due to time delays, then the incentive for a company to 
invest and go through the risky development process is reduced. As such for the biosimilar market 
to show an increased number of market entrants, it is vital that the first biosimilar to apply for 
regulatory approval retains its time advantage till market entry to reap the benefits of being the first 
to market.  
 
With lack of patent protection and regulatory provisions for exclusivity periods, biosimilars at 
present rely on market performance to recoup their investment. Hence, if the FMA is lost, because 
of delays during the regulatory process, it will weaken the incentives for a biosimilar developer to 
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overcome the market entry barriers and navigate the challenging development process. This can 
result in a lack of competition in the biosimilar market, as it will reduce the number of products aiming 
for market entry. Lack of competition will reduce the anticipated systemic cost savings that 
biosimilars can potentially provide to payers. Within this context, the research question of this thesis 
is to find out whether first mover biosimilars have an advantage during the regulatory approval phase 
in the EU and the U.S. and how this may have an impact on market entry. The answers to the 
research question will lead to a discussion into potential policy and regulatory interventions that may 
be necessary to assist the biosimilar industry. 
 
2.9. Chapter Conclusion 
First mover has been defined in several different ways in the literature (refer to the table). 
Most of these definitions are based on either being the first organization (or individual) to invent the 
product or the first organization to introduce a new product and/or new market or a combination of 
these. Being the first mover in a new market is risky and expensive but at the same time potentially 
profitable and rewarding53. If first movers have advantages in costs, information, intellectual property, 
product line breadth, product quality and long-term market share, companies may profit from first 
entry 53,64. However, if late entrants can overtake first movers with positioning, branding, and/or 
superior technology firms could gain more by entering after the pioneers40.   
 
In literature, FMA is often measured and analyzed after market entry in terms of market 
uptake, positioning and price structures. However, pharmaceutical products go through a unique 
commercialization process where the market entry of products is often dependent on the clinical 
development and regulatory approval process.  Whilst, FMA in biosimilar industry is not yet analyzed 
in the literature, previous studies into the generics industry show that post-patent pharmaceutical 
markets can enjoy FMA. 
 
However, due to their complex molecular nature biosimilars face a heightened degree of 
technical, manufacturing, and analytical challenges in comparison to generics. Other than the 
implications of the molecular complexity of biosimilars for both production processes and regulatory 
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compliance, biosimilar developers also face a multitude of other commercialization challenges such 
as labeling, naming and interchangeability, which are unique to them. Due to these challenges, 
biosimilar developers face number of market unique market entry barriers and have to navigate a 
complex commercialization process to bring a product to the market. For first mover biosimilars 
applicants, with lack of patent protection and market exclusivity, the length of the regulatory approval 
process  will be a critical determinant of (1) the timing of market entry, (2) whether they enter the 
market prior to later applicants, and (3) the length of time they are present in the market as the only 
available therapeutic alternative to an originator if they enter the market first. The findings of this 
research can hence promote a discussion into potential policy and regulatory interventions that may 
be necessary to promote market entry. The next chapter, Chapter 3, develops a research 
methodology to test whether there is first mover advantage during the regulatory approval phase for 
biosimilars commercialized in EU and the U.S. 
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CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH METHODS 
3.1. Introduction 
The present chapter describes the research methods that will be used to answer the research 
question presented in the previous chapter, namely: “is a first mover advantage observed during the 
regulatory approval phase for biosimilars commercialized in EU and the U.S.?” This chapter focuses 
on the decision-making processes, conceptual basis of the investigation and the methods of analysis 
utilized to answer the research question of the thesis. A quantitative approach was utilized to analyze 
data on biosimilars commercialized in the EU and the U.S.  
 
3.2. Research Design 
Figure 3-1 below provides schematic image of how the research question for this 
study is designed. The following section will discuss the various aspects of the research 
design. 
 
Figure 3-1: Overview of the research question 
3.2.1. Theory 
This research commenced by reviewing the current literature on the biosimilar industry as 
well as on first mover advantage (presented in Chapter 2). The primary reason for looking at the 
biosimilar industry is to gain an understanding of the current state and the issues currently identified 
by scholars.  The main goal for looking at the first mover literature was to trace its evolution as well 
as to build a theoretical framework for the current research. The literature review revealed that (i) 
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the biosimilar industry is facing unique challenges in comparison to other pharmaceutical and post-
patent pharmaceutical market, (ii) lack of a conceptual and theoretical framework to understand the 
first mover advantage in the post-patent pharmaceutical industry, (iii) lack of understanding of how 
the presence or absence of first mover advantage is affecting the biosimilar industry and (iv) the 
possible public policy interventions and changes. These considerations guided the research 
process, the design of the research question (refer to Chapter 2 section 2.9) and the research 
objectives (refer to section 3.1).  Hence, the literature review acted as a starting point for the current 
research, aided with the formulation of a research methodology and suggested what data needed to 
be collected and analyzed. 
 
3.2.2. Level of Analysis  
The main level of analysis for the present study is micro level (refer to Figure 3-2 and Figure 
3-3 below). 
 
 
Figure 3-2: Overview of different levels of analysis 
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Figure 3-3: Number of variants at each level of analysis for the present study 
 
3.2.3. Types of Data 
The current study is an observational study since data is collected without manipulation to the 
study environment. In general, there are two types of observational studies, longitudinal and cross 
sectional. Longitudinal studies collect data through time, whereas a cross sectional study will look 
data at a single point of time. A longitudinal study can distinguish and identify changes over time, 
which cross sectional studies cannot.  
 
For the current study, the data is required to be longitudinal. This is because the research 
question requires analysis of date related to biosimilars that are introduced at different times. The 
data will be sourced from biosimilar products that have received regulatory approval in the EU or in 
the U.S., on or before 31st July 2018. This is to ensure that the all the steps with in the regulatory 
approval phase for biosimilars are being captured. The primary benefit of a longitudinal study is its 
ability to measure and to study change124. Another advantage of longitudinal studies is the ability to 
identify the degree of variation in the dependent variable across time for one product124. 
 
For a longitudinal study, data can be collected via two main methods; historical data (batch 
data) or real-time data. Given that this study is only focused at looking products that have been 
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commercialized, this thesis looks only at collecting historical longitudinal data. Longitudinal historic 
data offers the ability to interpret dynamic account of past events125.  
 
3.2.4. Sources of Data 
To answer the present research question secondary sources of data were chosen considering 
(i) secondary data related to the study is available freely in the public domain, (ii) the need for the 
current study to analyze the entire population of data as the number of products available for analysis 
is a relatively small number, (iii) primary data sources will most likely restrict the access to entire 
population of data and (iv) secondary data obtained from recognized reliable sources are likely to 
eliminate any biases and personal opinions. Reanalysis of data have often resulted in unexpected 
discoveries and secondary data is widely used to come up with new relevant conclusions. 
 
Secondary data has multiple advantages over primary data sources for the current study. One 
of the advantages of secondary data that it is less time consuming to collect than primary data126. In 
comparison, secondary sources often allow greater accessibility which is likely to result in a more 
efficient and less expensive data collection process and allows for data collection on larger samples 
and entire populations126,127. In addition, since secondary data has been collated for motives other 
than to answer a study specific questions, it would eliminate and avoid any biases128.  
 
When selecting the secondary sources of data, attention was given to (i) identification and 
location of data sources that are applicable to answer the current research question, (ii) ability to 
retrieve the applicable data and (iii) how well the data meets the quality needs of the current study. 
The main sources of secondary data used for quantitative data collection were publicly available 
information from the regulatory bodies such as the FDA and the EMA, and from press releases from 
companies that have developed biosimilars. 
 
The FDA is a federal agency under the United States Department of Health and Human 
Services, responsible for “protecting and promoting public health”129. This is achieved by supervision, 
regulation and control of a range of products including biopharmaceuticals, pharmaceutical products, 
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medicines, vaccines and dietary supplements129. Among other laws, FDA is responsible for the 
enforcement of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic (FD&C) Act enacted in 1938130, Section 361 
of the Public Health Services Act enacted in 194447 and the Biologics Price Completion and 
Innovation Act (BPCIA) enacted in 2009115. The FDA consist of several Centers responsible for 
regulating different classes of products. Center for Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER) is 
responsible for assessing and granting regulatory approval for biosimilars129. 
 
The EMA is an EU agency responsible for the evaluation and approval of medicinal products. 
EMA is setup via directive Regulation EC No. 726/2004131. Prior to 2004, EMA was known as the 
European Agency for Evaluation of Medicinal Products (EMEA). The EMA (then known as EMEA) 
was established in 1995, funded by the EU, the pharmaceutical industry and with the support from 
the EU member states as indirect subsidies132. This agency was set up as an attempt to harmonize 
the regulatory activities carried out by the individual regulatory bodies of EU member states132. The 
main objectives of setting up this centralized agency were to increase competition by eliminating the 
protectionist susceptibility of member states to approve novel medicinal products that might compete 
with medicines produced by domestic companies and reduce the time and expenditure spent by 
pharmaceutical companies to obtain separate approvals from each member state133. The centralized 
processing of applications allowed pharmaceutical companies to submit one application to gain 
marketing authorization in countries recognized as part of the EU and the EEA131. New biosimilar 
applications are assessed by the Committee for Medicinal Products for Human Use (CHMP). If the 
CHMP finds that the safety, efficacy and quality of medicinal product sufficiently meets the 
requirements, it provides a positive opinion133. This opinion is then sent to the European Commission 
to be considered and translated a marketing authorization enabling the product to be marketed in 
the EU133. 
 
3.2.5. Sampling Process 
For the locations selected for this study (the U.S. and the EU), the data on the entire 
population of biosimilars that have undergone the regulatory approval process until 31st July 2018 
have been analyzed. The first biosimilar application was submitted to the EMA on 01st July 2005 and 
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the first biosimilar approval by the EMA took place on 12th April 2006 (refer to Figure 2-3 in Chapter 
2). In comparison in the U.S, the 1st biosimilar application was submitted to the FDA on 24th July 
2014 and the 1st biosimilar approval by the FDA was on 06th March 2015 (refer to Figure 2-3 in 
Chapter 2). This study included all biosimilar approvals by the EMA from 01st July 2005 to 31st July 
2018 and all biosimilar approvals by the FDA from 06th March 2015 to 31st July 2018. Thus, the 
findings are representative of the entire population. Studies of entire populations minimize selection 
bias134. 
 
3.2.6. Ethics Approval and Considerations 
 This study has received ethics approval from The University of Queensland Science, Low & 
Negligible Risk Ethics Sub-Committee on the 02nd of August 2017 (Approval Number 2017001050). 
 
This study only utilized de-identified, product related secondary data that is publicly available 
at free of charge. There were no enrolments of participants to this study. Hence, the researcher’s 
main responsibility was to ensure that the data collection, collation, observation and analysis were 
honest, trustworthy and had no conflict of interest in terms of financial or any personal gain. This 
research complies with these guidelines and the researcher made sure that the data was collected 
from valid sources, reliability of the data was ensured and where necessary citations were carried 
out. 
 
3.2.7. Limitations of the Research Design 
Numerous studies have examined limitations of using secondary sources of data. These 
include questions regarding missing information, quality of data, and lack of information on 
confounding variables134. However, given the constraints of time and hurdles that can be faced in 
gaining access to primary data, secondary sources of data provided a more viable option for 
conducting a comprehensive population study. Furthermore, to ensure that the quality of data is 
maintained in the quantitative analysis, the study has obtained data only from reliable third-party 
organizations such as regulatory bodies. Another possible criticism of the current research design is 
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in relation to the limited number of data points. Whilst, this aspect is beyond the control of the 
researcher given the emerging nature of the biosimilar industry, it means that there is a low number 
of biosimilars that have completed the regulatory approval phase. Hence, a whole population 
quantitative study has been designed to provide a more comprehensive analysis.  
 
3.3. Data Collection and Data Analysis 
3.3.1. Data Collection 
Data collection commenced by identifying the biosimilars approvals by the EMA and the FDA. 
Press releases and periodic reports by the EMA and the FDA were searched and analyzed to 
accumulate a list of biosimilar approvals by each regulatory body. This was an ongoing process from 
the point the research commenced in March 2015 until the end of the research period in 31st July 
2018. Since the study was designed as a population study it was vital to capture all biosimilars 
approved (refer to Appendix 3-1 for summary of websites used to collect this information). The list of 
biosimilars approved was the basis for the rest of data collection. The second step was to cross 
check the collated list of approved biosimilars with industry and journal publications such as the lists 
of Biosimilars approved in Europe135 and Biosimilars approved in the US136 maintained by the 
Generics and Biosimilar Initiative. The final step in the data collection process for this study was to 
collect data relevant to the regulatory approval process for each biosimilar. Relevant data such as 
the application date, the approval date, International Nonproprietary Name (INN), names of the 
biosimilars and biosimilar developers were collected (refer to Appendix 3-1 for summary of the data 
points collected as part of this study). A single coder extracted all of the required data using 
standardized data collection forms (refer to Figure 3-4 below). 
 
Reliability and validity of the data collected, and information presented are an important 
consideration in research. Since secondary data was used for this thesis, traditional methods of 
reliability testing such as test-retest method were not applicable, however, the FDA and the EMA 
have procedures in place to ensure that the records present are accurate. However, further internal 
validation was carried out to ensure that the data collected was correct. Examples of such measures 
include (1) cross validating the data collected from the FDA and EMA databases with the regulatory 
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dossiers submitted to the EMA or the FDA by the biosimilar sponsor companies as well as EMA and 
FDA product detail pages; (2) cross checking the regulatory approval information presented on EMA 
and FDA product detail pages with press releases of the regulatory agencies and of the respective 
biosimilar companies; and (3) validating biosimilar approvals by collating information from industry 
journals as well as checking the records with FDA and EMA.  
 
Figure 3-4: Excerpt of regulatory approval data downloaded from EMA website and collated in 
Microsoft Excel 
 
3.3.2. Data Analysis Methodology 
The data analysis was commenced by cataloguing and organizing the collected secondary 
data files. The data collected were tabulated into forms (refer to figure 3-4 for an example). After 
which, further analysis was conducted.   
 
To answer the research question, measures, as well as statistical analysis of the duration of 
regulatory approval phase were carried out. The measurement of historical variations in duration of 
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the regulatory approval phase required an application date and an approval date. The EMA records 
the application date as the “Application to the EMA or EMEA (EMA is previously known as EMEA – 
European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products) and the approval date as the “Marketing 
Authorization Date”. In a similar way, the FDA records the application date of a biosimilar as the 
“Application to the FDA” and the approval date simply as "Approval Date”. Statistical Analysis was 
then conducted to identify trends in the duration of regulatory approval phase.  
 
3.3.3. Data Presentation 
The eventual databases were both complex and voluminous. As such, the researcher 
investigated ways and tried different methods to collate data into a more manageable format. Such 
attempts resulted in the formulation of tables and graphical representations dividing the data into 
subsets which allowed for further statistical analysis and build-up of case studies. 
 
3.4.  Chapter Conclusion 
This chapter presented the research methods considered to be best suited for examination 
of the research question proposed in this thesis. Given the early stage of development of the 
biosimilar industry and limited literature on first mover advantage on post-patent pharmaceutical 
markets, a quantitative strategy investigating the trends in the regulatory approval phase for 
biosimilars, was selected. The quantitative design is a longitudinal population study utilizing historical 
data from secondary sources, which allowed the measurement and monitoring of changes over time. 
The next chapter, Chapter 4 presents and discusses the results of the quantitative analysis. 
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CHAPTER 4: FINDINGS 
4.1. Introduction 
By investigating trends in the duration of the regulatory approval phase for biosimilar drugs 
in the European Union and the United States of America, this research was directed to answering 
the question posed in Chapter 2 (refer to Chapter 2 section 2.9.). The previous chapter also detailed 
that a longitudinal, population study of biosimilars that have received regulatory approval till 31st July 
2018 was conducted to answer the research question. The current chapter describes the findings 
based on the data analysis. 
 
4.2.  Biosimilar Regulatory Approvals in the European Union 
For this study the date on which the EMA receives the Marketing Authorization Application is 
considered as the date on which the regulatory approval process commences. Once a biosimilar has 
received marketing authorization, it is considered to have obtained regulatory approval within the 
countries in the EU and EEA. Hence, for the current study, the date of marketing authorization by 
the European Commission is considered as the regulatory approval date for biosimilars in Europe.  
 
4.2.1. Number of biosimilars that have received regulatory approval in the European Union  
A dedicated regulatory approval pathway for biosimilars was established through the EU 
directive 2003/63/EC in June 2003 (refer to Figure 2-3 in Chapter 2, Section 2.7.) From June 2003 
to July 2018, 50 biosimilars have received regulatory approval from the EMA (refer to Table 4-1).  
 
Three biosimilars have been withdrawn from the market at the request of the marketing 
authorization holder after receiving marketing authorization (refer to the Status column in Table 4-
1). The reasons for these withdrawals were stated as “commercial” by the marketing authorization 
holder137. These three biosimilars are Valtropin, Filgrastim ratiopharm and Biograstim. Marketing 
authorization for Valtropin were withdrawn voluntarily in October 2011 and the withdrawn was 
formalized in 10th May 2012137,138. European Union withdrew the marketing authorization for 
Filgrastim ratiopharm on 20th April 2011 and for Biograstim on 15th September 2018139,140. The 
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withdrawal notifications by the EMA for Valtropin and Filgrastim ratiopharm further states that these 
two products were never marketed in the EMA138,140. These three biosimilars are not removed from 
the data set used to answer the research question since they underwent the regulatory approval 
process as with other biosimilars and were only withdrawn later for commercial reasons. 
Biosimilar INN Reference  
Originator 
Originator 
Company 
EMA Agency 
Product 
number for 
the 
Biosimilar 
Marketing 
Authorization 
Holder of the 
Biosimilar 
Biosimilar 
Applicatio
n Date to 
the EMA  
Biosimilar 
Marketing 
Authorizat
ion Date 
Status 
Valtropin** Somatropin Humatrop
e 
Eli Lily EMEA/H/C/0
00602 
BioPartners 
GmbH 
3-Jun-04 24-Apr-06 Withdrawn 
Omnitrope Somatropin Genotropi
n 
Pfizer EMEA/H/C/0
00607 
Sandoz GmbH 1-Jul-04 12-Apr-06 Authorized 
Binocrit Epoetin alfa Epogen Amgen EMEA/H/C/0
00725 
Sandoz GmbH 9-Mar-06 28-Aug-07 Authorized 
Epoetin 
alfa Hexal 
Epoetin alfa Epogen Amgen EMEA/H/C/0
00726 
Hexal AG 9-Mar-06 28-Aug-07 Authorized 
Abseamed Epoetin alfa Epogen Amgen EMEA/H/C/0
00727 
Medice 
Arzneimittel 
Pütter GmbH 
& Co. KG 
9-Mar-06 28-Aug-07 Authorized 
Silapo Epoetin zeta Epogen Amgen EMEA/H/C/0
00760 
Stada 
Arzneimittel 
AG 
28-Jun-06 18-Dec-07 Authorized 
Filgrastim 
ratiopharm
** 
Filgrastim Neupogen Amgen EMEA/H/C/0
00824 
Ratiopharm 
GmbH 
29-Jan-07 15-Sep-08 Withdrawn 
Ratiograsti
m 
Filgrastim Neupogen Amgen EMEA/H/C/0
00825 
Ratiopharm 
GmbH 
29-Jan-07 15-Sep-08 Authorized 
Tevagrasti
m 
Filgrastim Neupogen Amgen EMEA/H/C/0
00827 
Teva GmbH 29-Jan-07 15-Sep-08 Authorized 
Biograstim
** 
Filgrastim Neupogen Amgen EMEA/H/C/0
00826 
AbZ-Pharma 
GmbH 
29-Jan-07 15-Sep-08 Withdrawn 
Retacrit Epoetin zeta Epogen Amgen EMEA/H/C/0
00872 
Hospira UK 
Limited 
11-May-
07 
18-Dec-07 Authorized 
Filgrastim 
Hexal 
Filgrastim Neupogen Amgen EMEA/H/C/0
00918 
Hexal AG 6-Sep-07 6-Feb-09 Authorized 
Zarzio Filgrastim Neupogen Amgen EMEA/H/C/0
00917 
Sandoz GmbH 6-Sep-07 6-Feb-09 Authorized 
Nivestim Filgrastim Neupogen Amgen EMEA/H/C/0
001142 
Hospira UK 
Limited 
27-Feb-09 8-Jun-10 Authorized 
Ovaleap Follitropin 
alfa 
Gonal-f Merck EMEA/H/C/0
02608 
Teva Pharma 
B.V. 
28-Feb-12 27-Sep-13 Authorized 
Remsima Infliximab Remicade Janssen 
Biologics 
B.V., NL 
EMEA/H/C/0
02576 
Celltrion 
Healthcare 
Hungary Kft. 
1-Mar-12 10-Sep-13 Authorized 
Grastofil Filgrastim Neupogen Amgen EMEA/H/C/0
02150 
Apotex 
Europe BV 
30-Apr-12 18-Oct-13 Authorized 
Inflectra Infliximab Remicade Janssen 
Biologics 
B.V., NL 
EMEA/H/C/0
02778 
Hospira UK 
Limited 
26-Jun-12 10-Sep-13 Authorized 
Bemfola Follitropin - 
alfa 
Gonal-f Merck EMEA/H/C/0
02615 
Finox Biotech 
AG 
30-Oct-12 27-Mar-
14 
Authorized 
Abasaglar 
(previously 
Absaria) 
Insulin 
glargine 
Lantus Sanofi-
Aventis 
Deutschlan
d GmbH 
EMEA/H/C/0
02835 
Eli Lilly 
Regional 
Operations 
GmbH 
3-Jun-13 9-Sep-14 Authorized 
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Biosimilar INN Reference  
Originator 
Originator 
Company 
EMA Agency 
Product 
number for 
the 
Biosimilar 
Marketing 
Authorization 
Holder of the 
Biosimilar 
Biosimilar 
Applicatio
n Date to 
the EMA  
Biosimilar 
Marketing 
Authorizat
ion Date 
Status 
Accofil Filgrastim Neupogen Amgen EMEA/H/C/3
956 
Accord 
Healthcare 
Ltd 
24-Mar-
14 
18-Sep-14 Authorized 
Benepali Etarnacept Enbrel Pfizer 
Limited 
EMEA/H/C/0
04007 
Samsung 
Bioepis UK 
Limited 
(SBUK) 
3-Dec-14 14-Jan-16 Authorized 
Thorinane Enoxaparin 
sodium 
Clexane Sanofi 
Aventis 
EMEA/H/C/0
03795 
Pharmathen 
S.A. 
6-Feb-15 15-Sep-16 Authorized 
Flixabi Infliximab Remicade Janssen 
Biologics 
B.V., NL 
EMEA/H/C/0
04020 
Samsung 
Bioepis UK 
Limited  
3-Mar-15 26-May-
16 
Authorized 
Inhixa Enoxaparin 
sodium 
Clexane Sanofi 
Aventis 
EMEA/H/C/0
04264 
Techdow 
Europe AB 
27-May-
15 
15-Sep-16 Authorized 
Truxima Rituximab MabThera Roche 
Registratio
n Limited 
EMEA/H/C/0
04112/0000 
Celltrion 
Healthcare 
Hungary Kft. 
9-Oct-15 17-Feb-17 Authorized 
Erelzi Etarnacept Enbrel Pfizer 
Limited 
EMEA/H/C/0
04192/0000 
Sandoz GmbH 11-Nov-15 27-Jun-17 Authorized 
Terrosa Teriparatide Forsteo Eli Lilly 
Nederland 
B.V. 
EMEA/H/C/0
03916 
Gedeon 
Richter Plc. 
27-Nov-15 4-Jan-17 Authorized 
Movymia Teriparatide Forsteo Eli Lilly 
Nederland 
B.V 
EMEA/H/C/0
04368/0000 
STADA 
Arzneimittel 
AG 
30-Nov-15 11-Jan-17 Authorized 
Amgevita Adalimumab Humira  AbbVie Ltd EMEA/H/C/0
04212/0000 
Amgen 
Europe B.V.  
3-Dec-15 22-Mar-
17 
Authorized 
Solymbic Adalimumab Humira  AbbVie Ltd EMEA/H/C/0
04373/0000 
Amgen 
Europe B.V.  
3-Dec-15 22-Mar-
17 
Authorized 
Lusduna Insulin 
glargine 
Lantus Sanofi-
Aventis 
Deutschlan
d GmbH 
EMEA/H/C/0
04101 
Merck Sharp 
& Dohme 
Limited 
4-Dec-15 4-Jan-17 Authorized 
Rixathon Rituximab MabThera Roche 
Registratio
n Limited 
EMEA/H/C/0
03903/0000 
 Sandoz 
GmbH 
11-Apr-16 19-Jun-17 Authorized 
Imraldi Adalimumab Humira  Abbvie 
Deutschlan
d GmbH & 
Co. KG 
EMEA/H/C/0
04279/0000 
Samsung 
Bioepis UK 
Limted 
21-Jun-16 24-Aug-17 Authorized 
Semglee Insulin 
glargine 
Lantus Sanofi-
Aventis 
Deutschlan
d GmbH 
EMEA/H/C/0
04280/0000 
Mylan S.A.S 1-Aug-16 23-Mar-
18 
Authorized 
Ontruzant Trastuzmab Herceptin Roche 
Registratio
n Limited 
EMEA/H/C/0
04323 
Samsung 
Bioepis UK 
Limted 
30-Aug-16 15-Nov-17 Authorized 
Insulin 
lispro 
Sanofi 
Insulin lispro Humalog Eli Lilly 
Nederland 
B.V. 
EMEA/H/C/0
04303 
Sanofi-
Aventis 
Groupe 
7-Sep-16 19-Jul-17 Authorized 
Herzuma Trastuzmab Herceptin Roche 
Registratio
n Limited 
EMEA/H/C/0
02575 
Celltrion 
Healthcare 
Hungary Kft. 
10-Oct-16 9-Feb-18 Authorized 
Cyltezo Adalimumab Humira  Abbvie 
Deutschlan
d GmbH & 
Co. KG 
EMEA/H/C/0
04319/0000 
Boehringer 
Ingelheim 
27-Oct-16 10-Nov-17 Authorized 
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Biosimilar INN Reference  
Originator 
Originator 
Company 
EMA Agency 
Product 
number for 
the 
Biosimilar 
Marketing 
Authorization 
Holder of the 
Biosimilar 
Biosimilar 
Applicatio
n Date to 
the EMA  
Biosimilar 
Marketing 
Authorizat
ion Date 
Status 
Mvasi Bevacizuma
b 
Avastin Roche 
Registratio
n Limited 
EMEA/H/C/0
04728 
Amgen 
Europe B.V.  
1-Dec-16 15-Jan-18 Authorized 
Riximyo Rituximab MabThera Roche 
Registratio
n Limited 
EMEA/H/C/0
04729/0000 
Sandoz GmbH 9-Dec-16 15-Jun-17 Authorized 
Kanjinti Trastuzmab Herceptin Roche 
Registratio
n Limited 
EMEA/H/C/0
04361/0000 
Amgen 
Europe B.V., 
Breda 
1-Mar-17 16-May-
18 
Authorized 
Ritemvia Rituximab MabThera Roche 
Registratio
n Limited 
EMEA/H/C/0
04725/0000 
Celltrion 
Healthcare 
Hungary Kft. 
3-Mar-17 13-Jul-17 Authorized 
Blitzima Rituximab MabThera Roche 
Registratio
n Limited 
EMEA/H/C/0
04723/0000 
Celltrion 
Healthcare 
Hungary Kft. 
6-Mar-17 13-Jul-17 Authorized 
Rituzena 
(previously 
Tuxella) 
Rituximab MabThera Roche 
Registratio
n Limited 
EMEA/H/C/0
04724/0000 
Celltrion 
Healthcare 
Hungary Kft. 
6-Mar-17 13-Jul-17 Authorized 
Zessly Infliximab Remicade Janssen 
Biologics 
B.V., NL 
EMEA/H/C/0
04647/0000 
Sandoz GmbH 21-Apr-17 18-May-
18 
Authorized 
Hyrimoz Adalimumab Humira  Abbvie 
Deutschlan
d GmbH & 
Co. KG 
EMEA/H/C/0
04320/0000 
Sandoz GmbH 24-Apr-17 26-Jul-18 Authorized 
Trazimera Trastuzmab Herceptin Roche 
Registratio
n Limited 
EMEA/H/C/0
04463/0000 
Pfizer Europe 
MA EEIG 
27-Jun-17 26-Jul-18 Authorized 
Halimatoz Adalimumab Humira  Abbvie 
Deutschlan
d GmbH & 
Co. KG 
EA/H/C/004
866/0000 
Sandoz GmbH 23-Nov-17 26-Jul-18 Authorized 
Hefiya Adalimumab Humira  Abbvie 
Deutschlan
d GmbH & 
Co. KG 
EMEA/H/C/0
04865/0000 
Sandoz GmbH 23-Nov-17 26-Jul-18 Authorized 
Table 4-1: List of biosimilar approvals in Europe (Updated on 31st July 2018). The above list is in 
arranged from the earliest marketing authorization application to the latest application. 
**European Union withdrew marketing authorization for these biosimilars at the request of their 
respective marketing authorization holders 
 
 
4.2.1.2 Unique and Non-Unique Biosimilar Regulatory Approvals in Europe 
During the data collection, it was observed that certain biosimilars that applied under different 
marketing authorization holders in Europe underwent an identical regulatory approval process. For 
this study such biosimilars are grouped together as non-unique biosimilars. A biosimilar approval is 
categorized as non-unique if all the following criteria were met: 
• Submission of identical clinical data in the application as another biosimilar (recorded in the 
Committee for Medical Products for Human Use (CHMP) Assessment Report), 
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• Same application date as the other biosimilar 
• Same approval date as the other biosimilar 
• Have the same reference originator as the other biosimilar 
 
Such non-unique biosimilar approvals are grouped as one unique approval. This grouping 
was carried out to ensure that such non-unique approvals do not skew the statistical analysis of data. 
Table 4-2 provides a list of biosimilar approvals with the non-unique approvals grouped into unique 
approvals. Grouping of non-unique approvals led to 6 groupings resulting in a remaining 41 unique 
biosimilar approvals. These 41 unique approvals were then used for further statistical analysis to 
answer the research question. 
 
Biosimilars INN Reference 
Originator 
Originator Company Biosimilar 
Application Date  
Biosimilar 
Marketing 
Authorization Date 
Valtropin Somatropin Humatrope Eli Lily 3-Jun-04 24-Apr-06 
Omnitrope Somatropin Genotropin Pfizer 1-Jul-04 12-Apr-06 
Binocrit/ Epoetin 
alfa Hexal/ 
Abseamed 
Epoetin alfa Epogen Amgen 9-Mar-06 28-Aug-07 
Silapo Epoetin zeta Epogen Amgen 28-Jun-06 18-Dec-07 
Filgrastim 
ratiopharm/ 
Ratiograstim/ 
Tevagrastim/ 
Biograstim 
Filgrastim Neupogen Amgen 29-Jan-07 15-Sep-08 
Retacrit Epoetin zeta Epogen Amgen 11-May-07 18-Dec-07 
Filgrastim Hexal/ 
Zarzio 
Filgrastim Neupogen Amgen 6-Sep-07 6-Feb-09 
Nivestim Filgrastim Neupogen Amgen 27-Feb-09 8-Jun-10 
Ovaleap Follitropin 
alfa 
Gonal-f Merck 28-Feb-12 27-Sep-13 
Remsima (**Note 1) Infliximab Remicade Janssen Biologics B.V., 
NL 
1-Mar-12 10-Sep-13 
Grastofil Filgrastim Neupogen Amgen 30-Apr-12 18-Oct-13 
Inflectra (**Note 1) Infliximab Remicade Janssen Biologics B.V., 
NL 
26-Jun-12 10-Sep-13 
Bemfola Follitropin - 
alfa 
Gonal-f Merck 30-Oct-12 27-Mar-14 
Abasaglar 
(previously Absaria) 
Insulin 
glargine 
Lantus Sanofi-Aventis 
Deutschland GmbH 
3-Jun-13 9-Sep-14 
Accofil Filgrastim Neupogen Amgen 24-Mar-14 18-Sep-14 
Benepali Etarnacept Enbrel Pfizer Limited 3-Dec-14 14-Jan-16 
Thorinane Enoxaparin 
sodium 
Clexane Sanofi Aventis 6-Feb-15 15-Sep-16 
Flixabi Infliximab Remicade Janssen Biologics B.V., 
NL 
3-Mar-15 26-May-16 
Inhixa Enoxaparin 
sodium 
Clexane Sanofi Aventis 27-May-15 15-Sep-16 
Truxima Rituximab MabThera Roche Registration 
Limited 
9-Oct-15 17-Feb-17 
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Erelzi Etarnacept Enbrel Pfizer Limited 11-Nov-15 27-Jun-17 
Terrosa Teriparatide Forsteo Eli Lilly Nederland B.V. 27-Nov-15 4-Jan-17 
Movymia Teriparatide Forsteo Eli Lilly Nederland B.V 30-Nov-15 11-Jan-17 
Amgevita/ Solymbic Adalimumab Humira  AbbVie Ltd 3-Dec-15 22-Mar-17 
Lusduna Insulin 
glargine 
Lantus Sanofi-Aventis 
Deutschland GmbH 
4-Dec-15 4-Jan-17 
Rixathon Rituximab MabThera Roche Registration 
Limited 
11-Apr-16 19-Jun-17 
Imraldi Adalimumab Humira  Abbvie Deutschland 
GmbH & Co. KG 
21-Jun-16 24-Aug-17 
Semglee Insulin 
glargine 
Lantus Sanofi-Aventis 
Deutschland GmbH 
1-Aug-16 23-Mar-18 
Ontruzant Trastuzmab Herceptin Roche Registration 
Limited 
30-Aug-16 15-Nov-17 
Insulin lispro Sanofi Insulin lispro Humalog Eli Lilly Nederland B.V. 7-Sep-16 19-Jul-17 
Herzuma Trastuzmab Herceptin Roche Registration 
Limited 
10-Oct-16 9-Feb-18 
Cyltezo Adalimumab Humira  Abbvie Deutschland 
GmbH & Co. KG 
27-Oct-16 10-Nov-17 
Mvasi Bevacizumab Avastin Roche Registration 
Limited 
1-Dec-16 15-Jan-18 
Riximyo Rituximab MabThera Roche Registration 
Limited 
9-Dec-16 15-Jun-17 
Kanjinti Trastuzmab Herceptin Roche Registration 
Limited 
1-Mar-17 16-May-18 
Ritemvia Rituximab MabThera Roche Registration 
Limited 
3-Mar-17 13-Jul-17 
Blitzima/Rituzena 
(previously Tuxella) 
Rituximab MabThera Roche Registration 
Limited 
6-Mar-17 13-Jul-17 
Zessly Infliximab Remicade Janssen Biologics B.V., 
NL 
21-Apr-17 18-May-18 
Hyrimoz Adalimumab Humira  Abbvie Deutschland 
GmbH & Co. KG 
24-Apr-17 26-Jul-18 
Trazimera Trastuzmab Herceptin Roche Registration 
Limited 
27-Jun-17 26-Jul-18 
Halimatoz/ Hefiya Adalimumab Humira  Abbvie Deutschland 
GmbH & Co. KG 
23-Nov-17 26-Jul-18 
Table 4-2: Non-Unique biosimilar approvals grouped. The above list is in arranged from the earliest 
marketing authorization application to the latest application.  
**Note 1: Inflectra and Remsima are both manufactured at Celltrion Inc and are the same product 
(also referred to as CTP-13 which was the code used during the development clinical trials)141,142 
 
4.2.2. Trends in Time Taken for Biosimilar Regulatory Approvals vs. Date of Application 
The time taken for the regulatory approval process was determined by calculating the number 
of days between the EU marketing authorization application date to the date which marketing 
authorization is granted for each biosimilar. Figure 4-1 below shows the time taken for regulatory 
approval for biosimilar approvals until July 2018 as per Table 4-1. Figure 4-2 is a variation of Figure 
4-1 with the non-unique biosimilars grouped as per Table 4-2. 
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Figure 4-1: Time taken for regulatory approval for biosimilar approvals till July 2018.  The 
biosimilars were arranged in the order of application dates but not on a linear timescale. 
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Figure 4-2: A variation of Figure 4-2, depicting the time taken for regulatory approval for biosimilar 
approvals till July 2018, but with the non-unique applications grouped. The biosimilars were 
arranged in the order of application dates but not on a linear timescale. 
 
The mean, standard deviation, median and interquartile range calculated for the time taken 
for regulatory approvals (till 31st July 2018) of unique biosimilar applications in the EU are presented 
in Table 4-3. 
Number of data points  41 
Mean 440.29 days 
Population standard deviation 125.89 days 
Median 450.00 days 
Quartile 1 397.00 days 
Quartile 3 536.00 days 
Interquartile Range (Quartile 3 minus Quartile 1) 139.00 days 
Table 4-3: Mean, standard deviation, median and interquartile range calculated for unique 
biosimilar applications in the EU. 
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A single-factor (also commonly known as one-way) Analysis of Variance analysis (ANOVA) 
is used to test the null hypothesis that the means of several populations are equal. A single factor 
ANOVA was conducted to see whether the mean time taken for regulatory approval differed 
significantly between the different populations. The data was arranged as shown in Table 4-4, 
whereby each application year column was taken as one population.  
 
Application 
year 
2004 2006 2007 2009 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Duration of 
the regulatory 
approval 
phase 
690 537 595 466 577 463 178 587 434 441 
650 538 221   558   407 450 429 132 
    519   536     477 599 129 
        441     497 442 392 
        513     594 315 458 
              404 487 394 
              408 379 245 
              475 410   
              397 188   
 Table 4-4: Duration of the regulatory approval phase arranged by each application year to conduct 
a single factor ANOVA. 
 
The null hypothesis tested is that the mean duration of the regulatory approval phase for 
each application year is the same. The results show that the F value of 3.046985 is greater than F 
critical value of 2.199355 (refer to Table 4-5 below). Since the F calculated is greater than the F 
critical, the null hypothesis can be rejected. This indicates that there is a statistically significant 
difference in the mean duration of the regulatory approval phase for different application years (P-
value = 0.009923). 
 
Source of 
Variation 
SS df MS F calculated P-value F critical 
Between 
Groups 
338893 9 37654.78 3.046985 0.009923 2.199355 
Within Groups 383099.4 31 12358.05    
       
Total 721992.4 40         
Table 4-5: Results from the single-factor ANOVA testing the differences in mean duration of 
regulatory phase for each year of application. 
 
 Furthermore, non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis test was conducted in addition to ANOVA 
testing. ANOVA tests assume that the data are normally distributed. In comparison, non-parametric 
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tests do not have assumptions related any underlying distribution. This increases the robustness of 
the statistical model used in this thesis, especially considering that the population of data analyzed 
is small. The results from the Kruskal-Wallis test are as follows: 
• K statistic  : 19.819878 
• Degree of freedom : 9 
• P-value calculated : 0.019057 
 
 
The null hypothesis tested is that the duration of the regulatory approval phase for each 
application year is the same. As the P-value calculated is less than 0.05, the null hypothesis is 
rejected. The results from the Kruskal-Wallis test are in congruence with the results from the ANOVA 
test. 
 
 Furthermore, a scatter plot was drawn to examine whether there is a relationship between 
the date of regulatory application and the time taken for regulatory approval (refer to Figure 4-3). 
The linear trendline in Figure 4-3 indicates that the duration of the pre-market regulatory approval 
phase decreases over time. Correlation co-efficient, R calculated using the data sets from the two 
variables (dependent variable being duration for regulatory approval phase and independent variable 
being the application dates) was -0.47. To further examine this trend the coefficient of determination, 
R2, was calculated. R2 value describes the “proportion of the variance in the dependent variable” 
(time taken for regulatory approval phase) “that is predictable from the independent variable” (date 
of application). The R2 value was calculated to be 0.229, which corresponds to a 22.9% of the 
variability in the linear model. This indicates a weak to moderate negative linear relationship between 
the two variables. P-value calculated using this data was 0.00155.  Hence, the P-value calculated is 
less than or equal 0.05, indicating evidence rejecting the null hypothesis, that the duration of the 
regulatory approval phase does not change over time. Hence, the duration of the regulatory approval 
phase does change (decreases) over time. 
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Figure 4-3: Duration of the pre-market regulatory approval phase vs. application date, without any 
adjustment of cut-off date for inclusion of data points. 
 
Furthermore, non-parametric Spearman’s Rank correlation coefficient was calculated in addition 
to regression testing. Regression tests assume that the data are normally distributed. In comparison, 
non-parametric tests do not have assumptions related any underlying distribution. This increases 
the robustness of the statistical model used in this thesis, especially considering that the population 
of data analyzed is small. The results from the Spearman’s Rank correlation coefficient calculation 
is as follows: 
• Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient : -0.62286 
• Number of data points   : 41 
• P-value calculated    : 0.00014 
 
 
The null hypothesis tested is that the duration of the regulatory approval phase does not 
change over time. As the P-value calculated is less than 0.05, the null hypothesis is rejected. This 
indicates that there is a statistically significant change in the duration of the regulatory approval 
phase over time. Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient is negative, indicating that as the year of 
application increases, the duration of review decreases. The results from the Spearman’s Rank 
correlation test are in congruence with the results from the regression analysis above. 
77 
 
4.2.2.1. Sensitivity Analysis via Right Censoring 
Looking at Figure 4-3 above, there are two factors that can potentially have an impact on the 
results presented.  Firstly, ,there are biosimilar applications prior to 31st July 2018 (study sample) 
that are currently being reviewed by the EMA and hence not captured in Figure 4-3. According to 
the EMA as of July 2018, there are 14 biosimilar applications that were under review and yet to be 
approved (refer to Appendix 4-1)143. As a result, in the latter years, Figure 4-3 may only have 
captured biosimilars that have taken shorter duration of time to progress through the regulatory 
approval process. Secondly, a potential change to the regulatory approval process affecting duration 
of the regulatory approval phase, for example the increase in the product (INN) specific guidelines 
being published by the EMA since December 2012, especially related to approval of monoclonal 
antibodies with the approval of Infliximab in December 2013, accelerating the regulatory approval 
process144. This approval of Infliximab was a landmark in biosimilar approvals, marking a shift from 
relatively simple growth factor type molecules (Erythropoietin and Granulocyte-colony stimulating 
factors) to molecules of much greater complexity both in terms of molecular structure and 
pharmacological action but also clinical indication. Thus, statistical analysis conducted using Figure 
4-3 is potentially require right censoring.  
 
To investigate if these factors are biasing the results, sensitivity analysis was conducted 
using an earlier cut-off date for data collection. This eliminates data points that are potentially biasing 
(right censoring) the results.  To identify the earlier cut-off date the following steps were carried out: 
1. The population standard deviation (refer to Table 4-3) was multiplied by a factor of 2 (M1 
days).  For an approximately normal set of data it is widely accepted that two standard 
deviations account for about 95% of the data. 
2. The new cut-off date (here in referred to as the Adjusted Cut-Off Date) was then 
calculated by subtracting M1 days from 31st July 2018 (refer to Figure 4-4 below). Table 
4-7 below summarizes the calculations related to the Adjusted Cut-Off Date. Using the 
Adjusted Cut-Off Date, further statistical analysis was conducted (refer to following 
sections 4.2.2.2., 4.2.3.1., and 4.2.4.1. in this chapter). 
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Figure 4-4: Schematic diagram showing how the Adjusted Cut-Off Date is calculated 
 
Population standard deviation (refer to Table 4-3) 125.89 days 
2 x Population standard deviation (M1 days)  251.78 days 
Data collection cut-off date 31st July 2018 
Adjusted Cut-Off Date 21st November 2017 (251.78  
days prior to 31st July 2018) 
Table 4-7: Summary of calculations to identify Adjusted Cut-Off Date. 
 
4.2.2.2. Trends in Time Taken for Biosimilar Regulatory Approvals vs. Date of Application in 
the EU, using Adjusted Cut-Off Date 
As discussed in the previous section the Adjusted Cut-Off Date for biosimilar approvals was 
calculated to be 21st November  2017. The mean,  standard deviation, median and interquartile range 
calculated for the time taken for regulatory approval of unique application on or prior to the Adjusted 
Cut-Off Date are presented in Table 4-8. Whilst, the mean time taken for regulatory approval for the 
population of biosimilar applications on or prior to the Adjusted cut-off date was lower than the mean 
for the total population of the study (application till 31st July 2018), the difference was not great.  
 
Details Biosimilar application on or 
prior to Adjusted Cut-Off 
Date 
Biosimilar applications 
on or prior to 31st July 
2018 
Number of data points to 
Adjusted Cut-Off Date 33 41 
Mean 443.21 days  440.29 days 
Population standard 
deviation 133.40 days 125.89 days 
Median 463.00 days 450.00 days 
Interquartile range 133.00 days 139.00 days 
Table 4-8: Mean, standard deviation, median and interquartile range calculated for biosimilars 
applications on or prior to the Adjusted Cut-Off Date. 
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A single factor ANOVA was conducted to see whether the mean time taken for regulatory 
approval differed significantly over the years for the biosimilar applications approved on or prior to 
the Adjusted Cut-Off Date. The data was arranged whereby each application year column was taken 
as one population (refer to Table 4-9).  
 
Application 
year 
2004 2006 2007 2009 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Duration of 
the 
regulatory 
approval 
phase 
690 537 595 466 577 463 178 587 434 132 
650 538 221   558   407 450 429 129 
    519   536     477 442  
        441     497 315  
        513     594 379  
              404 188  
              408   
              475   
              397   
 Table 4-9: Duration of the regulatory approval phase in the EU arranged by each application year, 
for the biosimilar applications approved on or prior to the Adjusted Cut-Off Date, to conduct a 
single factor ANOVA. 
 
 
The null hypothesis tested is that the mean duration of the regulatory approval phase for 
each application year is the same. The results show that the F calculated value 5.431928 is greater 
than the F critical value 2.32010 (refer to Table 4-10 below). Since the F calculated is greater than 
F critical, the null hypothesis is rejected. This indicates that there is a statistically significant 
difference between the mean duration of the regulatory approval phase for the different  years (P-
value is 0.000496). The result of the ANOVA test for the population of biosimilar applications on or 
prior to the Adjusted Cut-Off Date is in congruence with the total population of biosimilar applications 
until 31st July 2018 (refer to tables 4-5 and 4-10). 
 
Source of Variation SS df MS F calculated P-value F critical 
Between Groups 443198.3 9 49244.25 5.431928 0.000496 2.320105 
Within Groups 208511.2 23 9065.705    
       
Total 651709.5 32         
Table 4-10: Results from the single-factor ANOVA testing the differences in mean duration of 
regulatory phase for each year of application, for biosimilar applications on or prior to the Adjusted 
Cut-Off Date. 
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 Furthermore, non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis test was conducted in addition to ANOVA 
testing. ANOVA tests assume that the data are normally distributed. In comparison, non-parametric 
tests do not have assumptions related any underlying distribution. This increases the robustness of 
the statistical model used in this thesis, especially considering that the population of data analyzed 
is small. The results from the Kruskal-Wallis test is as follows: 
• K statistic  : 20.074272 
• Degree of freedom : 9 
• P-value calculated : 0.017460 
 
 
The null hypothesis tested is that the duration of the regulatory approval phase for each 
application year is the same. As the P-value calculated is less than 0.05, the null hypothesis is 
rejected. This indicates that there is a statistically significant difference between the mean duration 
of the regulatory approval phase for the different  years. The results from the Kruskal-Wallis test is 
in congruence with the results from the ANOVA test. 
 
A regression analysis was then conducted to examine whether there was a correlation 
between the date of regulatory application and the time taken for regulatory approval (refer to Figure 
4-5). The R2 value was calculated to be 0.27579, which corresponds to a 27.58% of the variability in 
the linear model. Whilst the R2 value for the population of biosimilar applications approved on or prior 
to the Adjusted cut-off date was higher than the R2 value of 0.229 (refer to Figure 4-3) for the total 
population of the study (application till 31st July 2018), however the difference was not great. P-value 
calculated using this data is 0.001528. Similar to the to the entire data set,  the P-value calculated 
for biosimilar applications on or before the Adjusted Cut-Off Date is less than 0.05, providing 
statistical evidence to reject the null hypothesis, that the duration of the regulatory approval phase 
does not change over time. Hence, the duration of the regulatory approval phase does change 
(decreases) over time. This is in congruence to the results from the analysis from the entire study 
population of biosimilars approved on or before 31st July 2018 (refer to Section 4.2.2 above).  
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Figure 4-5: Duration of the regulatory approval phase vs. application date for biosimilar 
applications on or prior to the Adjusted Cut-Off Date 
 
Furthermore, non-parametric Spearman’s Rank correlation coefficient was calculated in addition 
to regression testing. Regression tests assume that the data are normally distributed. In comparison, 
non-parametric tests do not have assumptions related any underlying distribution. This increases 
the robustness of the statistical model used in this thesis, especially considering that the population 
of data analyzed is small. The results from the Spearman’s Rank correlation coefficient calculation 
is as follows: 
• Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient : -0.696 
• Number of data points   : 33 
• P-value calculated    : <0.00001 
 
 
The null hypothesis tested is that the duration of the regulatory approval phase does not 
change over time. As the P-value calculated is less than 0.05, the null hypothesis is rejected. This 
indicates that there is a statistically significant decrease in the duration of the regulatory approval 
phase over time. The results from the Spearman’s Rank correlation test is in congruence with the 
results from the regression analysis above. 
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4.2.3. Trends in Time Taken for Biosimilar Regulatory Approvals vs. Generation in the EU 
 For the current study, the first biosimilar that applies for regulatory approval is defined as the 
first generation or generation one (1), the second biosimilar applying for regulatory approval 
referencing the same originator as generation two (2) and hence forth. As such for the current study 
a generation is defined as all the biosimilars that are at the same position of regulatory application, 
relative to their respective originators. Table 4-11 below shows the unique biosimilars applications 
grouped under each generation and the corresponding durations of their regulatory approval phase. 
From Table 4-11, it can be observed that there are fifteen unique 1st generation biosimilar approvals 
showing that biosimilars have been developed using fifteen reference originators. Table 4-11 further 
shows that there are eleven 2nd generation, seven 3rd generation, five 4th generation, and three 5th 
generation unique biosimilar approvals. 
Generation Name of Biosimilar Duration of the regulatory approval phase (days) 
1st mover 
biosimilars 
1.1 Valtropin 690 
1.2 Omnitrope 650 
1.3 Binocrit/ Epoetin alfa Hexal/ Abeamed 537 
1.4 Filgrastim Ratiopharm/ Ratiograstim/ Tevagrastim/ 
Biograstim 595 
1.5 Remsima 558 
1.6 Ovaleap 577 
1.7 Absalgar 463 
1.8 Benepali 407 
1.9 Thorinane 587 
1.10 Terrosa 404 
1.11 Truxima 497 
1.12 Amgevita/ Solymbic 475 
1.13 Ontruzant 442 
1.14 Insulin lispro Sanofi 315 
1.15 Mvasi 410 
2nd mover 
biosimilars 
2.1 Silapo 538 
2.2 Fligrastim Hexal/Zarzio 519 
2.3 Inflectra 441 
2.4 Bemfola 513 
2.5 Inhixa 477 
2.6 Lusduna 397 
2.7 Movymia 408 
2.8 Rixathon 434 
2.9 Erelzi 594 
2.10 Imraldi 429 
2.11 Herzuma 487 
3rd mover 
biosimilars 
3.1 Retacrit 221 
3.2 Nivestim 466 
3.3 Flixabi 450 
3.4 Semglee 599 
3.5 Cyltezo 379 
3.6 Kanjinti 441 
3.7 Ritemvia 132 
4th mover 
biosimilars 
4.1 Grastofil 536 
4.2 Blitzima/Rituzena 129 
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Generation Name of Biosimilar Duration of the regulatory approval phase (days) 
4.3 Zessly 392 
4.4 Hyrimoz 458 
4.5 Trazimera 394 
5th mover 
biosimilars 
5.1 Accofil 178 
5.2 Riximyo 188 
5.3 Halimatoz/Hefiza 245 
Table 4-11: Unique biosimilar applications grouped in generations and corresponding duration of 
their regulatory approval phase. The rows highlighted in blue represents non-unique applications 
grouped as unique applications. 
 
Means, standard deviations and medians of each generation were calculated (refer to Table 
4-12) and then graphically represented (refer to Figure 4-6) to observe whether there are variations 
and/or trends in the time taken for regulatory approval across the different generations. 
Generation Number of 
Applications 
Mean 
(days) 
Standard Deviation 
(days) 
Median (days) 
1 15 507 103.73 497 
2 11 476 60.20 477 
3 7 384 158.46 441 
4 5 382 153.09 394 
5 3 204 36.14 188 
Table 4-12: Means, standard deviations and medians calculated for each generation. 
 
Figure 4-6 below, indicates a possible decrease in mean time taken for regulatory approval 
against ascending order of generations.  
 
Figure 4-6: Time taken for regulatory approvals of unique application vs. generation. Means and 
standard deviations calculated for each generation is indicated in red. 
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Furthermore, a single factor ANOVA was conducted to test the null hypothesis that the mean 
duration of the regulatory approval phase for each generation is the same. To conduct a single factor 
ANOVA the data was arranged as shown in Table 4-13, whereby each generation column was taken 
as one population. The results show that the calculated F value 5.976 is greater than the F critical 
value 2.634 (refer to Table 4-14 below). Since the F calculated is greater than F critical, null 
hypothesis is rejected. This indicates a statistically significant difference in the mean duration of the 
regulatory approval phase between the different generations (P-value 0.00085572). 
1st Generation 2nd Generation 3rd Generation 4th Generation 5th Generation 
690 538 221 536 178 
650 519 466 129 188 
537 441 450 392 245 
595 513 599 458  
558 477 379 394  
577 397 441   
463 408 132   
407 434    
587 594    
404 429    
497 487    
475     
442     
315     
410     
Table 4-13: Duration of the regulatory approval phase arranged by each generation to conduct a 
single factor ANOVA. 
 
Source of 
Variation 
SS df MS F calculated P-value F critical 
Between Groups 288091.0572 4 72022.7643 5.975596353 0.00085572 2.63353209 
Within Groups 433901.3818 36 12052.81616 
   
       
Total 721992.439 40 
    
Table 4-14: Results from the single-factor ANOVA testing the differences in mean duration 
of regulatory phase for each generation. 
 
Furthermore, non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis test was conducted in addition to ANOVA testing. 
ANOVA tests assume that the data are normally distributed. In comparison, non-parametric tests do 
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not have assumptions related any underlying distribution. This increases the robustness of the 
statistical model used in this thesis, especially considering that the population of data analyzed is 
small. The results from the Kruskal-Wallis test is as follows: 
• K statistic  : 11.858906 
• Degree of freedom : 4 
• P-value calculated : 0.018432 
 
 
The null hypothesis tested is that the duration of the regulatory approval phase for each 
generation is the same. As the P-value calculated is less than 0.05, the null hypothesis is rejected. 
This indicates that there is a statistically significant difference between the duration of the regulatory 
approval phase for the different  generations. The results from the Kruskal-Wallis test is in 
congruence with the results from the ANOVA test. 
 
Results from the single factor ANOVA and Kruskal-Wallis test were confirmed with a 
regression analysis (refer to Figure 4-7 below) to see whether there is trend in duration of regulatory 
approval time over generations. P-value calculated using this data is 0.00004. As the P-value 
calculated is less than 0.05, this indicates statistically strong evidence against the null hypothesis. 
Hence, the duration of the regulatory approval phase does change (decreases) over the generations.  
 
Figure 4-7: Time taken for regulatory approvals of unique application on or before 31st July 
2018 vs. generation. 
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Furthermore, non-parametric Spearman’s Rank correlation coefficient was calculated in 
addition to regression testing. Regression tests assume that the data are normally distributed. In 
comparison, non-parametric tests do not have assumptions related any underlying distribution. This 
increases the robustness of the statistical model used in this thesis, especially considering that the 
population of data analyzed is small. The results from the Spearman’s Rank correlation coefficient 
calculation is as follows: 
• Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient : -0.50493 
• Number of data points   : 41 
• P-value calculated    : 0.00076 
 
 
The null hypothesis tested is that the duration of the regulatory approval phase does not 
change over generations. As the P-value calculated is less than 0.05, the null hypothesis is rejected. 
This indicates that there is a statistically significant decrease in the duration of the regulatory 
approval phase over generations. The results from the Spearman’s Rank correlation test is in 
congruence with the results from the regression analysis above. 
 
4.2.3.1 Trends in Time Taken for Biosimilar Regulatory Approvals vs. Generation in the EU, 
using Adjusted Cut-Off Date 
 The Adjusted Cut-Off Date was calculated to be 21st November 2017 (refer to Section 
4.2.2.1). Table 4-15 below shows a variation of Table 4-11, where the unique biosimilars applications 
grouped under each generation and the corresponding durations of their regulatory approval phase 
for biosimilar applications on or prior to the Adjusted Cut-Off Date. 
Generation Name of Biosimilar Duration of the regulatory approval phase 
(days) 
1st mover 
biosimilars 
1.1 Valtropin 690 
1.2 Omnitrope 650 
1.3 Binocrit/ Epoetin alfa Hexal/ Abeamed 537 
1.4 Filgrastim Ratiopharm/ Ratiograstim/ Tevagrastim/ Biograstim 595 
1.5 Remsima 558 
1.6 Ovaleap 577 
1.7 Absalgar 463 
1.8 Benepali 407 
1.9 Thorinane 587 
1.10 Terrosa 404 
1.11 Truxima 497 
1.12 Amgevita/ Solymbic 475 
1.13 Ontruzant 442 
1.14 Insulin lispro Sanofi 315 
2.1 Silapo 538 
87 
 
Generation Name of Biosimilar Duration of the regulatory approval phase 
(days) 
2nd mover 
biosimilars 
2.2 Fligrastim Hexal/Zarzio 519 
2.3 Inflectra 441 
2.4 Bemfola 513 
2.5 Inhixa 477 
2.6 Lusduna 397 
2.7 Movymia 408 
2.8 Rixathon 434 
2.9 Erelzi 594 
2.10 Imraldi 429 
3rd mover 
biosimilars 
3.1 Retacrit 221 
3.2 Nivestim 466 
3.3 Flixabi 450 
3.4 Cyltezo 379 
3.5 Ritemvia 132 
4th mover 
biosimilars 
4.1 Grastofil 536 
4.2 Blitzima/Rituzena 129 
5th mover 
biosimilars 
5.1 Accofil 178 
5.2 Riximyo 188 
Table 4-15: Unique biosimilar applications on or prior to the Adjusted Cut-Off Date, grouped in 
generations and corresponding duration of their regulatory approval phase. The rows highlighted in 
blue represents non-unique applications grouped as unique applications. 
 
Means and standard deviations of each generation was calculated for biosimilar 
applications on or prior to the Adjusted Cut-Off Date (refer to Table 4-16 below). 
 
Generation Biosimilar application on or prior to 
Adjusted cut-off date 
Biosimilar applications on or prior to 31st 
July 2018 
Number  Mean 
(days) 
Standard 
Deviation (days) 
Number  Mean 
(days) 
Standard 
Deviation 
(days) 
1 14 514.07 103.98 15 507 103.73 
2 10 475 64.15 11 476 60.20 
3 5 329.6 146.95 7 384 158.46 
4 2 332.50 287.79  5 382 153.09 
5 2 183 7.07 3 204 36.14 
Table 4-16: Mean and standard deviation calculated for biosimilars applications on or prior to the 
Adjusted Cut-Off Date. 
 
Furthermore, a single factor ANOVA was conducted to test the null hypothesis that the mean 
duration of the regulatory approval phase for each generation is the same for biosimilar applications 
on or prior to the Adjusted Cut-Off Date. The results show that the calculated F calculated value 
6.15307 is greater than the F critical value 2.714076 (refer to Table 4-17 below). Since the F 
calculated is greater than F critical, null hypothesis is rejected, which indicates a statistical difference 
in the duration of the regulatory approval phase between the different generations of biosimilars (P-
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value 0.001104). This is the same trend as was discovered when the total population of biosimilar 
applications till 31st July 2018 was used. (refer to Section 4.2.3), but with a slightly smaller F 
calculated value (as might be expected because data which might spuriously increase the trend have 
been trimmed). 
Source of 
Variation SS df MS F calculated P-value F critical 
Between Groups 304872.9 4 76218.22 6.15307 0.001104 2.714076 
Within Groups 346836.6 28 12387.02           
Total 651709.5 32        
Table 4-17: Results from the single-factor ANOVA testing the differences in mean duration of 
regulatory phase for each generation for biosimilar applications on or prior to the Adjusted Cut-Off 
Date. 
 
Furthermore, non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis test was conducted in addition to ANOVA testing. 
ANOVA tests assume that the data are normally distributed. In comparison, non-parametric tests do 
not have assumptions related any underlying distribution. This increases the robustness of the 
statistical model used in this thesis, especially considering that the population of data analyzed is 
small. The results from the Kruskal-Wallis test is as follows: 
• K statistic  : 10.475630 
• Degree of freedom : 4 
• P-value calculated : 0.033134 
 
 
The null hypothesis tested is that the duration of the regulatory approval phase for each 
generation is the same. As the P-value calculated is less than 0.05, the null hypothesis is rejected. 
This indicates that there is a statistically significant difference between the duration of the regulatory 
approval phase for the different  generations. The results from the Kruskal-Wallis test is in 
congruence with the results from the ANOVA test above (Refer to Table 4-17) 
 
Results from the single factor ANOVA and Kruskal-Wallis test were confirmed with a 
regression analysis (refer to Figure 4-8 below) to see whether there is trend in duration of regulatory 
approval time over generations. P-value calculated using this data is less than 0.00001. As the P-
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value calculated is less than 0.05, this indicates statistically strong evidence against the null 
hypothesis. Hence the duration of the regulatory approval phase does change over the generations.  
 
Figure 4-8: Time taken for regulatory approvals of unique application on or before Adjusted Cut-Off 
Date vs. generation. 
 
Furthermore, non-parametric Spearman’s Rank correlation coefficient was calculated in 
addition to regression testing. Regression tests assume that the data are normally distributed. In 
comparison, non-parametric tests do not have assumptions related any underlying distribution. This 
increases the robustness of the statistical model used in this thesis, especially considering that the 
population of data analyzed is small. The results from the Spearman’s Rank correlation coefficient 
calculation is as follows: 
• Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient : -0.52902 
• Number of data points   : 33 
• P-value calculated    : 0.00155 
 
 
The null hypothesis tested is that the duration of the regulatory approval phase does not 
change over generations. As the P-value calculated is less than 0.05, the null hypothesis is rejected. 
This indicates that there is a statistically significant decrease in the duration of the regulatory 
approval phase over generations. The results from the Spearman’s Rank correlation test is in 
congruence with the results from the regression analysis above. 
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4.2.4. Trends in Time Taken for Biosimilar Regulatory Approvals for each Reference 
Originator in the EU 
This section details the findings from the data analysis conducted to investigate whether the 
molecular nature or class of drugs affects the duration of the regulatory approval phase of 
biosimilars. To identify whether the molecular nature or class of drugs had any effect on the 
regulatory approval duration, biosimilar approvals were grouped against their reference originator. 
Biosimilars must show similarity to the originator in terms of quality, biological activity, tolerability, 
and efficacy145. As such grouping biosimilars referencing the same originators, there is a direct 
comparison of molecules of similar attributes. Table 4-18 shows unique biosimilar approvals against 
their reference originator. Table 4-18 also shows that as of 31st July 2018 there have been biosimilar 
applications and subsequent regulatory approvals for biosimilars referencing 15 different originator 
biopharmaceuticals. Out of these 15 reference originators: 
• 3 reference originators have five generations of biosimilars (highlighted in yellow),  
• 2 reference originators have four generations of biosimilars (highlighted in grey),  
• 2 reference originators have three generations of biosimilars (highlighted in blue), 
• 4 reference originators have two generations of biosimilars (highlighted in green), and 
• 4 reference originators have only one generation of biosimilars (highlighted in orange). 
 
# Originator 1st Generation 2nd Generation 3rd Generation 4th Generation 5th Generation 
1 Humatrope Valtropin 
    
2 Genotropin Omnitrope 
    
3 Eprex/Erypo Binocrit/ Epoetin alfa 
Hexal/ Abseamed 
Silapo Retacrit 
  
4 Neupogen Filgrastim 
Ratiopharm/Ratiograsti
m/ Tevagrastim/ 
Biograstim 
Filgrastim Hexal 
/Zarzio 
Nivestim Grastofil Accofil 
5 Remicade Remsima Inflectra Flixabi Zessly 
 
6 Gonal-f Ovaleap Bemfola 
   
7 Lantus Absalgar Lusduna Semglee 
  
8 Enbrel Benepali Erelzi 
   
9 Clexane Thorinane Inhixa 
   
10 Forsteo Terrosa Movymia 
   
11 MabThera Truxima Rixathon Ritemvia Blitzima/Rituzena Riximyo 
12 Humira Amgevita/Solymbic Imraldi Cyltezo Hyrimoz Halimatoz/Hefiy
a 
13 Herceptin Ontruzant Herzuma Kanjinti Trazimera 
 
14 Humalog Insulin lispro Sanofi 
    
15 Avastin Mvasi 
    
Table 4-18: Summary of reference originators and the corresponding generations of 
biosimilars. 
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 The duration of the regulatory approval phase for each generation of biosimilars developed 
referencing the various originators was graphically represented to identify any characteristic trends 
(refer to Figure 4-9 below). Based on Figure 4-9, it can be observed that when there is more than 
one generation of biosimilars for a reference originator, the first generation appears to have the 
longest duration regulatory approval phase. Furthermore, in general the durations of the regulatory 
approval phase appear to decrease through the subsequent generations as confirmed by the 
statistical analysis in the previous section (refer to section 4.2.2.). 
 
 Figure 4-9: Number of days taken for regulatory approval of each generation of biosimilars 
developed using the different reference originators. 
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Initially a single factor ANOVA was conducted to see whether the mean time taken for 
regulatory approval (considering all generations from a given originator) differed significantly 
between for biosimilars, using the entire population of data. However, it was decided that this was 
not feasible, as the effect of the different number of generations for different originators would 
confound the results. Thus, it was decided to conduct a single factor ANOVA, with each ANOVA 
conducted with only the reference originators with the same number of biosimilar descendants.  
 
• ANOVA - originators with 2 biosimilar descendants 
The results of the single factor ANOVA show that the calculated F value 1.2664 is less than 
the F critical value 6.5914 (refer to Table 4-20 below). Since the F calculated is less than F critical, 
null hypothesis is accepted(P-value 0.39845129), which indicates that there is no statistical 
difference in the mean duration of the regulatory approval phase between the biosimilar descendants 
referencing the four different reference originators (Gonal-f, Enbrel, Clexane and Forsteo). 
  Descendants Gonal-f Enbrel Clexane Forsteo 
1 577 407 587 404 
2 513 590 477 408 
Table 4-19: Duration of the regulatory approval phase, arranged by each reference 
originator (column) for originator biologics with two biosimilar descendants, to conduct a 
single factor ANOVA. 
 
 
Source of 
Variation SS df MS F calculated P-value F critical 
Between 
Groups 23603.375 3 7867.79167 1.26641986 0.39845129 6.59138212 
Within Groups 24850.5 4 6212.625    
       
Total 48453.875 7         
Table 4-20: Results from the single-factor ANOVA testing the differences in mean duration 
of regulatory phase for biosimilar decedents of reference originators with two biosimilar 
descendants. 
 
 
Furthermore, non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis test was conducted in addition to ANOVA testing. 
ANOVA tests assume that the data are normally distributed. In comparison, non-parametric tests do 
not have assumptions related any underlying distribution. This increases the robustness of the 
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statistical model used in this thesis, especially considering that the population of data analyzed is 
small. The results from the Kruskal-Wallis test is as follows: 
• K statistic  : 2.83333 
• Degree of freedom : 3 
• P-value calculated : 0.418042 
 
 
The null hypothesis tested is that the duration of the regulatory approval phase between the 
descendants referencing the four different reference originators (Gonal-f, Enbrel, Clexane and 
Forsteo) is the same. As the P-value calculated is more than 0.05, the null hypothesis is accepted. 
This indicates that there is no statistically significant difference between duration of the regulatory 
approval phase of the biosimilar descendants of these four different reference originators. The 
results from the Kruskal-Wallis test is in congruence with the results from the ANOVA test. 
 
• ANOVA - originators with 3 biosimilar descendants 
The results of the single factor ANOVA show that the calculated F value 0.2012 is less than 
the F critical value 7.7086 (refer to Table 4-22 below). Since the F calculated is less than F critical, 
null hypothesis is accepted (P-value 0.20127878), which indicates that there is no statistical 
difference in the mean duration of the regulatory approval phase between the biosimilar descendants 
referencing the two different reference originators (Eprex/Erypo and Lantus). However, due to the 
limited availability of data this finding should only be considered preliminary. 
 Descendants Eprex/Erypo Lantus 
1 537 463 
2 538 397 
3 221 599 
Table 4-21: Duration of the regulatory approval, arranged by each reference originator 
(column) for originator biologics with three biosimilar descendants, to conduct a single 
factor ANOVA. 
 
 
Source of 
Variation SS df MS F calculated P-value F critical 
Between 
Groups 4428.16667 1 4428.16667 0.20127878 0.67692154 7.70864742 
Within Groups 88000.6667 4 22000.1667    
       
Total 92428.8333 5         
Table 4-22: Results from the single-factor ANOVA testing the differences in mean duration 
of regulatory phase for biosimilar decedents of reference originators with three biosimilar 
descendants. 
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Furthermore, non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis test was conducted in addition to ANOVA testing. 
ANOVA tests assume that the data are normally distributed. In comparison, non-parametric tests do 
not have assumptions related any underlying distribution. This increases the robustness of the 
statistical model used in this thesis, especially considering that the population of data analyzed is 
small. The results from the Kruskal-Wallis test is as follows: 
• K statistic  : 0.47619 
• Degree of freedom : 1 
• P-value calculated : 0.827259 
 
 
The null hypothesis tested is that the duration of the regulatory approval phase between the 
descendants referencing the two different reference originators (Eprex/Erypo and Lantus) is the 
same. As the P-value calculated is more than 0.05, the null hypothesis is accepted. This indicates 
that there is no statistically significant difference between duration of the regulatory approval phase 
of the biosimilar descendants of these two different reference originators. The results from the 
Kruskal-Wallis test is in congruence with the results from the ANOVA test. 
 
However, it should be noted that in the example of Semglee (3rd biosimilar descendent to 
Lantus originator), that there is a potential for technical issues related to manufacturing site, rather 
than the biosimilarity evaluation per se, influenced the duration of regulatory review146.  
 
• ANOVA - originators with 4 biosimilar descendants 
As there was only the originator Remicade with 4 biosimilar descendants, an ANOVA could 
not be conducted (refer to Table 4-18).  
 
• ANOVA - originators with 5 biosimilar descendants 
The results of the single factor ANOVA show that the calculated F value 1.9571 is less than 
the F critical value 3.8852 (refer to Table 4-24 below). Since the F calculated is less than F critical, 
null hypothesis is accepted (P-value 0.18381209), which indicates that there is no statistical 
difference in the mean duration of the regulatory approval phase between the biosimilar descendants 
referencing the three different reference originators (Neupogen, MabThera, and Humira). 
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  Descendants Neupogen MabThera Humira 
1 595 497 475 
2 519 434 429 
3 466 132 379 
4 536 129 458 
5 178 188 245 
Table 4-23: Duration of the regulatory approval phase, arranged by each reference 
originator (column) for originator biologics with two biosimilar descendants, to conduct a 
single factor ANOVA. 
 
 
Source of 
Variation SS df MS F calculated P-value F critical 
Between 
Groups 86499.7333 2 43249.8667 1.95711381 0.18381209 3.88529383 
Within Groups 265185.6 12 22098.8    
       
Total 351685.333 14         
Table 4-24: Results from the single-factor ANOVA testing the differences in mean duration of 
regulatory phase for biosimilar decedents of reference originators with five biosimilar descendants. 
 
Furthermore, non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis test was conducted in addition to ANOVA testing. 
ANOVA tests assume that the data are normally distributed. In comparison, non-parametric tests do 
not have assumptions related any underlying distribution. This increases the robustness of the 
statistical model used in this thesis, especially considering that the population of data analyzed is 
small. The results from the Kruskal-Wallis test is as follows: 
• K statistic  : 3.9800 
• Degree of freedom : 2 
• P-value calculated : 0.136695 
 
 
The null hypothesis tested is that the duration of the regulatory approval phase between the 
descendants referencing the three different reference originators (Neupogen, MabThera, and 
Humira) is the same. As the P-value calculated is more than 0.05, the null hypothesis is accepted. 
This indicates that there is no statistically significant difference between duration of the regulatory 
approval phase of the biosimilar descendants of these three different reference originators. The 
results from the Kruskal-Wallis test is in congruence with the results from the ANOVA test. 
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4.2.4.1. Trends in Time Taken for Biosimilar Regulatory Approvals for each Reference 
Originator in the EU, with the Adjusted Cut-Off Date 
 In the trend analysis of time taken for biosimilar regulatory approval for each reference 
originator, the analysis compared originators with same number of descendants irrespective of the 
time of application by the first biosimilar. As such the effect of any pending application was not 
considered as a factor that could potentially have skewed the trend analysis. Hence, it was decided 
that the Adjusted Cut-Off Date would not be considered.  
 
4.2.4.2. Trends in Time Taken for Biosimilar Regulatory Approvals for each Reference 
Originator in the EU, Including Available Reference Originator Approval Times 
Based on the results of the ANOVA conducted (refer to Tables 4-20, 4-22 and 4-24), a 
potential trend observed is that the duration of regulatory approval phase for biosimilars approved in 
the EU does not vary significantly between the different reference originators. 
 
The researcher then investigated the possibility of collating data on the duration of regulatory 
approval phase for each of the 15 reference originators. The duration of regulatory approval phase 
for 8 out of the 15 reference originators could be calculated from the available data in the publicly 
available EMA databases. These data points along with data points from Figure 4-9 were then 
graphically represented in Figure 4-10. 
 
Figure 4-10 shows that based on this limited data set, the duration of the regulatory approval 
phase for 3 originators (refer to generation 0 in Figure 4-10) was shorter in comparison to the duration 
of the regulatory approval for their corresponding first generation biosimilars. These 3 originators are 
Remicade, Lantus and MabThera. 
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Figure 4-10: Number of days taken for regulatory approval of each generation of biosimilars 
developed using the different reference originators and their reference originators. Column 0 
represents the number of days taken for regulatory approval for reference originators. 
 
 
4.2.5. 95% Confidence Interval Calculations for Biosimilar Approvals in the EU 
4.2.5.1. 95% Confidence Interval Calculation, without the Adjusted Cut-Off Date 
 To further understand the distribution of time taken for biosimilar regulatory approval, 95% 
confidence interval was calculated for biosimilar approvals on or prior to 31st July 2018 (entire study 
population). Refer to Table 4-25 below for the results of this calculation. 
 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5
Humatrope 690
Genotropin 650
Eprex/Erypo 537 538 221
Neupogen 595 519 466 536 178
Remicade 526 558 441 450 392
Gonal-f 688 577 513
Lantus 438 463 397 599
Enbrel 478 407 590
Clexane 587 477
Forsteo 740 404 408
MabThera 460 497 434 132 129 188
Humira 529 475 429 379 458 245
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Mean 440.2927 days 
Standard Deviation 134.4624 
Population size 41 
Standard Error of the Mean 20.9995 days 
Lower Limit (Mean – 1.96*Standard Error of the Mean) 399.1336 days 
Upper Limit (Mean + 1.96*Standard Error of the Mean) 481.4517 days 
Table 4-25: Results from 95% confidence interval calculation for biosimilar approvals in the 
EU, on or prior to 31st July 2018. 
 
 
 Results show that 95% confidence interval falls between 399 to 481 days. Looking at the 
time it took for biosimilar regulatory approvals in Table 4-2 above, 25 out of the 41 biosimilars (60.9% 
of regulatory approvals) fall outside of the 95% confidence level. This indicates a tight cluster of a 
subset of data points around the mean, with 60.9% of the falling outside of the 95% confidence 
interval (refer to Figure 4-11 below). 
 
Figure 4-11: Mean and 95% confidence interval for biosimilar approvals in the EU, on or 
prior to 31st July 2018. 
 
4.2.5.2. 95% Confidence Interval Calculation, using the Adjusted Cut-Off Date 
 The 95% Confidence Interval was then calculated for biosimilar approvals using the Adjusted 
Cut-Off Date. Refer to Table 4-26 below for the results of this calculation. 
Mean 443.21 days 
Standard Deviation 142.71 days 
Population size 33 
Standard Error of the Mean 24.8425 days 
Lower Limit (Mean – 1.96*Standard Error of the Mean) 394.5208 days 
Upper Limit (Mean + 1.96*Standard Error of the Mean) 491.9034 days 
Table 4-26: Results from 95% confidence interval calculation for biosimilar approvals in the 
EU, on or prior to the Adjusted Cut-Off Date. 
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Results show that 95% confidence interval falls between 394 to 491 days. Looking at the 
time it took for biosimilar regulatory approvals in Table 4-2 above, 20 out of the 33 biosimilars (58.8% 
of regulatory approvals) falls outside of the 95% confidence level. Similar to the analysis in Section 
4.2.51, this indicates tight cluster of a subset of data points around the mean are clustered around 
the mean, with the balance percentage of the data falling outside of the 95% confidence interval 
(refer to Figure 4-12 below).  
 
 
Figure 4-12: Mean and 95% confidence interval for biosimilar approvals in the EU, on or 
prior to the Adjusted Cut-Off Date. 
 
4.2.6. Summary of Key Findings - Biosimilar Regulatory Approvals in the European Union 
Based on the data analysis conducted indicate the following potential trends and findings for 
biosimilar regulatory approvals for 41 unique biosimilars: 
• durations of regulatory approval phase for biosimilars approved in the EU vary significantly 
between the different application years, with the duration of regulatory approval phase 
decreasing in the later years, 
• durations of regulatory approval phase for biosimilars approved in the EU shows significant 
variation between each subsequent generation of biosimilars, with the duration of regulatory 
approval phases decreasing with each subsequent generation 
• durations of regulatory approval phase for biosimilars approved in the EU does not differ 
significantly between the different reference originators, and 
• close to 60% of the data points were found to be outside of the 95% confidence interval, so 
it is going to be difficult to predict the expected duration of time a biosimilar application will 
take to gain regulatory approval phase in the EU. 
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The above trends and findings were found to be consistent when the investigation was 
conducted with  sensitivity analysis using the Adjusted Cut-off Date to prevent right censoring by 
recent data points. The sensitivity analysis was conducted using 33 of the 41 unique biosimilar 
approvals in the EMA. In addition to the above trends, it is interesting to note that some of the 1st 
generation biosimilars had a lengthier regulatory approval phase compared to their reference 
originator biopharmaceuticals.  
 
The next section of this chapter will summarize the findings from a similar data analysis 
conducted for biosimilar approvals in the United States, on or prior to 31st July 2018. 
 
4.3.  Biosimilar Regulatory Approvals in the United States 
 In the United States, all medicines including biosimilars, must be approved by the FDA and 
receives a license number from the Department of Health and Human Services USA, prior to being 
marketed and made available to patients. For biosimilars, the pathway to FDA approval commences 
when a biosimilar developer files for an aBLA using the 351(k) pathway (refer to Chapter 2, Section 
2.5). For this study the date on which the FDA receives the aBLA is considered as the date on which 
the regulatory approval process commences (application date), and the date of FDA approval and 
licensure is considered as the regulatory approval date for biosimilars in Europe. The following 
sections look into the regulatory approval phase of biosimilars that have received FDA approval on 
or prior to 31st July 2018 with the aim of answering the current research question. 
 
4.3.1. The Number of Biosimilars that have Received Regulatory Approval in the United States 
of America 
 In February 2012, the FDA issued three guidelines that paved the pathway for biosimilar 
applications and subsequent approvals147. From February 2012 to July 2018, twelve biosimilars have 
received FDA approvals (refer to Table 4-27 below). 
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Biosimila
r 
(Propriet
ary 
Name) 
Product 
(Proper) 
Name - as 
per FDA 
Definition 
INN Originator Originator 
Company 
Biosimilar 
Company 
aBLA 
number 
Date of aBLA 
(application 
date) 
Biosimilar 
Date of 
Licensure 
(approval 
date) 
Zarxio filgrastim-
sndz 
filgrastim Neupogen Amgen Inc. Sandoz Inc. (BLA) 
125553 
8-May-14 6-Mar-15 
Inflectra infliximab-
dyyb 
infliximab Remicade Janssen 
Biotech 
Celltrion 
Inc. 
(BLA) 
125544 
8-Aug-14 5-Apr-15 
Retacrit epoetin alfa-
epbx 
epoetin 
alfa 
Epogen/Pr
ocrit 
Amgen Inc. Hospira 
Inc. 
(BLA) 
125545 
16-Dec-14 15-May-18 
Erelzi etanercept-
szzs 
etanercept Enbrel Amgen Inc Sandoz Inc. (BLA) 
761042 
30-Jul-15 30-Aug-16 
Amjevita adalimumab
-atto 
adalimunab Humira Abbvie Inc Amgen Inc. (BLA) 
761024 
25-Nov-15 23-Sep-16 
Renflexis infliximab-
abda 
infliximab Remicade Janssen 
Biotech 
Samsung 
Bioepis Co. 
Ltd 
(BLA) 
761054 
21-Mar-16 21-Apr-17 
Cyltezo adalimumab
-adbm 
adalimunab Humira Abbvie Inc Boehringer 
Ingelheim 
Pharmaceu
ticals, Inc. 
(BLA) 
761058 
27-Oct-16 25-Aug-17 
Ogivri trastuzumab
-dkst 
trastuzuma
b 
Herceptin Genentech, 
Inc. 
Mylan 
GmbH 
(BLA) 
761074 
3-Nov-16 1-Dec-17 
Mvasi bevacizuma
b-awwb 
bevacizuma
b 
Avastin Genentech, 
Inc. 
Amgen Inc. (BLA) 
761028 
14-Nov-16 14-Sep-17 
Fulphila pegfilgrasti
m-jmdb 
pegfilgrasti
m 
Neulasta Amgen Inc. Mylan 
GmbH 
(BLA) 
761075 
9-Dec-16 4-Jun-18 
Ixifi infliximab-
qbtx 
infliximab Remicade Janssen 
Biotech 
Pfizer Inc. (BLA) 
761072 
13-Feb-17 13-Dec-17 
Nivestim filgrastim-
aafi 
filgrastim Neupogen Amgen Inc. Hospira 
Inc. 
(BLA) 
761080 
21-Sep-17 20-Jul-18 
Table 4-27: List of biosimilars approvals in the U.S., (Updated on 31st July 2018). The above list is 
in arranged from the earliest application to the latest application. 
 
 
4.3.2. Trends in Time Taken for Biosimilar Regulatory Approvals vs. Date of Application  
The time taken for the regulatory approval process was determined by calculating the number 
of days between the application date to the date which FDA notifies approval and licensure. Figure 
4-13 below shows the time taken for regulatory approval for biosimilar approvals till 31st July 2018 
as per Table 4-27. As there are only 12 available data points, the results are only interpreted as 
preliminary. 
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Figure 4-13: Time taken for regulatory approval for biosimilar approvals till 31st July 2018.  The 
biosimilars were arranged in the order of application dates but not on a linear timescale. 
 
 
The mean, standard deviation, median and interquartile range calculated for the time taken 
for regulatory approval are presented in Table 4-28. 
Number of data points  12 
Mean 419 days 
Population standard deviation 260.45 days 
Median 304.00 days 
Quartile 1 302.00 days 
Quartile 3 396.00 days 
Interquartile range (Quartile 3 minus Quartile 1) 94.00 days 
Table 4-28: Mean, standard deviation, median and interquartile range calculated. 
 A single factor ANOVA was conducted to see whether the mean time taken for regulatory 
approval differed significantly between the different application years. The data was arranged as 
shown in Table 4-29, whereby each application year column was taken as one population.  
2014 2015 2016 2017 
302 397 396 303 
240 303 302 302 
1246   393   
    304   
    542   
Table 4-29: Duration of the regulatory approval phase arranged by each application year to 
conduct a single factor ANOVA. 
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
Le
ng
th
 o
f t
he
 re
gu
la
to
ry
 a
pp
ro
va
l p
ro
ce
ss
 
(d
ay
s)
Biosimilar
103 
 
The null hypothesis tested is that the mean duration of the regulatory approval phase for 
each application year is the same. The results show that the F calculated value 0.5332 is less than 
the F critical value 4.0662 (refer to Table 4-30 below). Since the F calculated < F critical, null 
hypothesis is accepted. This indicates that between the different application years there is no 
statistically significant difference in the mean duration of the regulatory approval phase and hence 
the time taken for regulatory approval (P-value = 0.672232) 
Source of Variation SS df MS F calculated P-value F critical 
Between Groups 135646 3 45215.32 0.533242 0.672232 4.066181 
Within Groups 678345.7 8 84793.21    
       
Total 813991.7 11     
 
Table 4-30: Results from the single-factor ANOVA testing the differences in mean duration of 
regulatory phase for each year of application. 
 
Furthermore, non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis test was conducted in addition to ANOVA testing. 
ANOVA tests assume that the data are normally distributed. In comparison, non-parametric tests do 
not have assumptions related any underlying distribution. This increases the robustness of the 
statistical model used in this thesis, especially considering that the population of data analyzed is 
small. The results from the Kruskal-Wallis test is as follows: 
• K statistic  : 1.830724 
• Degree of freedom : 3 
• P-value calculated : 0.608272 
 
 
The null hypothesis tested is that the duration of the regulatory approval phase for each 
application year is the same. As the P-value calculated is more than 0.05, the null hypothesis is 
accepted. This indicates that there is no statistically significant difference between the duration of 
the regulatory approval phase for the different  years. The results from the Kruskal-Wallis test is in 
congruence with the results from the ANOVA test (refer to Table 4-30). 
 
Results from the single factor ANOVA and Kruskal-Wallis test were confirmed with a 
regression analysis. A scatter plot was drawn to examine whether there was a correlation between 
the date of regulatory application and the time taken for regulatory approval (refer to Figure 4-14). 
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The linear trendline in Figure 4-14 indicates that the duration of the pre-market regulatory approval 
phase has decreased over time. The R2 value was calculated to be 0.0665, which corresponds to 
6.65% of the variability in the linear model. P-value calculated using this data is 0.4183 (refer to 
Figure 4-14 below).  As the P-value calculated is greater than 0.05, this indicates statistically strong 
evidence to accept the null hypothesis, that the duration of the regulatory approval phase does not 
change over the years.  
Figure 4-14: Duration of the pre-market regulatory approval phase vs. application date. 
 
Furthermore, non-parametric Spearman’s Rank correlation coefficient was calculated in 
addition to regression testing. Regression tests assume that the data are normally distributed. In 
comparison, non-parametric tests do not have assumptions related any underlying distribution. This 
increases the robustness of the statistical model used in this thesis, especially considering that the 
population of data analyzed is small. The results from the Spearman’s Rank correlation coefficient 
calculation is as follows: 
• Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient : 0.07861 
• Number of data points   : 12 
• P-value calculated    : 0.808155 
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The null hypothesis tested is that the duration of the regulatory approval phase does not 
change with different application date. As the P-value calculated is greater than 0.05, the null 
hypothesis is accepted. This indicates that there is no statistically significant difference in the 
duration of the regulatory approval phase over time. The results from the Spearman’s Rank 
correlation test is in congruence with the results from the regression analysis above. 
 
4.3.2.1. Sensitivity Analysis : Investigation of the need for an Adjusted Cut-Off Date 
Unlike in the European Union, the scatter diagram looking at regulatory approval phase 
versus the application date for biosimilars approved in the United States did not indicate any obvious 
potential right-censoring of data. However, to statistically examine whether there is a skewing 
sensitivity of R2 value was calculated at different time points to compare with overall R2. This was 
conducted to identify whether there is an inflection point in R2 value over this time period. Figure 4-
15 below shows the different dates selected for calculation of R2. Table 4-31 summarizes the 
variation in R2 sensitivity in comparison to overall R2 value. 
 
Figure 4-15: Indicates the different dates selected to calculate the sensitivity of R2 values. 
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Corresponding Figure 4-
15 Indicator 
Details R2 Values 
Not Applicable Overall R2 value R2 = 0.0665 
A Biosimilar Applications prior to 01st Feb 2016 R2 = 0.001 
B Biosimilar Applications prior to 01st Apr 2016 R2 = 0.0086 
C Biosimilar Applications prior to 01st Dec 2016 R2 = 0.0598 
D Biosimilar Applications prior to 01st Jan 2017 R2 = 0.0335 
Table 4-31: Summary of R2 values at different cut-off dates. 
 
Based on the calculated values for R2 in Table 4-31, there is an inflection point for R2 values 
in the period between 01st April 2016 to 01st December 2016. There were three biosimilar applications 
in this period of time (refer to Table 4-27). It is interesting to note that with the removal of the very 
recent approvals the time taken for regulatory approval seem to be consistent (refer to Figures 4-16 
and 4-17 below).  
 
 
Figure 4-16: Duration of the pre-market regulatory approval phase vs. application date, for 
biosimilar approvals till 01st February 2016. 
 
 
107 
 
 
Figure 4-17: Duration of the pre-market regulatory approval phase vs. application date, for 
biosimilar approvals till 01st April 2016. 
 
Whilst, the R2 potential inflection after 01st April 2016, it was decided that for generational 
(Section 4.3.3) and reference originator analysis (Section 4.3.4) an Adjusted Cut-Off Date is not 
necessary as the explanatory variable in these scenarios is categorical rather than linear. It should 
however be noted here that there was one extreme outlier (Retacrit) (2.37 times of standard 
deviations from the mean of the first mover biosimilars) that was considered likely to skew the data. 
This is dealt with below (see 4.3.2.2). 
 
4.3.2.2. Trends in Time Taken for Biosimilar Regulatory Approvals vs. Date of Application, 
after removing Retacrit from the Study Population 
The time taken for regulatory approval of Retacrit was 1,246 days, which is 2.972 times the 
population average and 4.788 times the population standard deviation. Retacrit was developed and 
marketed by Pfizer Inc. The regulatory approval for Retacrit was delayed due to a request for more 
data by the FDA after the initial evaluation of the application in 2015148 and was further delayed due 
to regulatory concerns over the manufacturing site in 2017149. The data analysis was conducted with 
and without Retacrit, as these delays due to the regulatory concerns at the manufacturing plant may 
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potentially confound the data analysis. The mean, standard deviation, median and interquartile range 
calculated for the time taken for regulatory approval, without Retacrit, are presented in Table 4-32. 
Number of data points  11 
Mean 344.00 days 
Population standard deviation 78.73 days 
Median 303.00 days 
Interquartile range 93.00 days 
Table 4-32: Mean and standard deviation calculated, without Retacrit. 
  A single factor ANOVA was conducted to see whether the mean time taken for regulatory 
approval differed significantly between the different application years. The data was arranged as 
shown in Table 4-33, whereby each application year column was taken as one population. 
2014 2015 2016 2017 
302 397 396 303 
240 303 302 302  
  393   
    304   
    542   
Table 4-33: Duration of the regulatory approval phase, without Retacrit, arranged by each 
application year to conduct a single factor ANOVA. 
 
The null hypothesis tested is that the mean duration of the regulatory approval phase for 
each application year is the same. The results show that the F calculated value 1.2344 is less than 
the F critical value 4.3468 (refer to Table 4-34 below). Since the F calculated < F critical, null 
hypothesis is accepted  (P-value = 0.3668). This indicates that there is no statistically significant 
difference in the mean duration of the regulatory approval phase between the different application 
years. As such removing Retacrit has not changed the outcome from the single-factor ANOVA 
calculations (refer to section 4.3.2). However, it must be remembered that this finding must be 
regarded as provisional and could change in the next few years, with more biosimilar applications. 
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Source of Variation SS df MS 
F 
calculated P-value F critical 
Between Groups 23592.3 3 7864.1 1.234395 0.3668 4.346831 
Within Groups 44595.7 7 6370.814    
       
Total 68188 10         
Table 4-34: Results from the single-factor ANOVA, without Retacrit, testing the differences in mean 
duration of regulatory phase for each year of application. 
 
Furthermore, non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis test was conducted in addition to ANOVA 
testing. ANOVA tests assume that the data are normally distributed. In comparison, non-parametric 
tests do not have assumptions related any underlying distribution. This increases the robustness of 
the statistical model used in this thesis, especially considering that the population of data analyzed 
is small. The results from the Kruskal-Wallis test is as follows: 
• K statistic  : 5.306977 
• Degree of freedom : 3 
• P-value calculated : 0.150650 
 
 
The null hypothesis tested is that the duration of the regulatory approval phase for each 
application year is the same. As the P-value calculated is more than 0.05, the null hypothesis is 
accepted. This indicates that there is no statistically significant difference between the duration of 
the regulatory approval phase for the different  years, without Retacrit. The results from the Kruskal-
Wallis test is in congruence with the results from the ANOVA test (refer to Table 4-34). 
 
Furthermore, the results from the single factor ANOVA and Kruskal-Wallis test were 
confirmed with this regression analysis. A scatter plot was drawn to examine whether there was a 
correlation between the date of regulatory application and the time taken for regulatory approval 
(refer to Figure 4-18). The R2 value was calculated to be 0.079, which corresponds to 7.9% of the 
variability in the linear model. P-value calculated using this data is 0.4024 (refer to Figure 4-18 
below).  As the P-value calculated is greater than 0.05, this indicates statistically strong evidence to 
accept the null hypothesis, that the duration of the regulatory approval phase does not change over 
the years.  
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Figure 4-18: Duration of the pre-market regulatory approval phase vs. application date, with 
Retacrit removed. 
 
Furthermore, non-parametric Spearman’s Rank correlation coefficient was calculated in addition 
to regression testing. Regression test assume that the data are normally distributed. In comparison, 
non-parametric tests do not have assumptions related any underlying distribution. This increases 
the robustness of the statistical model used in this thesis, especially considering that the population 
of data analyzed is small. The results from the Spearman’s Rank correlation coefficient calculation 
is as follows: 
• Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient : 0.220455 
• Number of data points   : 11 
• P-value calculated    : 0.5149 
 
 
The null hypothesis tested is that the duration of the regulatory approval phase does not 
change with different application date. As the P-value calculated is greater than 0.05, the null 
hypothesis is accepted. This indicates that there is no statistically significant difference in the 
duration of the regulatory approval phase over time, without Retacrit. The results from the 
Spearman’s Rank correlation test is in congruence with the results from the regression analysis 
above. 
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4.3.3. Trends in Time Taken for Biosimilar Regulatory Approvals vs. Generation 
As discussed in the analysis for biosimilars approvals by the EMA, biosimilar applications to 
the FDA must show high similarity to and no clinically meaningful differences from an existing FDA 
approved originator150. As such grouping biosimilars referencing the same originators, there is a 
direct comparison of molecules of similar attributes. Table 4-35 below shows the biosimilars 
applications in the U.S. grouped under each generation and the corresponding durations of their 
regulatory approval phase. From Table 4-35, it can be observed that there are eight 1st generation 
biosimilar approvals showing that biosimilars have been developed using eight reference originators. 
Furthermore, there are three 2nd generation and one 3rd generation biosimilar applications and 
subsequent approvals. 
Generation Name of Biosimilar Duration of 
regulatory approval 
phase (days) 
1st mover biosimilars 1.1 Zarxio 302 
1.2 Inflectra 240 
1.3 Retacrit 1246 
1.4 Erelzi 397 
1.5 Amjevita 303 
1.6 Ogivri 393 
1.7 Mvasi 304 
1.8 Fulphila 542 
2nd mover biosimilars 2.1 Renflexis 396 
2.2 Cyletzo 302 
2.3 Nivestim 302 
3rd mover biosimilars 3.1 Ixifi 303 
Table 4-35: Biosimilar applications grouped in generations and corresponding duration of their 
regulatory approval phase. 
 
Means, standard deviations and medians of each generation was calculated (refer to Table 
4-36) to observe whether there are variations and/or trends in the time taken for regulatory approval 
across the different generations. Means and standard deviations are also graphically represented in 
Figure 4-19 below. 
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Generation Number of 
biosimilars 
Mean (days) Standard Deviation (days) Median (days) 
1 8 466 328.43 348.5 
2 3 333 54.27 302 
3 1 Not Applicable Not Applicable Not Applicable 
Table 4-36: Means, standard deviations and medians calculated for each generation. 
Figure 4-19 below, indicates a possible decrease in mean time taken for regulatory approval 
against ascending order of generations. It should be noted that biosimilar Ixifi is the only 3rd 
generation biosimilar approved by the FDA as of 31st July 2018.  
 
Figure 4-19: Time taken for regulatory approvals vs. generation. Means and standard deviations 
calculated for each generation is indicated in red. 
 
 
Furthermore, a single factor ANOVA was conducted to test the null hypothesis that the mean 
duration of the regulatory approval phase for each generation is the same. To conduct a single factor 
ANOVA the data was arranged as shown in Table 4-37, whereby each generation column was taken 
as one population. The results show that the calculated F value 0.3137 is less than the F critical 
value 4.2565 (refer to Table 4-38 below). Since the F calculated is less than F critical, null hypothesis 
is accepted, indicating that there is no statistical difference in the mean duration of the regulatory 
approval phase between the different generations (P-value 0.738399). 
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1st mover 
biosimilars 
2nd mover 
biosimilars 
3rd mover 
biosimilars 
302 396 303 
240 302   
1246 302   
397     
303     
393     
304     
542     
Table 4-37: Duration of the regulatory approval phase arranged by each generation to conduct a 
single factor ANOVA. 
 
Source of Variation SS df MS F calculated P-value F critical 
Between Groups 53050.125 2 26525.06 0.313724 0.738399 4.256495 
Within Groups 760941.5417 9 84549.06 
   
       
Total 813991.6667 11 
    
Table 4-38: Results from the single-factor ANOVA testing the differences in mean duration 
of regulatory phase for each generation. 
 
Furthermore, non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis test was conducted in addition to ANOVA testing. 
ANOVA tests assume that the data are normally distributed. In comparison, non-parametric tests do 
not have assumptions related any underlying distribution. This increases the robustness of the 
statistical model used in this thesis, especially considering that the population of data analyzed is 
small. The results from the Kruskal-Wallis test is as follows: 
• K statistic  : 0.902802 
• Degree of freedom : 2 
• P-value calculated : 0.636735 
 
 
The null hypothesis tested is that the duration of the regulatory approval phase for each 
generation is the same. As the P-value calculated is more than 0.05, the null hypothesis is accepted. 
This indicates that there is no statistically significant difference between the duration of the regulatory 
approval phase for the different generations. The results from the Kruskal-Wallis test is in 
congruence with the results from the ANOVA test (refer to Table 4-38). 
 
Results from the single factor ANOVA and Kruskal-Wallis test were confirmed with a 
regression analysis (refer to Figure 4-20 below). R2 value was calculated to be 0.06, which 
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corresponds to an 6% of the variability in the linear model. P-value calculated using this data is 
0.4431. As the P-value calculated is greater than 0.05, this indicates statistically strong evidence to 
accept the null hypothesis, that the duration of the regulatory approval phase does not change over 
generations.  
 
 
Figure 4-20: Duration of the regulatory approval phase vs. generation. 
 
Furthermore, non-parametric Spearman’s Rank correlation coefficient was calculated in 
addition to regression testing. Regression test assume that the data are normally distributed. In 
comparison, non-parametric tests do not have assumptions related any underlying distribution. This 
increases the robustness of the statistical model used in this thesis, especially considering that the 
population of data analyzed is small. The results from the Spearman’s Rank correlation coefficient 
calculation is as follows: 
• Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient : -0.27345 
• Number of data points   : 12 
• P-value calculated    : 0.3898 
 
 
The null hypothesis tested is that the duration of the regulatory approval phase does not 
change with different generations. As the P-value calculated is greater than 0.05, the null hypothesis 
is accepted. This indicates that there is no statistically significant difference in the duration of the 
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regulatory approval phase over generations. The results from the Spearman’s Rank correlation test 
is in congruence with the results from the regression analysis above. 
 
4.3.3.1. Trends in Time Taken for Biosimilar Regulatory Approvals vs. Generation, without 
Retacrit 
The data analysis was then conducted without Retacrit, as discussed in section 4.3.2.2., the 
delays experienced were due to the regulatory concerns at the manufacturing plant for Retacrit. It 
was suspected that this extreme outlier might confound the data analysis. Means, standard 
deviations and medians without Retacrit, for each generation were calculated (refer to Table 4-39 
below)  to observe whether there are variations and/or trends in the time taken for regulatory approval 
between the different generations. Means and standard deviations are also graphically represented 
in Figure 4-21 below.  
Generation Number of 
biosimilars 
Mean (days) Standard Deviation 
(days) 
Median (days) 
1 7 354 99.59 304 
2 3 333 54.27 302 
3 1 Not Applicable Not Applicable Not Applicable 
Table 4-39: Means, standard deviations and medians calculated for each generation, without 
including Retacrit. 
 
 
Figure 4-21: Time taken for regulatory approvals vs. generation, without Retacrit. Means and 
standard deviations calculated for each generation is indicated in red. 
 
Figure 4-21 above, indicates a possible decrease in mean time taken for regulatory approval 
against ascending order of generations. 
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A single factor ANOVA was conducted to test the null hypothesis that the mean duration of 
the regulatory approval phase for each generation is the same. To conduct a single factor ANOVA 
the data was arranged as shown in Table 4-40, whereby each generation column was taken as one 
population. Retacrit was excluded from this data. The results show that the calculated F value 0.1702 
is less than the F critical value 4.45897 (refer to Table 4-41 below). Since the F calculated is less 
than F critical, null hypothesis is accepted, indicating that there is no statistical difference in the 
duration of the regulatory approval phase and hence the time taken for regulatory approval between 
the different generations (P-value 0.846439). Thus, the removal of Retacrit has only slightly changed 
the F-calculated value from the single-factor ANOVA calculations in this scenario and has not 
changed the overall conclusion. 
 
1st mover 
biosimilars 
2nd mover 
biosimilars 
3rd mover 
biosimilars 
302 396 303 
240 302   
397 302   
303     
393     
304     
542     
Table 4-40: Duration of the regulatory approval phase arranged by each generation, without 
Retacrit, to conduct a single factor ANOVA. 
 
Source of 
Variation SS df MS F calculated P-value 
F 
critical 
Between Groups 2783.619048 2 1391.81 0.170241 0.846439 4.45897 
Within Groups 65404.38095 8 8175.548    
       
Total 68188 10     
Table 4-41: Results from the single-factor ANOVA testing the differences in mean duration of 
regulatory phase for each generation. 
 
Furthermore, non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis test was conducted in addition to ANOVA 
testing. ANOVA tests assume that the data are normally distributed. In comparison, non-parametric 
tests do not have assumptions related any underlying distribution. This increases the robustness of 
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the statistical model used in this thesis, especially considering that the population of data analyzed 
is small. The results from the Kruskal-Wallis test is as follows: 
• K statistic  : 0.465116 
• Degree of freedom : 2 
• P-value calculated : 0.792504 
 
 
The null hypothesis tested is that the duration of the regulatory approval phase for each 
generation is the same. As the P-value calculated is more than 0.05, the null hypothesis is accepted. 
This indicates that there is no statistically significant difference between the duration of the regulatory 
approval phase for the different generations, without Retacrit. The results from the Kruskal-Wallis 
test is in congruence with the results from the ANOVA test (refer to Table 4-41). 
 
Results from the single factor ANOVA was confirmed with a regression analysis (refer to 
Figure 4-22 below). R2 value was calculated to be 0.0403, which corresponds to an 4.03% of the 
variability in the linear model. P-value calculated using this data is 0.5538. As the P-value calculated 
is greater than 0.05, this indicates statistically strong evidence to accept the null hypothesis, that the 
duration of the regulatory approval phase does not change over generations.  
 
   Figure 4-22: Duration of the regulatory approval phase, without Retacrit vs. generation. 
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Furthermore, non-parametric Spearman’s Rank correlation coefficient was calculated in 
addition to regression testing. Regression tests assume that the data are normally distributed. In 
comparison, non-parametric tests do not have assumptions related any underlying distribution. This 
increases the robustness of the statistical model used in this thesis, especially considering that the 
population of data analyzed is small. The results from the Spearman’s Rank correlation coefficient 
calculation is as follows: 
• Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient : -0.19949 
• Number of data points   : 11 
• P-value calculated    : 0.55647 
 
 
The null hypothesis tested is that the duration of the regulatory approval phase does not 
change with different generations, without Retacrit. As the P-value calculated is greater than 0.05, 
the null hypothesis is accepted. This indicates that there is no statistically significant difference in 
the duration of the regulatory approval phase over generations, without Retacrit. The results from 
the Spearman’s Rank correlation test is in congruence with the results from the regression analysis 
above. 
 
4.3.4. Trends in Time Taken for Biosimilar Regulatory Approvals for each Reference 
Originator 
This section details the findings from the data analysis conducted to investigate whether the 
molecular nature or class of drug affects the duration of the regulatory approval phase of biosimilars. 
To identify whether the molecular nature or class of drugs had any effect on the regulatory approval 
duration, biosimilar approvals were grouped against their reference originator. Table 4-42 shows 
unique biosimilar approvals against their reference originator. Table 4-42 also shows that as of 31st 
July 2018 there have been biosimilar applications and subsequent regulatory approvals for 
biosimilars referencing 8 different originator biopharmaceuticals. Out of these 8 reference 
originators: 
 
• 1 reference originator has three generations of biosimilars (highlighted in yellow),  
• 2 reference originators have two generations of biosimilars (highlighted in grey),  
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• 5 reference originators have only one generation of biosimilars (highlighted in green). 
 
# Originator 1st Generation 2nd Generation 3rd Generation 
1 Neupogen Zarxio Nivestim 
 
2 Remicade Inflectra Renflexis Ixifi 
3 Epogen/Procrit Retacrit 
  
4 Enbrel Erelzi 
  
5 Humira Amjevita Cyletzo 
 
6 Avastin Mvasi 
  
7 Herceptin Ogivri 
  
8 Neulasta Fulphila 
  
Table 4-42: Summary of reference originators and the corresponding generations of 
biosimilars. 
 
 
 The duration of the regulatory approval phase for each generation of biosimilars referencing 
the different originators was graphically represented to identify any trends (refer to Figure 4-23 
below). Figure 4-23 shows that for the data available, except for the Epogen/Procrit biosimilar 
(Retacrit), the number of days for regulatory approval remains consistent across the generations, for 
three different reference originators. However, the data set is of limited size, so this conclusion must 
be regarded as provisional at this stage. No further statistical analysis was conducted due to limited 
availability of data. 
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 Figure 4-23: Number of days taken for regulatory approval of each generation of biosimilars 
developed referencing different originators. 
 
4.3.5. 95% Confidence Interval for all Biosimilar Approvals in the United States 
 To further understand the distribution of time taken for biosimilar regulatory approval, 95% 
confidence interval was calculated for biosimilar approvals on or prior to 31st July 2018 (entire study 
population). Refer to Table 4-43 below for the results of this calculation. 
Mean 419.1667 days 
Standard Deviation 272.0280 days 
Population size 12 
Standard Error of the Mean 78.5277 days 
Lower Limit (Mean – 1.96*Standard Error of the Mean) 265.2523 
Upper Limit (Mean + 1.96*Standard Error of the Mean) 573.0810 
Table 4-43: Results from 95% confidence interval calculation for biosimilar approvals in the 
U.S. 
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 Results show that 95% confidence interval lies between 265 to 573 days. Looking at the time 
it took for biosimilar regulatory approvals in Table 4-35 above, only 2 out of the 12 biosimilars falls 
outside of the 95% confidence level. These two biosimilars are Retacrit and Inflectra, with time taken 
for regulatory approvals being 1246 days and 240 days respectively. This indicates that an expected 
large percentage of data points fall within the 95% confidence interval (refer to Figure 4-24 below). 
 
Figure 4-24: Mean and 95% confidence interval for biosimilar approvals in the U.S. 
 
4.3.5.1. 95% Confidence Interval Calculation, without Retacrit 
 The 95% Confidence Interval was then calculated for biosimilar approvals in the US, without 
Retacrit. Refer to Table 4-44 below for the results of this calculation. Results show that 95% 
confidence interval lies between 295 to 392 days. As expected, the 95% confidence interval without 
Retacrit was much narrower than with Retracrit. Looking at the time it took for biosimilar regulatory 
approvals in Table 4-35 above, 4 out of the 11 biosimilars falls outside of the 95% confidence level. 
Of the four biosimilars, Erelzi and Renflexis fall marginally outside the 95% confidence interval with 
durations of regulatory approval being 295 and 392 days respectively. Inflectra (240 days) and 
Fulphila (540 days) are the other two biosimilars that fall outside of the 95% confidence interval. 
Erelzi and Renflexis marginally, 295 and 396 days respectively (refer to Figure 4-25 below). 
Mean 344 days 
Standard Deviation 82.5760 days 
Population size 11 
Standard Error of the Mean 24.8976 days 
Lower Limit (Mean – 1.96*Standard Error of the Mean) 295.2006 days 
Upper Limit (Mean + 1.96*Standard Error of the Mean) 392.7993 days 
Table 4-44: Results from 95% confidence interval calculation for biosimilar approvals in the U.S., 
without Retacrit. 
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Figure 4-25: Mean and 95% confidence interval for biosimilar approvals in the U.S., without 
Retacrit. 
 
4.3.6. Summary of Key Findings - Biosimilar Regulatory Approvals in the United States of 
America 
Based on the data analysis conducted indicate the following potential trends and findings. 
I. Durations of regulatory approval phase for biosimilars approved in the U.S does not vary 
significantly over time and, interestingly, is consistent even after  the removal of more recent 
approvals. However, as noted above, the U.S. data set is small, so this conclusion must be 
regarded as provisional. 
II. Durations of regulatory approval phase for biosimilars approved in the U.S. shows no 
statistical difference between each subsequent generation of biosimilars, with the average 
duration of regulatory approval phases remaining consistent with each subsequent 
generation. 
III. Durations of regulatory approval phase for biosimilars approved in the U.S. does not vary 
significantly between the different reference originators, but this requires additional research, 
as the data set is currently small. 
IV. As most of the data points were found to be inside or marginally outside of the 95% 
confidence interval, it is likely that most future biosimilar applications will take between 295 
to 392 days from application of aBLA to receive regulatory approval from the FDA. 
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Furthermore, the presence of biosimilar Retacrit appears to have a confounding effect on the 
analysis of the duration of regulatory phase of biosimilars over time and with the different reference 
originators. 
 
When comparing the EU EMA biosimilar approvals to U.S. FDA approvals: 
I. EMA has approved 41 unique biosimilars in a period of 15 years. corresponding to 2.7 
applications per year. FDA has approved 12 biosimilars in a period of 6.5 years, 
corresponding to 1.84 applications per year. 
II. The mean time taken for EMA approval of biosimilars is 440.29 days for biosimilar approvals 
till the 31st July 2018 and 466.50 days for biosimilar approvals till the Adjusted Cut-Off Date. 
In comparison the mean time taken for FDA approval of biosimilars is 419 days. However, 
after removing the anomaly, Retacrit, the mean duration calculated for regulatory approval in 
the U.S. is 344 days. This is 96 days faster than Europe. 
III. Europe has up to 5 generations of biosimilars and, in comparison U.S. has up to 3 
generations of biosimilars. 
IV. The EMA has approved biosimilars referencing 15 originators and, in comparison the FDA 
has approved biosimilars referencing 8 originators. 
 
4.4. Chapter Conclusion 
 The data analysis presented in this chapter investigated how passage of time, generations 
and reference originator have affected the duration of the pre-market regulatory approval phase of 
biosimilars approved in the EU and the U.S on or prior to 31st July 2018.  
 
The findings indicate that in the EU the earlier applicants and earlier generations of biosimilar 
applicants had a longer duration of regulatory approval phase. The analysis shows that in the EU, 
the durations of the regulatory approval phase for biosimilars do not seem to have been impacted 
by the reference originator. The analysis also shows that in the U.S. the durations of the regulatory 
approval phase is consistent for all approvals and the three factors, i.e. passage of time, generations 
and reference originator, do not seem to have an individually impacted on the duration of regulatory 
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approval phase of biosimilars, although the data on reference originator must be regarded as 
provisional. As the available number of biosimilar approvals in the U.S. is limited, a larger extent of 
variation due to chance differences, and may not have had the power to detect a difference is 
expected. Furthermore, in this chapter the comparison between EU biosimilar approvals and the 
U.S. biosimilar approvals was made (refer to section 4.3.6). The next chapter of this thesis discusses 
the contributions of the thesis and suggests directions for further research. 
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CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
5.1. Introduction to the Chapter 
This thesis addressed the research question whether first mover advantage (FMA) exists 
during the regulatory approval phase for first mover biosimilars commercialized in the EU and the 
U.S. (refer to Chapter 2 section 2.7 Figure 2-3). Being the first to enter a new market can be costly 
but also can be profitable53. If first movers have advantages in access to information, intellectual 
property, and subsequent gains in product line breadth, product quality and long-term market share, 
they will profit from first entry 53,64 (refer to Chapter 2 section 2.3.). However, if late entrants can 
perform better than  first movers, through a shorter regulatory approval phase, better positioning, 
branding, and/or superior technology, these firms could benefit more by entering after the first 
movers40 (refer to Chapter 2 section 2.4.).   
 
With lack of patent protection and lack of regulatory provisions that provide exclusivity periods 
for first to market biosimilars, biosimilars at present rely on market performance to recoup their 
investment. Hence, if there is no first mover advantage during the regulatory approval phase, it will 
weaken the incentives for a biosimilar developer to overcome the market entry barriers and navigate 
the challenging development process. Chapter 3 of this thesis identified ways to quantify and 
measure the duration of the regulatory approval phase for biosimilars. The trends in the time taken 
for regulatory approval phase for biosimilars approved by the EMA and FDA prior to 31st July 2018, 
were investigated. These trends were analyzed with respect to date(s) of regulatory application(s) 
(Chapter 4 sections 4.2.2. and 4.3.3.), different generations of biosimilars (Chapter 4 sections 4.2.3. 
and 4.3.3.) and reference originators (Chapter 4 sections 4.2.4. and 4.3.4.). The results of these 
analyzes were presented in Chapter 4 of this thesis. The current chapter discusses the implications 
of the research findings for first and later mover biosimilars, potential contributions of this thesis to 
the industry and policy as well as suggestions for future research.  
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5.2. Contributions of this Research 
The focus of this thesis was on biosimilars that have received regulatory approvals in the EU 
and the U.S. This section of the thesis reflects on the findings of Chapter 4 for biosimilars that have 
received regulatory approval in these two jurisdictions. 
 
5.2.1. European Union 
 In the EU, 50 biosimilars had received regulatory approval from the EMA by 31st July 2018. 
From these 50, 41 unique approvals (refer to Chapter 4 section 4.2.1.2. on unique and non-unique 
biosimilar applications) were investigated in this thesis. The data analysis discovered the following 
trends for biosimilar approvals in the EU: 
I. The durations of the regulatory approval phase for biosimilars have changed significantly 
over time (refer to Chapter 4 section 4.2.2.). 
II. The durations of regulatory approval phase show significant change with each subsequent 
generation of biosimilars, with the average duration of regulatory approval phase decreasing 
with each subsequent generation (refer to Chapter 4 section 4.2.2.). 
III. The durations of regulatory approval phase do not differ significantly between biosimilars 
referencing different originator biologics (refer to Chapter 4 section 4.2.3.). 
 
In addition, within the sample set of data used in this study, close to 60% of biosimilar 
approvals fall outside the calculated 95% confidence interval for the duration taken for biosimilar 
regulatory approvals (refer to Chapter 4 section 4.2.5.). Thus, it will be difficult to accurately predict 
the duration of the regulatory approval phase for future biosimilar applications, unless there is a 
stabilization of the regulatory process in the longer term. These findings are further discussed in the 
following sections of this chapter. 
 
5.2.1.1. Duration of Regulatory Approval Phase Has Changed Significantly Over Time 
The data analysis showed that the approval phase for biosimilars has decreased over time in 
the EU. This is in congruence with what might have been predicted based on the literature in relation 
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to both small molecule generics and originators, where maturation of the regulatory process over 
time was expected to result in expedition of regulatory phases for some classes of drugs28.  
 
5.2.1.2. Duration of Regulatory Approval Phase Decreases with each Subsequent Generation 
 The data analysis shows that the average duration of the regulatory approval phase for first 
generation biosimilars is longer than for the subsequent generations of biosimilars and that the 
average duration of regulatory approval phase decreased for each subsequent generation. This 
result provides evidence that for the early generations of biosimilars, there could in fact be a relative 
disadvantage (refer to Chapter 2 section 2.4. on first mover disadvantage). 
 
There are two potential reasons for this finding. Firstly, once a biosimilar finishes regulatory approval 
by the EMA, the data submitted by the biosimilar developers and the discussions between the EMA 
and the biosimilar developer becomes publicly available. This information can potentially assist the 
subsequent generation of biosimilars as the information related to the biosimilar application of the 
first biosimilar applicant provides information specific to biosimilar regulatory approval that the first 
mover biosimilars cannot obtain via originator regulatory approval dossiers. Such biosimilar specific 
information that becomes publicly available via first biosimilar approval include details about 
reference product selection (refer to Chapter 2 section 2.6.1.3) and the type and amount of pre-
clinical (refer to Chapter 2 section 2.6.1.4) and clinical data (refer to Chapter 2 section 2.6.1.5) that 
is deemed acceptable by the regulatory agency for regulatory approval. This disadvantage to the 
early generations of biosimilars, where the subsequent generations of biosimilar applicants profit 
from the work of a prior biosimilar applicants, is commonly known in literature as the free rider effect 
(refer to Chapter 2 section 2.4.1. on free rider effect).  
 
Secondly, EMA’s method of establishing molecule or International Non- proprietary Name 
(INN) specific guidelines usually when the first generation of biosimilars obtain regulatory approval 
may advantage the subsequent generations. This is because the first generation biosimilar would 
need to navigate a complex regulatory approval process adhering to general guidelines for 
biosimilars whilst the subsequent generations would have more specific guidelines often developed 
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by the EMA after their experience with the first-generation biosimilar applicant. In addition to free 
rider effects as above, the first generation navigating the regulatory framework shows the first 
generation of biosimilars resolving market uncertainties (refer to Chapter 2 section 2.4.3. resolution 
of market uncertainties by the first mover). 
 
5.2.1.3. Duration of Regulatory Approval does not Vary Significantly Between Biosimilars 
Referencing Different Originator Biologics 
 This finding provides evidence that, to date, the duration of the regulatory approval process 
is independent of the originator. Based on table 5-1 below, there are several different types of 
molecules that forms 15 originators referenced by biosimilars approved in the EU, investigated in 
this study. These types of molecules vary greatly in terms of molecular nature and complexity. It is 
known that more complex biologics increase the time taken for pre-clinical and clinical development 
of biosimilars28.   
# Originator INN Type of Molecule 
1 Humatrope Somatropin Peptide hormone 
2 Genotropin Somatropin Peptide hormone 
3 Eprex/Erypo Epoetin alfa Glycoprotein  
4 Neupogen Filgrastim Haematopoietic growth factors 
5 Remicade Infliximab Monoclonal antibody (mAb) 
6 Gonal-f Follitropin alfa Peptide hormone 
7 Lantus Insulin glargine Peptide hormone 
8 Enbrel Etarnacept Fusion protein 
9 Clexane Enoxaparin sodium Low molecular weight heparin 
10 Forsteo Teriparatide Peptide hormone 
11 MabThera Rituximab Monoclonal antibody (mAb) 
12 Humira Adalimumab Monoclonal antibody (mAb) 
13 Herceptin Trastuzmab Monoclonal antibody (mAb) 
14 Humalog Insulin lispro Peptide hormone 
15 Avastin Bevacizumab Monoclonal antibody (mAb) 
Table 5-1: Summary of originators referenced by biosimilars in the EU and the respective 
type of molecules 
 
In contrast, this finding shows that the complexity of the molecule may not be a contributor 
in determining the duration of the regulatory approval phase for biosimilars in the EU. This result 
also provides evidence that the nature and complexity of molecules does not influence whether there 
is first mover advantage during the regulatory approval phase for biosimilar applicants in the EU. 
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5.2.2. United States of America 
 The FDA had approved 12 biosimilar applications till 31st July 2018. In Chapter 4 of this thesis 
the duration of the regulatory approval phase for these biosimilar approvals was investigated. The 
data analysis conducted found the following trends for biosimilar approvals in the U.S.: 
I. The durations of regulatory approval phase for biosimilars approvals in the U.S do not change 
significantly over time (refer to Chapter 4 section 4.3.2.). Furthermore, with the removal of 
the very recent approvals the time taken for regulatory approval seem to be “flattening out” 
(refer to Figures 4-13 and 4-14 in Chapter 4). 
II. The durations of regulatory approval phase for biosimilars approved in the U.S. show no 
change with each subsequent generation of biosimilars, with the average duration of 
regulatory approval phases remaining consistent with each subsequent generation (refer to 
Chapter 4 section 4.3.3.).  
III. The durations of regulatory approval phase for biosimilars approved in the U.S. do not 
change significantly with the different reference originators (refer to Chapter 4 section 4.3.4.). 
 
In addition, as most of the data points were found to be inside or marginally outside of the 
95% confidence interval of 295 to 392 days, it is likely that for most future biosimilar applications to 
the FDA, the regulatory approval phase will take between 295 to 392 days (refer to Chapter 4 Section 
4.3.5). These findings are discussed in the next section of the chapter. 
 
However, as the sample size of number of biosimilar approvals in the U.S. is limited, a larger 
extent of variation due to chance differences, and may not have had the power to detect a difference 
is expected. Hence, it must be remembered that these finding must be regarded as provisional and 
could change in the next few years. 
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5.2.2.1. The Duration of Regulatory Approval Phase has not Changed Significantly Over Time 
This finding shows that the time at which a biosimilar application was filed to the FDA had 
not significantly changed the length of the regulatory approval phase. This result hence provides 
evidence that the time at which a biosimilar application is filed does not influence whether there is a  
first mover advantage during the biosimilar regulatory approval phase.  This is in contrary to the 
findings observed for biosimilar approvals in the EU (refer to Chapter 5 section 5.2.1.1) and the 
expectations based on current literature28. 
  
5.2.2.2. The Duration of Regulatory Approval Phase has not Changed with Subsequent 
Generations 
The data analysis shows that the average duration of the regulatory approval phase does not 
change significantly with each subsequent generation of sampled biosimilar applications from the 
U.S. This contrasts with the findings from the EU. The EMA developed biosimilar guidelines prior to 
the FDA, establishing the first biosimilar guideline in 2005. More than six years later, FDA issued 
three biosimilar guidelines in February 2012, which paved the pathway for biosimilar applications 
and subsequent approvals147. Since the FDA guidelines were established later than the EMA, 9 out 
of the 12 FDA biosimilars approvals included in this study received FDA approvals after the EMA 
approval151. The ability for these biosimilar developers to use both pre-market and post-market 
clinical in the EU as part of the abbreviated Biologics License Application (aBLA) to the FDA, may 
counter the first mover disadvantage seen in the EU. However, two of the more recent biosimilars 
approvals, Cyletzo and Hyrimoz received FDA approval prior to the EMA approval. Whether 
applications to the FDA first would affect the regulatory approval phase can be a research 
consideration in the future. 
 
This result provides evidence that generation to which a biosimilar application belongs to 
does not influence whether an advantage exists during the biosimilar regulatory approval phase. 
Europe has up to 5 generations of biosimilars and in comparison, the U.S. has up to 3 generations 
of biosimilars.  There are only 12 biosimilar approvals in the U.S. during this study period and only 
three generations of biosimilars with the number of biosimilars in each generation is small.  Whether 
131 
 
these findings would change with more biosimilar approvals by the FDA in the U.S. can be 
investigated in future research. 
 
5.2.2.3. The Duration of Regulatory Approval does not Vary Significantly Between Biosimilars 
Referencing Different Originator Molecules 
The data analysis demonstrated that the duration of the regulatory approval process is 
independent of the reference originators.  This is similar to the findings in the EU. Based on table 5-
2 below, there are several different types of molecules that forms 8 originators referenced by 
biosimilars approved in the U.S., investigated in this study. These types of molecules vary greatly in 
terms of molecular nature and complexity. It is known that more complex biologics increase the time 
taken for pre-clinical and clinical development of biosimilars28.  As such this result also provides 
evidence that the nature and complexity of molecules does not influence whether there is a first 
mover advantage during the biosimilar regulatory approval phase.  
# Originator INN Type of Molecule  
1 Neupogen Filgrastim Haematopoietic growth factors 
2 Remicade Infliximab Monoclonal antibody (mAb) 
3 Epogen/Procrit Epoetin alfa Glycoprotein 
4 Enbrel Etarnacept Fusion protein 
5 Humira Adalimumab Monoclonal antibody (mAb) 
6 Avastin Bevacizumab Monoclonal antibody (mAb) 
7 Herceptin Trastuzmab Monoclonal antibody (mAb) 
8 Neulasta Pegfilgrastim Haematopoietic growth factors 
Table 5-2: Summary of originator biologics referenced by biosimilars in the U.S. and the 
respective type of molecule 
 
5.2.3. Comparison of EU EMA Biosimilar Regulatory Approvals to the U.S. FDA Approvals 
5.2.3.1. Number of Biosimilar Regulatory Approvals and Rate of Approvals 
The EMA established biosimilar approval pathway 16.5 years ago (see Figure 2-3 in Chapter 
2, Section 2.7.). The EMA has since approved 41 unique biosimilars in a period of 16.5 years. This 
corresponds to 2.48 applications per year. In comparison, the FDA established biosimilar regulatory 
approval pathway 6.5 years ago (see Figure 2-3 in Chapter 2, Section 2.7.). FDA has since approved 
12 biosimilars in a period of 6.5 years, that is, 1.84 applications per year. The EMA has approved 
biosimilars referencing 15 originators and the FDA has approved biosimilars referencing 8 
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originators. Figure 5-1 shows biosimilar approvals for each year since biosimilar regulations were 
established in the EU and the U.S respectively. At present, the U.S. is behind the EMA in the total 
number of biosimilar approvals and the rate of biosimilars approvals per year. 
 
EMA established guidelines for approval of biosimilars in June 2003, whilst FDA established 
similar guidelines in February 2012 (refer to Figure 3-2 in Chapter 3, Section 3.2).  Literature 
identifies this time difference in establishing regulatory frameworks as a factor for the U.S. biosimilar 
approvals to be lagging behind the E.U.28. Whether the biosimilar approvals in the U.S. will reach 
the same numbers or rate of approvals as the EU are questions that can only be answered by future 
research. 
 
 
Figure 5-1: Number of drug approvals for each year since biosimilar regulations were established in the EU 
and the U.S. Year 1 represents the first year after the respective regulation were passed into law: 2004 for 
the EU (biosimilar regulation was formally introduced in June 2003 under Directive 2003/63/EC152) and 
2010 for the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009 (BPCIA)115. 
 
5.2.3.1. Time taken for Regulatory Approvals 
For the sampled data, the average time taken for regulatory approval was 96 days faster for 
U.S. biosimilar applications than for EU biosimilar applications (refer to Chapter 4 Section 4.3.5). It 
was discovered that 9 out of the 12 U.S. biosimilars approvals included in this study received FDA 
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approvals after the EMA approval151. The prior approvals in the EU allows biosimilar applicants to 
provide both pre-market and post-market clinical data from the EU to the FDA. In addition, both the 
FDA and the biosimilar developers can learn from the regulatory approval process taken by the EMA 
for prior biosimilar approvals in the EU. These two factors may have contributed to the observed 
difference in average time taken for regulatory approvals, as well as the consistency observed in the 
time taken for regulatory approvals (see Figures 4-13 and 4-14 in Chapter 4) and the narrow 95% 
confidence interval observed for the sample of biosimilar applications in the U.S. that was 
investigated in this study. 
 
5.3. Recommendations 
It is evident that in the case of biopharmaceuticals and their biosimilars, where the high 
technical complexity exacerbates time and cost, the balance between public good and private reward 
is not simple to achieve. The need to achieve this balance continues to influence the current policy 
and regulatory levers. Ongoing policy initiatives regarding regulation, development, approval and 
reimbursement of biosimilars will assist in surmounting the high barriers to market entry (see Chapter 
2, section 2.6.1., on Biosimilar Commercialization Challenges in the U.S. and the EU). Such policy 
initiatives are likely to influence whether the first mover biosimilar has an advantage during the 
commercialization phase, and will, in turn, influence the development of a competitive market. 
 
The next section of this chapter discusses three potential policy interventions that could 
accelerate the availability of biosimilars to the public and could have a favorable impact price. This 
discussion around recommendations on potential policy interventions aims to address the findings 
from the data analysis conducted. 
 
5.3.1. Staggered Incentive Structure to Counter Potential 1st Generation Disadvantage 
The biosimilar industry, specifically the biosimilar industry in the U.S. has often been 
compared to the small molecular generics industry. The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term 
Restoration Act of 1984153, commonly known as Hatch Waxman Act (HWA)  is considered a pivotal 
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policy intervention which assisted in accelerating the growth of the generics industry in the U.S154,155. 
HWA simultaneously drove industry growth and price reduction, lowered barriers to market entry and 
opened up the small molecule chemical drug market to generics, improving accessibility and 
affordability of these drugs for millions of people154.  Figure 5-2 shows the impact of HWA on the 
prescription drug market; in 1983 generic drugs accounted for only 3.4% of the total prescription 
drug market, but by 1984 their market share increased to 8% and continued to steadily increase in 
the ensuing years156 A key provision of the HWA was a 180-day market exclusivity period for the first 
generic that met certain set criteria117. 
 
The challenges faced by biosimilars detailed in Chapter 2 Section 2.7.1., shows that 
biosimilars face many developmental hurdles prior to market entry. Furthermore, in particular the 
first mover biosimilar applicant is likely have to navigate interpreting evolving regulatory requirements 
related to adequacy of clinical or non-clinical data in a submission, reference product selection as 
well as  IP challenges posed by originator biologic companies28.  A major relevant issue is that the 
first mover biosimilar is more likely to be subject to legal challenges by the originator firm, in order to 
delay biosimilar competition, whereas such costly legal challenges (refer to Chapter 2 section 
2.6.1.8) are less likely for later entrants per first mover disadvantage theory on free riders (refer to 
Chapter 2 section 2.4.1.) . The results from Chapter 4 of this thesis indicate that currently a first 
mover advantage does not exist during the regulatory approval phase for biosimilars. In addition, in 
Europe the data analysis showed that there is first mover disadvantage to the early generations of 
biosimilar regulatory applicants in the EU. An incentive structure for biosimilars similar to the 180-
day market exclusivity period for generics provided by the HWA could potentially counter the 
absence of a first mover advantage (indeed the existence of a generational first mover 
disadvantage).  
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Figure 5-2: Generic Share of the Prescription Market in the years prior to and post the Hatch-
Waxman Act156, 157-159. The slow growth in generic drug share in prescription market in the early 
1990s is largely attributable to the generic drug scandal that occurred in 1989, which negatively 
impacted consumers’ perception & uptake of generic drugs155. 
 
However, the generics industry in the U.S has also shown that such an incentive scheme 
that only applies to the first mover, can provide excessive leverage to the first-to-market product and 
can lead to anti-competitive behaviour160. To overcome such possible outcomes, a staggered 
incentive structure that benefits first as well as subsequent early generations of biosimilars might be 
the solution. Such a staggered incentive structure might reduce the market dominance of one 
product, accelerate the market entry of subsequent products, increase competition and lead to 
sustainable cost savings. In addition, the increased competition is likely to reduce the cost of 
biopharmaceuticals to the public.  
 
Another potential positive outcome of a staggered incentive structure is the minimization of 
possible market distortions by of “authorized-biosimilars”. In the generics market, authorized-
generics35 are generic drugs produced by originator companies, often distributed through a third 
party, and priced to compete with generics161. They keep prices artificially high, distorting the market 
and making it difficult for true generics to gain market share35. The Federal Trade Commission in the 
U.S. also reports that some originator companies use agreements not to launch authorized-generics 
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as a way to compensate would-be generic competitors, in order  to delay market entry162. Whilst, 
there are currently no examples of originator companies marketing biosimilar versions of their own 
originator biologics, originators are actively involved in the biosimilar space and there is potential for 
“authorized-biosimilars”. Increased complexity and high cost related to biopharmaceutical 
development and manufacturing means that originator companies venturing into biosimilar space 
will have a considerable advantage over new entrants. Originator companies such as Biogen Idec, 
Merck and Teva Pharmaceuticals have commenced biosimilar development programs. Further, 
Pfizer’s acquisition of Hospira, a spin off from Abbott Laboratories and one of the largest biosimilar 
and generic companies in the world 163, is an indication of the interest originator companies have in 
the biosimilar market. Furthermore, given the higher cost of entry (compared to small molecule 
generics), the biosimilar market will be likely to have fewer competitors than generics. Any policy 
changes will need to take account of the possibility of “authorized-biosimilars”, and a staggered 
incentive structure could ensure that there are incentives for both first and subsequent biosimilars to 
enter the market, with a view to maintaining the socio-economic benefits of biosimilars.  
 
 
 
5.3.2. Reimbursement  
Another policy intervention with potential to improve biosimilar uptake by the market, which 
in turn provides incentive for biosimilars developers, is to improve the flexibility in the current 
reimbursement structure. 
  
In the EU, reimbursement for biosimilars is determined by each individual member country. 
For example in Spain, France and Italy biosimilar reimbursement is set at a fixed percentage less 
than the originator pricing164. In the U.S., the reimbursement for biosimilars is governed by the 
Physician Fee Schedule (PFS) Guideline by the Centres of Medicare and Medicaid Services165. The 
PFS provides Medicare Part B payment guidance for biosimilars165. According to the original 
guideline, all biosimilars referencing an originator is given a Healthcare Common Procedure Coding 
System (HCPCS) code. Reimbursement for biosimilars is then to be carried out at the average sales 
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price of all biosimilars marketed in the U.S. referencing a particular originator (or one HCPCS code), 
plus an additional 6% of the average sales price of the reference originator product166. When a first 
generation biosimilar enters the market and average sales price for the biosimilar is not yet 
established, the guideline stipulates the use of the  wholesale acquisition cost to calculate the 
Medicare  reimbursement in place of the average sales price166. However, in 2018 the CMS 
requested comments on the current PFS rule on biosimilar reimbursement to understand how the 
reimbursement structure has impacted market experience of biosimilars in the U.S. Based on strong 
response from a wide range of stakeholders, the CMS has decided to implement a guideline where 
each biosimilar (regardless of the reference originator) is provided with a unique HCPCS code and 
hence reimbursement structure specific to that biosimilar166.  This detailed guideline is yet to be 
published166. Till such guideline is published, the current biosimilar reimbursement structure in the 
U.S. remains as before and is determined by two factors; average sales price of biosimilars 
referencing an originator and the average sales price of the reference biologic.  
 
For biosimilar developers, one potential disincentive that stems from the determination of 
reimbursement based on the price of the originator is where originator companies reduce their pricing 
to be equal to, or less than, the cost price of a biosimilar. Such behaviour has already been evident 
in the EU where originator pricing of erythropoietin was lowered even prior to patent expiry in 
anticipation of biosimilar competition31. Such competition and price reduction can initially be 
advantageous to public health, as it reduces the cost of biopharmaceuticals. However, in the long 
term it can be disadvantageous, as undue decrease in price of originators will affect reimbursement 
and may deter and reduce the number of biosimilar market entrants. The generics industry has 
shown that an increase in the number of market entrants has reduced the cost of these drugs160. For 
example, a study conducted by the FDA on the small molecular generics industry found that, on 
average, the price of the first generic is only slightly less than the originator, however the presence 
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of second generic product in the market reduces the average price to nearly half the originator 
price81.  
 
A reimbursement system commensurate with the differences between generics and 
biosimilars, and with the variations in complexity of the regulatory approval process for each product 
may be necessary for biosimilars to achieve systemic benefits. Furthermore, an appropriate 
reimbursement structure for biosimilars will play an integral role in reducing the cost of biologics by 
encouraging price competition among originator biologics and biosimilars and improving market 
uptake. 
 
5.3.3. Promoting Uptake 
The uptake of biosimilars in Europe has shown bimodal characteristics, with initial adoption 
for new patients, followed by substitution with interchangeable biosimilars in existing patients  once 
the interchangeability has been formally allowed31. Based on the European experience, it has been 
asserted that the biosimilar market in the U.S. is likely to be bimodal as well31. However, there is  
increasing resistance from physicians to change their prescribing practice in relation to biosimilars, 
especially in the U.S.33. Medical practitioners will resist substitution of biosimilars if they are not 
confident that the biosimilars will be as efficacious or if there is a concern that the biosimilar might 
have different pharmacokinetics or side-effects. Such resistance could persist 
even after interchangeability has been formally sanctioned by regulatory bodies such as the FDA 
and the EMA. This resistance from physicians is not a surprise, given that they are risk averse and 
guided by the precept “primum non nocere”. Given the resistance from physicians to prescribe 
biosimilars, it is expected that biosimilars will be treated as therapeutic alternatives rather than 
therapeutic equivalents17.  
 
To improve biosimilar uptake by the market and to incentivize biosimilars developers, policy 
interventions to improve the flexibility of the current reimbursement structure must be looked at. A 
reimbursement system that accounts for the differences between the variations in complexity of the 
regulatory approval process for each class of biosimilar product would be necessary for biosimilars 
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to achieve the anticipated systemic benefits. An appropriate reimbursement structure for biosimilars 
could play an integral role in reducing the cost of biologics by encouraging price competition among 
biopharmaceuticals and improving market uptake. For example, Germany has established a 
reference price system and budget ceilings and practice specific prescription targets for physicians 
to encourage uptake of less expensive “follow-on” drugs167. As per the reference price system, 
patients in Germany have to bear a certain percentage of the difference in cost between the drug 
they opt for and the reference price167. In addition, if the physicians exceed their prescribing target 
and budget they are notified, with repayment of excess enforceable167. These measures have led to 
improved biosimilar uptake and price competition in Germany, as seen in the case of Sandoz 
increasing the discount of its Epoetin biosimilar Binocrit from 15% to 33%, through which it captured 
30% market share119. Even in the generics market in the U.S. subsequent to the Hatch Waxman Act, 
the uptake of generics was attributed to state specific legislation that made it mandatory for 
pharmacists to switch prescriptions to the lowest priced interchangeable alternatives159.  
 
5.4. Future Research Directions 
The following possibilities for future research directions were identified as during this study: 
• 9 of 12 biosimilar applications to the FDA in this study were biosimilars that have received 
prior approvals from the EMA. However, two recent applications were filed first to the FDA. 
There is potential to conduct future research to identify whether the trend observed in filing 
to the EMA first is changing and how such a change might affect the duration of regulatory 
approval phase for biosimilars (refer to Chapter 5 section 5.2.2.2). 
• In this study, it was discovered that the first generation of biosimilars in both U.S. and EU did 
not benefit from a first mover advantage during the regulatory approval phase. In addition, a 
first mover disadvantage was discovered for the first generation of biosimilars in Europe. 
Europe has up to 5 generations of biosimilars for some originators.  In comparison, the U.S. 
to date has up to 3 generations of biosimilars. There is a need for future research to 
investigate whether these findings will change with more biosimilar approvals in the U.S. 
(refer to Chapter 5 section 5.2.2.2). 
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• This study discovered that there is first mover disadvantage during the regulatory approval 
phase for biosimilars (refer to Chapter 5 section 5.2.2.2) and there is the need for policy and 
regulatory interventions to improve biosimilar market entry (refer to Chapter 5 section 5.3). 
There is an opportunity for future research to monitor whether such policy and regulatory 
interventions take place and to examine the effect of such interventions on the biosimilar 
industry. 
• For this study period, in comparison to the EU the U.S. lags in number and rate of biosimilar 
approvals. Whether the biosimilar approvals in the U.S. eventually reach the same number 
as the EU is an open question. If there are increases in biosimilar uptake, it will be important 
to examine the legislative and other factors that are associated with this change (see Chapter 
5 section 5.3). 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 2-1: Widely Used Definitions for First Mover 
Definition 
“The first appearance of a brand in a distinct new product category”51 
“The first entrant in a new market”43 
“First product to enter the market, earliest surviving brand”44 
”Pioneers as producing a new product, using a new process or entering a new market”42 
“Inventor is the firm(s) that develops patents or important technologies in a new product category. 
Product pioneer is the first firm to develop a working model or sample in a new product category  
Market pioneer is the first firm to sell in a new product category Product category is a group of close 
substitutes such that consumers consider the products substitutable and distinct from those in 
another category”53 
“A pioneer or “first-mover” as “a firm that is among the first three firms to introduce a new 
product/brand into its primary served markets.” 45 
Table A2-1: First mover definitions widely used in literature 
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Appendix 3-1: Summary of the Data Points Collected 
Data Points Collected Source Reason for Data Collected 
Europe - Overall 
1 No of biosimilars approved from 
the point of establishment of 
regulatory framework 
EMA website, 
Company press 
releases 
To analyze the market entry of 
biosimilars since regulatory 
intervention. 
Forms a basis of all other data 
points collected. 
2 Biosimilar Applicant / Marketing 
Authorization Holder 
EMA Website – 
EPAR public 
assessment report 
Provides the name of the 
company applying for biosimilar 
approval from the EMA 
3 Biosimilar Agency Product 
number 
EMA Website  Forms a basis of all other data 
points collected. 
4 Originator Product EMA Website – 
EPAR public 
assessment report 
Forms a basis of all other data 
points collected. 
5 Originator Marketing 
Authorization Holder 
EMA Website – 
EPAR public 
assessment report 
Forms a basis of all other data 
points collected. 
Europe – Regulatory Approval data 
1 Biosimilar EU Market 
Authorization Date 
EMA Website – 
EPAR public 
assessment report 
Provides the concluding date of 
regulatory approval 
Required to measure the time 
taken for regulatory approval 
2 Biosimilar Application Date to the 
EMA 
EMA Website – 
EPAR public 
assessment 
documents report 
Provides the date in which the 
sponsor organization has 
applied for regulatory approval   
Required to measure the time 
taken for regulatory approval 
3 Biosimilar Approved Indications – 
both type and number 
EMA Website – 
EPAR public 
assessment report 
Provides an overview to the 
actual uses of the biosimilars  
Provides information to whether 
all biosimilars which the same 
International Nonproprietary 
Name (INN) are approved for 
the same type and number of 
indications 
This also provides a 
measurement as to whether 
biosimilars apply for the same 
number and type of indications 
as the originator 
4 Biosimilar Regulatory Procedure 
start date 
EMA Website – 
EPAR public 
assessment report  
Provides a measurement as to 
the length of time taken by the 
EMA to commence regulatory 
proceedings. 
This will also provide a good 
measurement to determine 
whether the time taken for 
regulatory approval process 
decreases as the regulatory 
framework matures; and 
whether this is related to 
increase in knowledge and 
capabilities within the EMA.  
143 
 
Data Points Collected Source Reason for Data Collected 
5 Biosimilar Regulatory milestones 
as applicable: 
- Rapporteur’s and Co-
Rapporteur’s first 
Assessment Report 
- First set of consolidated 
questions from the CHMP 
- Submission of responses 
from the applicants to the 
first set of questions from 
the CHMP 
- Second set of consolidated 
questions from the CHMP 
- Submission of responses 
from the applicants to the 
second set of questions 
from the CHMP 
- Third set of consolidated 
questions from the CHMP 
- Submission of responses 
from the applicants to the 
third set of questions from 
the CHMP 
- Oral presentations by the 
applicant 
- CHMP positive opinion 
EMA Website – 
EPAR public 
assessment report 
To map the regulatory timeline 
Provides an indication as to 
which steps took the most 
amount of time. 
Provides a measurement as to 
whether number of steps taken 
during the regulatory approval 
period has decreased as 
overtime as the regulatory 
framework matures 
 
 
6 Originator Marketing 
Authorization Date 
EMA Website – 
EPAR public 
assessment report 
To measure the time taken for 
biosimilar regulatory approval 
7 Originator Approved Indications – 
both type and number 
EMA Website – 
EPAR public 
assessment report 
Provides a measurement as to 
whether biosimilars apply for the 
same number and type of 
indications as the originator 
Europe – Other Data Points 
1 Delays in Market Entry due to 
patent litigation 
Company Press 
Releases, 
Secondary news 
sources 
Provides a measurement as to 
whether there is first mover 
advantage or disadvantage 
USA- Overall 
1 No of biosimilars approved from 
the point of establishment of 
regulatory framework 
FDA website – 
Drugs@FDA, 
Company press 
releases 
To analyze the market entry of 
biosimilars since regulatory 
intervention. 
Forms a basis of all other data 
points collected. 
2 Biosimilar Applicant  FDA website – 
Drugs@FDA, 
Company press 
releases 
Provides the name of the 
company applying for biosimilar 
approval from the EMA 
3 Biologics License Application 
Number (BLA #) 
FDA website – 
Drugs@FDA 
Forms a basis of all other data 
points collected. 
4 Originator Product  FDA website – 
Drugs@FDA 
Forms a basis of all other data 
points collected. 
5 Originator BLA # FDA website – 
Drugs@FDA 
Forms a basis of all other data 
points collected. 
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Data Points Collected Source Reason for Data Collected 
4 Originator Marketing 
Authorization Holder 
FDA website – 
Drugs@FDA, 
Company press 
releases, Literature 
Forms a basis of all other data 
points collected. 
USA– Regulatory Approval data 
1 Biosimilar BLA approval date FDA website – 
Drugs@FDA BLA 
Provides the concluding date of 
regulatory approval 
Required to measure the time 
taken for regulatory approval 
2 Biosimilar Application Date to the 
FDA 
FDA website – 
Drugs@FDA BLA 
Provides the date in which the 
sponsor organization has 
applied for regulatory approval   
Required to measure the time 
taken for regulatory approval 
3 Biosimilar Approved Indications – 
both type and number 
FDA website – 
Drugs@FDA BLA 
Provides an overview to the 
actual uses of the biosimilars  
Provides information to whether 
all biosimilars which the same 
International Nonproprietary 
Name (INN) are approved for 
the same type and number of 
indications 
This also provides a 
measurement as to whether 
biosimilars apply for the same 
number and type of indications 
as the originator 
6 Originator Marketing 
Authorization Date 
FDA website – 
Drugs@FDA BLA 
To measure the time taken for 
biosimilar regulatory approval 
7 Originator Approved Indications – 
both type and number 
FDA website – 
Drugs@FDA BLA 
Provides a measurement as to 
whether biosimilars apply for the 
same number and type of 
indications as the originator 
USA – Other Data Points 
1 Delays in Market Entry due to 
patent litigation 
Company Press 
Releases, 
Secondary news 
sources 
Provides a measurement as to 
whether there is first mover 
advantage or disadvantage 
2 USA generics approved via 
505(b) pathway that were approved 
as biosimilars in the USA 
FDA website – 
Drugs@FDA BLA, 
Literature  
To see how alternate regulatory 
pathways have affected the 
commercialization landscape 
Table A3-1: Summary of the data points collected for the current research study 
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Appendix 4-1: List of biosimilar application filed to the EMA prior to 31st July 2018 and not 
approved during this study period ending on 31st July 2018. 
Biosimilar applications filed to the EMA prior to 31st July 2018, that are being reviewed and yet to 
receive regulatory approval143.  
Biosimilar INN Pending Applications 
Adalimumab 2 
Bevacizumab 1 
Etanercept 1 
Pegfilgrastim 8 
Rituximab 1 
Trastuzumab 1 
Total 14 
Table A4-1: List of biosimilar application filed to the EMA prior to 31st July 2018 and not approved 
during this study period ending on 31st July 2018. 
 
Note: It is important to note that whether these 14 biosimilar applications are unique or non-unique 
(unique and non-unique biosimilar applications are defined in Chapter 4 Section 4.2.1.2 of this thesis) 
is unknown. 
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